



German Army Office  
Division I – Army Development  
Division II – Army Training

# Preliminary Basics

## for the Role of

## Land Forces in

# Counterinsurgency



Cologne, June 2010

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## Foreword

The term “counterinsurgency” (COIN) is an emotive subject in Germany. It is generally accepted within military circles that COIN is an interagency, long-term strategy to stabilise a crises region. In this context fighting against insurgents is just a small part of the holistic approach of COIN. Being aware that COIN can not be achieved successfully by military means alone, it is a fundamental requirement to find a common sense and a common use of terms with all civil actors involved.

However, having acknowledged an Insurgency to be a group or movement or as an irregular activity, conducted by insurgents, most civil actors tend to associate the term counterinsurgency with the combat operations against those groups. As a result they do not see themselves as being involved in this fight. For that, especially in Germany, the term COIN has been the subject of much controversy.

Germany has resolved this challenge with two steps. First, in national discussions, the term COIN was replaced by the paraphrase “establishing security and state order in crises areas” (Herstellung von Sicherheit und staatlicher Ordnung in Krisengebieten). Secondly, Germany has redefined the term insurgency as the “process of destabilisation caused by political, economic and/or social grievances, which affects both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the governmental system; this process is exacerbated by insurgent activity”. This definition – in contrast to the understanding of insurgency as a group or movement or as an activity – focusses on the real challenge in COIN-missions and leads automatically to a much clearer understanding of COIN. It must be a main aim to enable our civilian co-actors in theatre to accept the COIN-approach as a foundation for fruitful cooperation.

The present document does not constitute a directive. It is meant to convey information, stimulate reflection on the topic and provide points for discussions. It describes the role of land forces at the tactical level, addresses the divisions of capability development and instruction/training at Army schools and training centres, and follows international and national basic concepts currently under development<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> “Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) – AJP-3.4.4”, “Konzeptionelle Grundvorstellungen zum militärischen Beitrag zur Herstellung von Sicherheit und staatlicher Ordnung in Krisengebieten” (Basic Conceptual Guidelines for the Military Contribution to Establishing Security and State Order in Crisis Areas) and “Joint Operational Guidelines 01/04 Counterinsurgency (COIN)”.

The document is divided into three parts:

- Part A provides the basic conceptual framework as needed to give a better understanding of the broader context. It specifically describes the overall interagency approach to COIN.
- Part B shifts the focus to the military component of the overall task described previously.
- Part C contains some guiding principles to stimulate discussions as well as a list of abbreviations and important reference documents.

The key messages of the “Preliminary Basics for the Role of the Land Forces in COIN“ are:

- An insurgency can not be countered by military means alone.
- Establishing security and state order is a long-term, interagency and usually multinational strategy (no military operation) in which the government of the country affected by insurgency has the lead while the other nations and international organisations perform a supporting role.
- The military’s contribution to implementing this strategy is, in principle, a cross-service support task for the Bundeswehr.
- The general approach to describing the role of the land forces is through the Triumvirate of CLEAR – HOLD – BUILD.

This document specifies the tasks to be performed by the land forces in support of COIN. All these tasks are mentioned in the Army Regulation (HDv) 100/100 – however, this document deliberately assumes a different systematic approach to emphasise the individual tasks particularly relevant to COIN. As a result, it is more in line with the “Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) – AJP-3.4.4” currently under development, which will be useful for the dialogue with Allies.

The “Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in COIN” will be adapted once the previously mentioned international and national basic concepts are available. By the same token, Army Office Section I 1 (1), bearing overall responsibility for this document, welcomes any suggestions for improvement. In the fullness of time this document will be superseded by the production of command and control regulations for the Arms and Services.

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# Contents

## **Part A - Understanding the Overall Context**

<b>1. Insurgency and Insurgents .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Definition .....	1
1.2 The root causes of insurgency .....	1
1.3 Characteristics of INS .....	1
1.4 Means of destabilisation .....	1
1.5 Possible INS weak points .....	2
1.6 Conclusions .....	2
<b>2. Establishing security and state order in crisis areas .....</b>	<b>3</b>
2.1 Definition .....	3
2.2. Characteristics .....	3
2.3 Support by international actors .....	3
2.4 The role of armed forces .....	4
2.5 The significance of the information environment .....	4
2.6. Summary .....	5

## **Part B – The Military Role in Establishing Security and State Order in crises areas**

<b>3. Principles of the military role in establishing security and state order.....</b>	<b>7</b>
3.1 Principles and overview .....	7
3.2 CLEAR .....	8
3.3 HOLD .....	8
3.4 BUILD .....	9
3.5 What is SHAPE? .....	9
3.6. Summary .....	10
<b>4. Military operations and measures .....</b>	<b>11</b>
4.1 Enabling/supporting measures .....	11
4.2 Eliminating a threat .....	13
4.3 Creating a safe and secure environment.....	15
4.4 Consolidating a safe and secure environment .....	16
<b>5. Tactical tasks.....</b>	<b>19</b>
5.1 General tasks during land operations .....	19
5.2 Combat tasks .....	21
5.3 Control tasks .....	21
5.4 Consolidating .....	22
5.5 Other tasks .....	22
<b>6. Contributions and training provided by the forces.....</b>	<b>23</b>
6.1 Land forces in general.....	23
6.2 Contributions by land forces .....	24
6.3 Contributions made by Special Forces.....	44
6.4 Contributions made by Air Forces .....	44
6.5 Contributions by Naval Forces.....	47

## **Part C – Annex**

C1 Guiding principles on the conduct of military measures to establishing security and state order .....	48
C2 List of abbreviations .....	49
C3 Reference documents and recommended reading .....	51

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# Part **A**

## Understanding the Overall Context

### 1. Insurgency and Insurgents

#### 1.1 Definition

For the purpose of this document, **insurgency**<sup>2</sup> is the process of destabilisation caused by political, economic and/or social grievances, which affects both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the governmental system; this process is exacerbated by insurgent activity.

For the purpose of this document, an **insurgent (INS)** is a person carrying out or supporting irregular activities as part of insurgency. INS are usually members of a group or supporters of a movement; although their motives usually differ, they are united in the aim of extending or preserving the state of instability.

#### 1.2 The root causes of insurgency

The wide range and scope of insurgent activity make it very hard to give a single general description. There is often a combination of causes that lead to insurgency, such as poverty, unemployment, a poor level of education, ethnic, social, political or religious prejudice, conflicts or extremist tendencies but also inner-governmental tensions and irregularities or wars between states. It is thus primarily social, economic and political grievances that make parts of the population think that the government lacks the ability or legitimacy to establish or preserve state order and/or to provide the population with basic supplies and services. As a result, the government will be at risk of losing its legitimacy and effectiveness as law enforcement authority or - if it has lost them already - it will eventually lapse into chaos and anarchy.

It is against this background that INS are given the opportunity and motivation for armed struggle, which further accelerates the destabilisation process outlined above.

#### 1.3 Characteristics of INS

INS are intent on destabilising state structures or preventing their establishment. Their motives may be of materialistic, ethnic, religious, political, national-separatist or spiritual nature. These main motives may be used as an excuse to justify violence, legitimise the insurgent organisation's claim to leadership and the leadership itself, and to mobilise supporters. INS may also infiltrate from abroad, pursuing completely different goals that are not related to the situation in the country concerned.

INS are often difficult to identify as they mingle with the population and/or receive support from parts thereof. They usually do not feel bound by international humanitarian law or national law. Besides, complying with universal international law and human rights may be a closed book to them. Nevertheless, INS are bound by their own values and standards, which are often linked to customs that are observed unconditionally, sometimes ignoring the consequences to life and limb, which strikes us as outlandish.

To realise their interests and achieve their intentions and goals, either directly or at least indirectly, INS are open to all potential courses of action, including operations in the information environment.

Although their organisational structure must be analysed on a case-by-case basis, the majority of INS organisations are characterised by a small number of authoritarian, charismatic leaders among whom tensions and rivalries may occur. INS organisations are rarely homogeneous. Every INS organisation needs material resources. In many cases, financial support comes from external organisations or individuals, often even from foreign states. The resulting dependencies may lead to internal conflicts and reveal moral controversies within the INS organisation.

#### 1.4 Means of destabilisation

Usually INS neither have the resources nor the will to take rapid and direct action against a state and its allies by military means. But they do have a wide range of means of destabilising state structures.

INS often employ covert and / or irregular tactics, even at the political level, with the objective of undermining the population's loyalty to the state and gaining support for their own cause.

For this purpose, they may use propaganda to directly address the population, discredit the government and draw a positive image of themselves. Whilst at the same time, however, they may also terrorise the population to intimidate and subjugate it.

<sup>2</sup> These definitions result from the national comments on the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) - AJP-3.4.4 - Ratification Draft 1 dated 29 January 2010. They are of preliminary character until adopted by the Bundeswehr Terminology Committee.

By acts of sabotage and attacks and by taking hostages, INS expose the inability and weakness of the government and demonstrate their own ability to act. Their motive for this is not so much to inflict objective material losses on the state but to spread fear and chaos among the population and office holders. This effect is subsequently magnified by media coverage and propaganda.

International actors, too, become a target for INS attacks for their support of government authorities (cf. Chapter 2.3). From the INS point of view, the fact that the populace has no emotional ties with the international actors and the resulting possibility to discriminate against them as enemies, spies, occupying forces etc. often favour the subsequent exploitation of media and propaganda purposes.

If the maintenance of state structures actually depends on the presence of international security forces, INS will probably seek to undermine the latter's sustainability. Since the sustainability of democratically authorised forces hinges particularly on the approval of the people in their home countries, their population may itself become a target group for INS, i.e.

- indirectly by deliberately causing losses on the part of the forces employed, or
- directly by threatening to commit or actually committing terrorist attacks on the sending nation itself.

INS will therefore always seek to influence public opinion in the sending nations by leveraging the media.

### **1.5 Possible INS weak points**

The increasing use of force is often (not always) in conflict with the values represented by INS. It jeopardises the bond of trust between INS and the local population.

Information activities<sup>3</sup> may help increase or create this awareness among the population and thus isolate INS in the long term.

By revealing their material dependencies, INS may be discredited amongst the population.

The consistent channelling of funds or freezing of assets and the curbing of arms smuggling may impair INS capability of action.

Deliberately exacerbating factional and power struggles between rival INS groups may create insecurity and incapacity among INS.

The involvement of INS in organised crime often contradicts the values and moral standards claimed by INS. If this fact is conveyed to the population, the position of INS will be weakened.

### **1.6 Conclusions**

- INS are a symptom of insurgency and not the cause.
- INS activities in their entirety are primarily aimed at producing effects in the information environment; causing objective material losses is usually of secondary importance.
- The relation between the state and the INS organisation is one marked by rivalry. INS feel less bound by legal and ethnic constraints while the state and its allies mostly have better resources.
- Establishing security and state order requires to successfully fight the root causes of an insurgency, primarily by civilian means.
- It is the population and its attitude that decide whether insurgency will prevail. Consequently, analysing the situation in the information environment is key to the planning of counterinsurgency activities.
- International actors operating against INS themselves or merely against INS objectives, i.e. actors seeking to establish security and state order, must prepare to face considerable threat posed by irregular forces conducting covert operations.

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<sup>3</sup> Information activities are measures intended to produce a particular effect on information and/or information systems (e.g. individuals, organisational structures, processes).

## **2. Establishing security and state order in crisis areas**

### **2.1 Definition**

For the purpose of this document, **establishing security and state order in crisis areas** is the entirety of political, economic, social, legal, executive and psychological measures taken by civilian actors<sup>4</sup> and / or military forces to eliminate the causes of an insurgency.<sup>5</sup>

### **2.2. Characteristics**

Historically, operations against insurgencies were often understood as the fight against INS (counterinsurgency or counterterrorist operations, translated into German as Aufstands- und Bandenbekämpfung), which is a one-dimensional approach. Ignoring the actual causes of conflict usually led to cycles of violence and counter-violence and not to a viable and sustainable solution to the problem.

Instead, the establishment of security and state order is seen today as a comprehensive, interagency, medium or long-term strategy aimed at sustaining or rebuilding the population's confidence in the state system and at improving its living conditions. This means above all to satisfy its basic needs (food, clothing, security).

Countering an insurgency requires establishing and maintaining public security. This includes reliably protecting the population from attacks and assaults by INS and, in addition, establishing and/or strengthening functioning state institutions that are recognised and respected by local population.

In parallel with working on the issue of public security it is necessary to eliminate the socio-economic causes of insurgency, for example, by launching education and employment programmes, activities for infrastructure and economic development, job-creation measures or anti-corruption initiatives.

This may also be aimed at minimising and/or eliminating the existing or potential factors of discontent<sup>6</sup> to remove the breeding ground for insurgency. Causes of discontent are insufficient

- food supplies,
- water supply, waste water disposal, hygiene,
- health care,
- housing (protection from the weather),
- energy supplies
- security (protection from violence).

This shows that the military component in establishing security and state order is but *one* tool to be used together with other "civilian" instruments. It is only in a comprehensive, interagency approach that the root cause(s) of insurgencies can be tackled (see Figure 1). Establishing security and state order is primarily the responsibility of nonmilitary actors and organisations.



### **2.3 Support by international actors**

In crisis areas the states themselves are often incapable of countering the socio-economic causes and the threats posed by INS since they neither have sufficient resources nor effective, well-organised state institutions. In this case, the state concerned may request support from the United Nations or other organisations and/or individual states.

<sup>4</sup> Civilian actors as defined in the Subconcept for Civil-Military Cooperation in the Bundeswehr (TK ZMZBw) are governmental and nongovernmental organisations on the one hand, and the population, state structures and relevant groups on the other.

<sup>5</sup> This definition results from the national comments on the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) - AJP-3.4.4 - Ratification Draft 1, dated 29 January 2010. It shall be preliminary until adopted by the Bundeswehr Terminology Committee.

<sup>6</sup> Factors of discontent are categories derived from "International Humanitarian Law on the Protection of Civilians in Times of War and on the Protection of the Victims of Armed Conflicts" (Geneva Conventions), which describe basic supplies and services provided to the population. Guaranteeing/reaching the local minimum standards in these categories is a matter of priority.

The sending nations will provide support by offering advice and guidance to shape the strategy for establishing security and state order and will then implement this strategy in cooperation with the authorities of the state in question. But they will only act on a temporary basis and on behalf of the state concerned and hand over responsibility as soon as possible. Wherever possible, international actors should confine themselves to a supporting role, helping the people to help themselves. Excessive direct assistance and reconstruction aid will create a dependency that is counter-productive and contrary to building confidence between the population and the government. Encouraging the local people to take the initiative and helping them to successfully implement their own projects will not only improve their self-confidence and trust in the government and its organisations but also raise the Acceptance of foreign actors in the country.



On no account must international actors – be they civilian or military – assume the attitude of an occupying force. They often have a cultural background that is completely different from the customs, values and standards in the country concerned. Establishing security and state order will, however, be particularly effective if international actors adopt a policy that is in line with the local customs and standards and therefore likely to create consensus. For this reason, they must have a high level of cultural awareness. Decision makers, in particular, need advice on cultural matters tailored to the special features of the country of deployment.

One major challenge connected with this is consistent and coordinated multinational cooperation between the international actors and the local authorities.

Much needed coordination may be complicated by the fact that international actors are considerably restricted in their actions by the national requirements of the sending nations.

#### **2.4 The role of armed forces**

Some of the tasks connected with the establishment of security and state order can only be performed by armed forces with special capabilities and equipment needed for this purpose. Among these tasks are, to varying degrees, the collection of information, the establishment and maintenance of public order, and the protection of the population, governmental institutions and critical infrastructure.

Effective protection cannot be given by adopting a passive wait-and-see strategy. On the contrary, the armed forces must be proactive based on sound analysis, elimination of the threat and, where necessary, deter it by a show of force.

Basically, this is a task for local police forces. If they are not available or lack the required capabilities, armed forces will be employed. A high level of INS threat or acute shortcoming of the local police may result in armed forces being mainly or even exclusively employed for a limited time.

The military role in establishing security and state order (Figure 2) generally includes the following measures:

- Eliminate a threat
- Create a safe and secure environment
- Consolidate the safe and secure environment
- Carry out enabling/supporting measures

If the host countries armed forces are not strong enough, the state may request international assistance or support as specified under Chapter 2.3. The potential commitment of German armed forces in support of establishing security and state order in the country of deployment is described in Part B of this document.

#### **2.5 The significance of the information environment**

The attitude and demeanour of the population are key to establishing security and state order. What is of crucial importance in this regard is the population's perception of INS and at the same time its perception of government actors and their supporters.

The strategic significance of the information environment, especially with regard to producing regional and global strategic effects, encourages INS to concentrate their efforts in this field to compensate for their inferiority in other areas.

Transparency, media coverage and political processes help INS reach their goals. They feel less bound by restrictions in their choice of means than the actors in the country of deployment and their allies who follow constitutional law. Actual or even alleged misconduct of government and international actors and undesired side effects of military and police measures (civilian casualties, violation of cultural norms and values) but also activities of INS themselves are exploited for their effects in the information environment to influence, if possible, all persons in the country of deployment, in the sending nations and elsewhere. INS have recognised the potential of the information environment and use it to their benefit. They capitalise on the fact that international forces on operations are exposed to permanent media coverage. In contrast to the large number of positive events, misconduct of the chain of command and negative side effects of the conduct of operations will rapidly trigger global feedback. This may have a negative impact on the acceptance of the use of military means - both in the country of employment and in the sending nations of international actors.

All efforts to establish security and state order must therefore be planned and implemented against the background of how they might be perceived by the public. The attitude and demeanour of the population can be influenced by military information activities and civilian public relations work. Emphasising positive events and developments is a first step to stabilise a population traumatised by violence and terror. Although this cannot make up for the absence of public security and economic rebound nor for the non-satisfaction of primary and secondary needs, it may reinforce positive developments and alleviate negative effects. Viewed as such, information activities and public relations work are key to establishing security and state order. This includes gearing civilian and above all military activities towards the effect they have in the information environment. At the same time, it is crucial to completely deny the effective use of information by INS. In this context, however, the rights to freedom of opinion and freedom of the press must be observed.

## **2.6. Summary**

- Establishing security and state order is primarily a civilian responsibility which is aimed at maintaining, restoring and establishing a stable state system in the long run.
- This requires above all to provide a safe and secure environment focused on giving the people a subjective sense of security. Military forces can make a contribution to this goal.
- The key to success in establishing security and state order is to implement a multinational, interagency information strategy and consistently gear all activities towards the desired effect to be achieved in the information environment.
- The long-term goal is to improve the economic and social conditions, e.g. by raising the level of education, creating new jobs, providing incentives for economic growth, improving the infrastructure or developing an appropriate political culture based on consensus.
- The short-term goal is to carry out measures that produce an immediate visible effect for the population, i.e. measures that create a palpable difference in their living conditions such as the provision of emergency accommodation, clothing and sufficient food.
- With the threat inherent to INS, establishing security and state order may require active and offensive measures to counter INS in order to prevent or impede them from taking violent action.
- If a state has not enough forces and assets available to counter an insurgency it may request assistance from the international community or from individual states and organisations. In any such case action taken to establish security and state order must be aimed at stabilising state structures and laying the foundation for the rule of law, enabling the state to take control of its own affairs.




Figure 1 – Interagency approach to establishing security and state order in crisis areas.




Figure 2 – Military component as an integral part of the interagency approach

# Part **B**

## The Military Role in Establishing Security and State Order

### 3. Principles of the military role in establishing security and state order

#### 3.1 Principles and overview

The military role in establishing security and state order in crisis areas involves an interagency strategy which must be planned and implemented by the Armed Forces as a whole, at multinational level and, as a matter of principle, in cooperation or with the approval of the responsible local security forces.

For the purpose of restoring governmental power in the country of deployment it is crucial to closely cooperate with local security forces (police, armed forces, intelligence community). Depending on their level of readiness, the security forces must be increasingly integrated into operations and ultimately take over responsibility in its entirety (e.g. partnering<sup>7</sup>). This is an indispensable prerequisite for successfully concluding the military deployment which is not to be confused with the successful completion of *all* measures taken in support of establishing security and state order in crisis areas since these measures must continue even after our own forces have terminated their military commitment. In this respect, the withdrawal of own forces from the country of deployment is but one part of the objective in the process of establishing security and state order in crisis areas.

The key to success in establishing security and state order with regard to the military role in this process is the population and/or its subjective perception of the situation. Analysing the needs of the population against its cultural background is thus of great importance.

The focus of all military measures is to uphold or build and enhance the population's confidence in the security forces and/or governmental structures.

This means that the military commitment is not primarily aimed at achieving a tactical success against INS. The intended effect of any action must follow the subjective perception among the population, which must be the prime measure of its worth. Whatever channels of communication are available must utilised for this purpose. In this context, information operations have an important function. The aim of any action is to gain and

maintain the support of the local population. For this purpose, it is crucial to effectively implement the protection of the population who must feel that the security forces exercise and live up to their responsibility for the people. This requires strong and sustained presence throughout the area, geared to personal contacts with the population even if this increases the risk for friendly forces at least temporarily. This presence is usually ensured by smaller, independent units widely dispersed in the area and tailored to the demands of the given situation/mission.



The leaders of these mixed subunits (platoon or patrol leaders) must have the equipment and the skills to exploit the entire range of means and capabilities available and integrate them into current operations. Besides they must know how to conduct talks for the purpose of collecting information.

With the subunits operating independently, every soldier must be prepared to take quick decisions with far-reaching consequences that go beyond his scope of responsibility.

As a result, there is a need for cultural awareness and responsible action at all levels and for the consistent application of the principle of mission command. Depending on their responsibilities, the soldiers must be familiar with and understand the operational environment, this means the cultural, economic, social and political background.

Ultimately, however, the people's security can only be guaranteed if the forces are determined to provide lasting protection from attacks by INS. This may require to weigh the demands of protection of the population against those of force protection.

One particular feature of the military role in establishing security and state order is that overall success cannot be achieved at one crucial point but depends on the overall impact of individual successes and failures at local level.

This underlines the importance of small, sometimes dismounted units and subunits.

<sup>7</sup> See AJP-3.4.4 (RD2), No. 0580.

For the purpose of establishing security and state order in crisis areas military leaders will task their subordinates to take the following measures:

- Eliminate a threat
- Create a safe and secure environment
- Consolidate the safe and secure environment, and
- Carry out enabling/supporting measures.

On operations, these measures will not be taken separately but concurrently even at local level.

The local *character* of the military role in establishing security and state order in crisis areas results from the proportionate relation of the previously mentioned measures on the ground. It is summarised by the threesome of **CLEAR**, **HOLD** and **BUILD** (see Figure 3).




Figure 3 – CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD

### 3.2 CLEAR

CLEAR is when INS control an area and/or are so aggressive that friendly forces, population and/or members of governmental organisations are under permanent threat and constantly subject to hostile acts and as a result it is not possible to maintain enduring civil order.

The objective in CLEAR is to force INS into the defensive and to prevent them from taking action against friendly forces, civilian organisations, governmental structures or the population.

This allows friendly forces to gain the scope of action needed to enforce public order. One criterion for success in CLEAR is that friendly forces can manoeuvre freely while keeping the risk at an acceptable level.

Actions/operations in CLEAR are primarily aimed at eliminating threats by restricting INS courses of action or denying them the capability to take action. This is to gain control of the area and ensure friendly forces freedom of action.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> See Chapter 4.2 “Eliminate a threat”.

In this situation, any action by friendly forces against INS, their structures and safe havens is mainly offensive by nature.



To avoid jeopardising the overall success of establishing security and state order it must be ensured that uninvolved people do not come to harm and that collateral damage is avoided wherever possible. On the one hand, offensive military action may be tactically successful in that it causes considerable harm to INS but on the other hand it may alienate the population from the security forces and provoke resistance against the state system. This must be avoided at all costs.

Any action must therefore be judged not only by its physical effect but also by the repercussion on the information environment and thus by its psychological impact on both the population and on INS. It is indispensable to interlink offensive measures and information activities.

### 3.3 HOLD

HOLD begins when allied forces and/or civilian actors can manoeuvre freely in an area and have assumed control of the largest part thereof.

The objective in HOLD is to create a safe and secure environment which is the prerequisite for improving the people’s situation in political, social and economic terms.

Accordingly, actions in HOLD are focused on operations and measures intended to create and preserve a safe and secure environment<sup>9</sup>. These operations or measures are aimed at increasing or stabilising the subjective sense of security among the people, at dispelling its fears of terror and violence, and at building confidence in the government and its security agencies. Although actions in HOLD may at least initially still be accompanied by direct operations or measures against INS, the focus is on the effects produced among the population.

<sup>9</sup> See Chapter 4.3 on measures to “create a safe and secure environment”.

It is important to demonstrate commitment and resolve in the area and to enforce or establish public order to give the population a sense of security while deterring INS. This may also include performing police or police-like tasks if the responsible forces are not available in sufficient numbers. If necessary, the population must be informed in advance about the reasons for any restrictions or inconvenience this may cause.



Blatant deficiencies in supplies to the population must be remedied by military resources, if need be, because wherever friendly forces exercise control they will be held responsible for any existing grievances. In this context, the principle of helping the people to help themselves must be applied as early as possible to counter a possible sense of categorical entitlement among the population, enhance the self-esteem of the locals and prevent local economic developments from being impeded.

In the end, HOLD also involves the need to defend the control gained over the area against attacks from INS, if necessary.

All in all, it is of increasing importance in HOLD to consistently enhance civilian freedom of action and to support their activities. Military means alone are insufficient to ensure security for more than a limited period of time. Increasingly drawing on civilian commitment will stabilise the situation and allow the transition to BUILD.

### **3.4 BUILD**

BUILD begins when perceivable regional security has been established and public order achieved and when a positive development of the living conditions becomes apparent that is when security must to permanently consolidated.<sup>10</sup>

The objective in BUILD is to enable the responsible non-military authorities to provide for permanent local security and public order without external support, and thus to terminate the military commitment to establishing security and state order.

In this phase the military activities focus on setting up and consolidating national security forces in the country of deployment. They may have to be trained, advised and sustainably qualified to perform control and supervisory functions independently and reliably. This includes to win and retain / secure the confidence of the people. If multinational police forces are not available, this task may also be fulfilled by friendly military forces.

The troops on the ground will gradually cease to be the mainstay of operations, confining themselves to an observer role.

They will remain a passive guarantor of security who is almost invisible in public life.

The crucial criterion for a successful BUILD phase is the independence of the local security agencies.



### **3.5 What is SHAPE?**

In the concept of the current NATO mission in Afghanistan, the previously mentioned triumvirate of CLEAR – HOLD – BUILD is preceded by the SHAPE phase which basically serves to pave the way for the CLEAR – HOLD – BUILD approach.

The SHAPE phase is primarily aimed at setting up and subsequently augmenting not only friendly forces and assets but also and above all local/national security forces. In concrete terms it is about establishing, training and integrating these forces into the conduct of friendly operations. This enhances the sustainability of friendly forces and, in addition, improves the professionalism of the local/national security forces and gives operations a “national face”. The cooperation between friendly and local/national forces opens up additional sources of information.

<sup>10</sup> See Chapter 4.4 on measures to “consolidate a safe and secure environment”.

With regard to INS, operations in the SHAPE phase are primarily conducted to

- identify/localise INS,
- identify the main reasons and causes for the backing and support that INS receive from (parts of) the population,
- drive a wedge between INS and the rest of the population,
- reveal that INS goals and courses of action prejudice the interest of and are detrimental to the population,
- restrict INS freedom of movement and freedom of action (including impairment of their communication capabilities), and
- isolate INS.



On the whole, the spectrum of tasks performed by the armed forces in the SHAPE phase comprises:

- Support in establishing and training local/national security forces and cooperation in the conduct of operations;
- Comprehensive information activities;
- If required, the establishment of safe areas and the protective surveillance of flows of people;
- Show of commitment throughout and control of the area (if possible, in cooperation with local/national security forces). In this respect, it is important to establish, develop and maintain contact with the local population. This is the only way to win confidence, counter prejudice against foreign soldiers and ultimately gather information;
- Protection of individuals and objects/installations;
- Support of national authorities in performing sovereign duties;
- Assistance in performing administrative tasks, implementing reforms and conducting elections;
- Support of civilian organisations by providing protection and security and/or supplies/services.

The focus of SHAPE will thus be on enabling/supporting and consolidating measures<sup>11</sup>.

Demonstrating commitment throughout the area and maintaining contact with the population exposes deployed forces to threats by INS that are in fact directed at governmental organisations. Besides the troops themselves may become the target of INS attacks.

### 3.6. Summary

- The military commitment to establishing security and state order is intended to support or strengthen the state structures of the country of deployment; the multinational military forces are not occupying forces.
- In this context military measures must not be considered in isolation but have to be in line with the interagency strategy.
- Successful military measures to establish security and state order always require a strong visible commitment throughout the area based on personal contact with the population even if this increases, at least temporarily, the risk for friendly forces.
- The mainstay of the military commitment to establishing security and state order are usually smaller, independent subunits widely dispersed in the area and tailored to the demands of the given situation.
- Any military action or inaction has an impact on the information environment, especially because of the omnipresence of the media.
- Although it may be necessary to directly fight the INS, the focus is always on gaining the support and approval of the population.
- Military means can *weaken* INS but they *cannot destroy* them. The root cause of insurgency, i.e. the political, social and/or economic grievances and the resulting resentment among parts of the population against governmental institutions, must be alleviated or removed above all by non-military measures.

<sup>11</sup> See Chapter 4.1 on enabling/supporting measures and Chapter 4.4 on measures to consolidate a safe and secure environment.

#### **4. Military operations and measures**

The military role in establishing security and state order in crisis areas comprises the following measures:

- Eliminate a threat
- Create a safe and secure environment
- Consolidate the safe and secure environment, and
- Take enabling/supporting measures

##### **4.1 Enabling/supporting measures**

All military actions and operations must be continually backed by enabling/supporting measures. In addition to combat service support and command support which are important for any military operation but not specifically necessary for the establishment of security and state order, special importance must be attached to military intelligence, operations in the information environment, and civil-military cooperation.

##### **Military intelligence**

The early detection of changes in public opinion, of the realignment of forces and preparation of INS activities is crucial for the planning and implementation of both civilian and military measures. For this purpose, comprehensive and current information must be available. It enhances the effectiveness of any friendly action and operation and considerably contributes to the effective protection of civilian and military actors. For this reason, friendly information and intelligence, to include that of other military, governmental and civilian elements, must be incorporated into a permanently updated situation picture based on comprehensive situation assessment.

The information needed by the commander must be provided in a targeted manner to the appropriate levels by using all assets available. The results achieved by deployed intelligence and reconnaissance assets as part of continuous and area-covering reconnaissance activities are complemented by the observations and information of friendly forces performing other tasks in theatre as well as by the findings/information of the military intelligence organisation. Gauging the public opinion at an early stage is especially effective through face-to-face communication.

The focus here is on:

- The intent, capabilities, TTP<sup>12</sup>, motivation, structures of the different local pressure groups
- The intent, capabilities, TTP, motivation, structures, networking, strength, weapons and equipment of INS groups
- The opinion, attitude, demeanour and needs of the population
- Local decision-making processes, power structures and channels of communication
- Political, commercial, religious, ethnical and/or social structures of power and order, to include the relevant actors in theatre
- The conduct, reputation and courses of action of local security forces and of security forces deployed
- Possibly imminent or existing security threats
- Perception of the different actors among the local population

Evaluating/analysing the usually diverse and ample supply of intelligence and any other information is a particular challenge. This must be achieved by a sufficient number of situation analysis personnel. Any important evaluation and analysis work that cannot be done for lack of personnel must be carried out at the home base following the REACHBACK concept.

The evaluation of the influencing factors must also involve open sources (OSINT<sup>13</sup>) and civilian experts.

As part of the situation assessment all available intelligence is systematically incorporated into a current, comprehensive and accurate situation picture which provides the basis for the estimate of the situation and information to the commander. The situation assessment ends with the military security estimate and comprises recommendations for the further course of action.

The analysis of the military intelligence situation includes exercising a controlling influence on intelligence and reconnaissance for the purpose of optimising the results produced (situation picture, estimate of the situation). The intelligence made available to the subordinate units must be tailored to their needs, taking into account that the unit level does not have the personnel required to analyse and process extensive documentation.

Information processing is the original task of S2/G2/J2/CJ2 elements, military intelligence centre and geoinformation service at HQ level.

<sup>12</sup> Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.

<sup>13</sup> Open source intelligence

If information or assumptions need to be consolidated or verified, friendly forces will be employed to perform concrete intelligence and reconnaissance missions to enhance the situation picture. Information that cannot be collected by friendly intelligence and reconnaissance forces is gathered by submitting an RFI<sup>14</sup> to the higher command to improve or consolidate the operational picture. Intelligence and reconnaissance operations can be conducted concurrent with other missions. It is therefore always recommended that friendly forces be ordered to meet concrete information requirements in addition to other missions.

### Operations in the information environment

With the population and its subjective sense of security at the centre of all activities, special importance must be attached to the information environment to establish security and state order. Any action taken reverberates in the information environment, which may be perceived and assessed differently both by the population and by INS. This varying perception is often more important to achieving the strategic goals than the actual, objective tactical effect of an action. For this reason, it is essential to influence the information environment and not to yield it to INS. Operations in the information environment may enhance positive efforts and alleviate negative side effects. At the same time, enemy information activities and/or active exertion of INS influence on the information environment must be prevented, put into perspective, impeded or restricted.



Operations in the information environment are aimed at influencing the situational understanding, the will and capabilities of INS and other mission-relevant actors for the purpose of one's own mission accomplishment through the coordinated employment of adequate military assets. In this connection, information operations are of particular importance.

<sup>14</sup> Request for Information

Information operations help the commander see the information environment as his scope of action and understand it in its overall context and dynamics. The personnel in charge of information operations coordinate military information activities and advise the commander on any effects and consequences in the information environment. This is based on the interagency information strategy coordinated at political level, which defines the type and purpose of the operation and the goals to be achieved in the information environment.

As a matter of principle, information operations and their specific, coordinated activities in the information environment serve the purpose of

- influencing the decision-making process and the behaviour of relevant actors in favour of one's own objectives (*key leader engagement*),
- weakening the will and capabilities of INS to wage conflict, and
- preventing enemy information activities from having an impact or at least reducing their impact not only on one's own situational understanding and capabilities but also on the understanding and perception among the population.

### Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)

CIMIC is aimed at the cooperation with civilian actors, i.e. civilian authorities, governmental/non-governmental, national and international authorities and organizations, and with the population in the country of deployment.

The key functions of CIMIC, i.e.

- shaping civil-military relations,
- providing civilian authorities and actors with information, advice and support, and
- contributing to the command and control process and supporting the operation,

are performed by CIMIC staff elements and CIMIC forces. CIMIC functions related to the (civilian) medical and health services are fulfilled by the service personnel and assets of the Bundeswehr Medical Service.

Integration, support, advice and information of civilian actors are provided in compliance with the relevant security provisions. Wherever possible, this is coordinated with one's own military intents and plans.

### Other German ministries

Establishing security and state order is an interagency task which requires appropriate and targeted cooperation at equal terms. All persons involved need to be aware that they pursue the same goal and must coordinate their assets to avoid undesired overlaps/duplication of effort, and

achieve synergetic effects. It is important to share expertise and to provide assistance and support at all times. Besides it is of importance to draw on the experience of other ministries.

If military operations and actions may have a negative impact on other, civilian measures (or vice versa), these (military or civilian) operations need to be adapted accordingly.

CIMIC makes a major contribution to the overarching, appropriate and targeted cooperation with other German ministries and their subordinate agencies. The basis for this cooperation must be built at home at the earliest stage possible. Wherever possible, regular contact at and between the appropriate levels must be established, common situational awareness created and, in addition, common goals defined, courses of action coordinated and potential fields of cooperation identified.

International civilian actors

These actors include governmental (GO<sup>15</sup>), nongovernmental (NGO<sup>16</sup>) and international (IO<sup>17</sup>) organisations which support the country of deployment in establishing security and state order and/or provide humanitarian assistance.

These organisations have a positive effect on establishing security and state order and must therefore, as far as possible, be supported and protected against any type of attack.

All information gathered by civilian actors must be evaluated for its reliability as part of the situation assessment.

Civilian cooperation with military forces is coordinated by CIMIC personnel. The scope for cooperation should, in principle, be driven by the goals defined, the willingness to cooperate and the loyalty of the civilian actors.

In this context, consideration must always be given to the requirements of military security for force protection.

Local civilian actors

As a matter of principle, local politicians/officials and dignitaries (mayors, religious representatives, judges etc.) and, as the case may be, unofficial leaders and rulers are integrated into and/or informed about the conduct of operations and are invited to join negotiations and exchange views and ideas. Without the general willingness to disclose relevant information, the necessary confidence cannot be achieved. Even in the context of this type of cooperation special care must be exercised when selecting the information to be transmitted in order to avoid any jeopardy to friendly forces. In this process, operations security

(OPSEC<sup>18</sup>) measures are a matter of course and it also goes without saying that directives on and orders for the transfer of military intelligence and the handling of personal data must be complied with.



Involving local civilian actors may provide additional security and support among the population since they act as multipliers. What needs to be given due consideration, however, is that their goals and intentions may conflict with the overall objective of establishing security and state order because local rulers may not be interested in strong, efficient state structures that would necessarily restrict their sphere of influence.

For this very reason it is important to enter into dialogue with the local chiefs, build confidence and seek common solutions. If this cooperation does not exist, local chiefs may feel threatened and turn to INS.

**4.2 Eliminating a threat**

Operations to eliminate a threat are primarily directed against INS. They are conducted to actively counter existing or potential threats, that is, in particular, to fight covertly operating adversaries and their lines of supply and communication. In the context of establishing security and state order such action will become necessary if or when INS activities have become numerous enough to either restrict or totally nullify the freedom of action of friendly forces and civilian relief and law-and-order organisations.

Operations to eliminate a threat can also be conducted prior to a potential rise of INS that is before INS take offensive and massive action.

Within the overall strategy, they must be orchestrated sensitively. Using military force carries the risk of producing a counterproductive effect in the long run although, on the other hand, a tactical success will neutralise a current threat.

<sup>15</sup> Governmental Organisations

<sup>16</sup> Non-Governmental Organisations

<sup>17</sup> International Organisations

<sup>18</sup> Operations Security

If, at the end of an operation, the local population is alienated from friendly forces or responds with increasing opposition (e.g. as a result of casualties among uninvolved people), the operation will not only be useless but even detrimental. As early as in the planning phase, operations to eliminate a threat must therefore be combined with information activities or operations to positively shape the information environment or at least mitigate potential negative effects. Besides they may have a negative impact on the provision of supplies and services to the local people or the work of civilian organisations.

To avoid or minimise such risks it is necessary to assess the interaction of military and civilian measures as early as possible during operational planning.

It is especially in operations to eliminate a threat that we must not lose sight of the purpose of our action. The fight against INS is not an end in itself. The objective is not to destroy INS but, first and foremost, to deny them the will and capability to fight, which is a precondition for establishing a safe and secure environment.

Operations to eliminate a threat may be:

#### **Attack**

Attacks are always conducted according to the principles of offensive action.<sup>19</sup> The military force used in an attack is actively and directly aimed at INS to either seize terrain or destroy enemy forces and their infrastructure. Enemy forces will, wherever possible, be apprehended to be detained. Larger groups of enemy forces can be encircled and subsequently be engaged or forced to surrender. Surprise and quick, resolute action are the key to success. Ambushes, for example, are an appropriate means to destroy or detain an identified enemy by exploiting the element of surprise.

Reconnoitred and identified targets can be engaged by long-range fire support assets (artillery, air support). With hardly any effective means to defend themselves, enemy forces will be surprised by friendly fire. At the same time, friendly forces will be saved and not exposed to any threat.

The special operational procedure of combat patrol operations is applied to reconnoitre, wear down, harass, fix or deceive enemy forces.

Given a favourable situation and appropriate conditions, even smaller units with inferior combat power can momentarily seize enemy buildings, areas, infrastructure or facilities in a raid by exploiting the element of surprise.

Once the overall situation has been assessed, the attack is continued by pursuing fleeing, withdrawing or evading INS until they are fixed, detained or destroyed.

The purpose of doing this is to exploit a friendly success in combat or to prevent the enemy from accomplishing his hit-and-run strategy after launching an attack.

#### **Relief operation**

If friendly forces are isolated or encircled it may be necessary to conduct a relief operation. Friendly forces operating in wide areas may easily lead to local superiority of enemy forces.

Isolated situations may also occur as a result of other incidents/events such as technical failures, encirclement caused by a demonstration etc. On the whole, there is a wide range of threats conceivable that lead to isolated situations. For the relief of friendly forces it is therefore of special importance to hold reserve troops available.

#### **Moving members of GO/IO/NGO to safety**

Situations may degenerate to the extent that the prevailing threat will deny civilian members of GO/IO/NGO to stay in a particular area for a specific time. Friendly forces must be prepared to move such personnel to a safe place, if necessary. This may require reserve forces to be employed.

#### **Evacuation/rescue of hostages**

Non-combatant evacuees or friendly forces detained and/or held hostage by enemy forces can be liberated by personnel earmarked for national risk prevention. Such operations must be supported.<sup>20</sup>

#### **Searching and seizing INS**

Seizing areas without coherent resistance is often possible because INS evade approaching friendly forces and/or resort to covert operations.

Therefore occupying an area will not be enough to ensure control by friendly forces. Further offensive operations will be necessary to break irregular resistance and allow friendly forces and civilian actors in the area to gain freedom of action.

INS operating covertly and waging armed struggle from the underground must be actively engaged to ensure that friendly control of the area can become effective. This means that covertly operating INS must be targeted for active search operations.

<sup>19</sup> See German Army Regulation 100/100 Chapter 14.

<sup>20</sup> See German Army Regulation 100/100 Chapter 25.

For this purpose, compound forces and assets must be employed to identify the INS structure and network and subsequently encircle, fix and defeat INS, or apprehend them to be detained by appropriate measures such as interdiction and searches. In doing this, the inward and outward movements of the people to and from a defined area are denied for a limited period of time and the area is intensively combed for INS and/or INS materiel as well as wanted criminals.

If the terrain does not allow the forces to take interdicting measures, if not enough personnel are available for this purpose or if the situation makes any such action seem unnecessary, the operation may also be limited to systematically searching buildings/combing terrain and seizing INS (search & destroy).

Operations of searching and seizing INS may also be conducted by using a tight-woven network of checkpoints or patrols. Any such measures will only rarely bring about tactical success since they can be reconnoitred in advance or sidestepped by INS and yet they are effective in that they deny or restrict INS freedom of action.

Operations of searching and seizing INS may target both individual, currently wanted persons and less clearly defined groups or materiel (e.g. weapons). Depending on the situation, terrain and forces available, several operations may be conducted sequentially (in sections) or simultaneously (in one single effort).

**Snatch operations**

Snatch operations are conducted against clearly identified targets (individuals and storage facilities/hiding place for materiel) by exploiting the element of surprise.

They are usually preceded by a long reconnaissance phase. Unlike an attack, this operation is, in principle, aimed at detaining enemy forces and/or seizing enemy materiel.

Wherever possible, local security forces should be involved in the operation and cultural practices of the population be taken into account.

**4.3 Creating a safe and secure environment**

Operations and measures to create a safe and secure environment are primarily aimed at producing effects among the population. The key objective is to considerably enhance the local population's sense of security.

This requires to restore and/or enforce public order in close cooperation with local security forces.

If the local security forces are not yet capable of assuming this responsibility, the military forces must prepare to perform police and police-like tasks as well. But any such action should always be carried out in close consultation with the local security forces. What is important is to establish positive, personal contact between friendly forces and the population. It is only on the basis of a relationship characterised by mutual understanding that confidence and credibility can develop.

Operations and measures to create a safe and secure environment may include:

**Protection of the population and infrastructure**

Areas under the control of friendly forces, to include the local population living in these areas, must be protected from attacks by INS or other armed forces. This must be appropriately and visibly prepared to give the population the feeling that its protection is sustainable and credible.

If necessary, protection must also be provided to civilian organisations operating in the country of deployment.

The robustness and resolve of friendly forces must leave no reason to doubt so as to avoid a decline in confidence among the people. To create a normal, safe and secure living environment it is important for the population to overcome its fear of INS, their violence or even their takeover of power. Ultimately, this may also imply that particular areas or the population must be defended against attacks. This may require the weighing up the demands of the people's protection against those of force protection. The conduct of defensive operations is governed by the principles described in Chapter 15 of German Army Regulation 100/100.

**Show of Commitment**

By showing commitment 24 hours a day, if possible, friendly forces will not only substantially raise the level of security but also enhance the subjective sense of security among the population.



They are the point of contact for the local population and discourage people from resorting to violence or committing a crime by their mere passive presence. It is only by their show of commitment throughout the area that contact can be established with the population, and the commander can be provided with a permanently updated situation picture. Measures and operations intended to show presence underpin the claim for a safe and secure environment and help build confidence.

Showing commitment throughout the area is largely achieved by a network of

- mounted and dismounted and, to a limited extent, also aerial patrols,
- combat outposts,
- checkpoints.

### **Establishing public order**

If the local security forces are unable to maintain or establish public order independently, military forces will have to train or actively support them in performing their tasks if no other forces are available for this purpose. This may also include the performance of police tasks – but always in cooperation with the local security forces.

Operations to establish public order require a network of patrols, checkpoints and combat outposts, which is also necessary to demonstrate commitment. In this case, however, friendly forces take an active role by monitoring and enforcing the observance of public regulations. Besides, military forces may also be employed to reinforce the observation posts of the local security forces. In addition, operations to establish public order may include monitoring borders and operating border stations.

During public order operations it is of importance to deploy and, if necessary, rapidly reinforce small, independent subunits operating throughout the area. The strategy of deploying but large units for reasons of protection will only have an isolated effect and give INS and other criminals the space and opportunity to (re)organise.

Operations to establish public order also comprise crowd and riot control duties<sup>21</sup> (CRC<sup>22</sup>).

### **Supporting the provision of basic supplies and services**

If the country of deployment or other actors are not able to supply the local population with food, clothing, emergency accommodation and medical emergency assistance that are sufficient and adequate from the humanitarian point of view, measures will have to be taken by the military forces in the areas controlled by them to provide the people with basic supplies and services. This is not only a matter of course and a humanitarian necessity but also an effective measure to gain support among the population.

Capacities permitting, the Bundeswehr Medical Service - in addition to the medical support of the armed forces - may as “force effectors” be actively involved in the medical assistance to the population and contribute to the above measures to win the hearts and minds.

Relief measures beyond emergency care must, as a matter of principle, be taken carefully – technical assistance is generally not a task of the armed forces. Active development or construction efforts by friendly forces incur a risk of making the country of deployment dependent, impeding its drive for independence and of delaying the successful completion of international measures to establish security and state order. For this very reason, any support or assistance should primarily be based on the principle of “help for self-help”.

### **4.4 Consolidating a safe and secure environment**

Military measures to consolidate a safe and secure environment are primarily aimed at enabling the local security agencies to assume their own responsibility for security and state order. Besides, the multinational forces must strengthen and train the local armed forces to a point where they can take military measures and perform tasks without support by multinational entities. The buildup and training of local troops and security forces are therefore key elements of the multinational exit strategy.

<sup>21</sup> See CRC Concept, Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr, 18 January 2007, and “Streitkräftegemeinsame Ausbildungshilfe Einsatz zur Kontrolle von Menschenmengen und gewalttätigen Ausschreitungen in Einsätzen der Bundeswehr im Ausland“ (Joint Training Manual for Crowd and Riot Control during Bundeswehr Operations Abroad), Director of Joint Training, 12 November 2007.

<sup>22</sup> Crowd and Riot Control

### **The principle of conducting joint operations**

Multinational forces contribute to consolidating a safe and secure environment especially by conducting operations always together with local armed forces.

This gives local forces the opportunity to learn from the concepts and approaches of multinational troops and apply what they have learned according to their understanding.

The conduct of joint operations, however, must be adapted to the given equipment and training standards.

Local armed forces must be involved in operations at least at the lowest level that is as passive observers. As a next step, they can actively participate in operations under the guidance and control of the multinational forces and increasingly perform key functions. Ultimately, the security forces will be able to conduct operations independently and on their own responsibility with friendly forces playing an advisory role only in planning and execution, which will finally be restricted to a mere supervisory function.

Apart from that, multinational efforts to consolidate a safe and secure environment may be independent of the actual conduct of friendly operations. They cover initial and follow-on training and/or advice to local, regional and/or national security personnel and, in particular, armed forces to consolidate and strengthen them.

### **Training and development programmes**

At the earliest stage possible friendly forces will begin to train and develop the local armed forces, for instance by inviting them to training courses in Germany, offering in-theatre training and advanced training to security forces, or providing on-the-job training. In doing so, they must take into account that the local forces are usually more familiar with the culture of the country and can better assess the situation on the ground.

Local people must not be forced to adopt the views of the friendly forces.

### **Operational training and mentoring teams**

Operational training and mentoring teams may be employed to support national military and local security forces; they will provide advice at the relevant levels on measures and operations conducted independently and – as the case may be – train them to help themselves. This implies that the training and mentoring teams will deploy together with local military forces on operations they may conduct, which may include combat action.

Such tasks call for particular skills and qualifications by forces that have been prepared and trained accordingly.

In addition to their training and mentoring functions these teams are the liaison element between international and local armed forces.




Figure 4: Overview of the military role in establishing security and state order in crisis areas




Figure 5: Overview of the tactical tasks performed by the land forces in support of establishing security and state order in crisis areas

## 5. Tactical tasks

Operations and measures intended to eliminate a threat, to create and consolidate a safe and secure environment as well as enabling/additional measures (for an overview see figure 4) are conducted according to the command principle of composite force operations – that is, in interaction with various national or multinational assets at tactical level, under unified command, and with a common objective. The tactical tasks to be carried out in this context (overview see figure 5) can be summarised as follows:

- general tasks during land operations,
- tasks in the category of combat,
- tasks in the category of control,
- tasks in the category of consolidation, as well as
- other tasks.

This kind of categorisation allows a better accentuation of individual tasks/bundles of tasks while aspects relevant to establishing security and state order are duly observed.<sup>23</sup>

### 5.1 General tasks during land operations

The general tasks during land operations defined in part E of German Army Regulation (*HDv*) 100/100 also apply to the military contribution to establishing security and state order. In the following, however, some special aspects and/or focal areas will be pointed out.

#### **Intelligence and reconnaissance**

Intelligence and reconnaissance remains a crucial task even in the context of the military role to establish security and state order, ensuring that information requirements are met and the protection of own forces is improved.

Every soldier contributes to intelligence and reconnaissance. Besides the fact that the environment is permanently monitored – in particular regarding new developments – talks with the population, local security forces and with civilian state and non-state organisations each held at their respective level considerably contribute to the development of the military intelligence situation. Therefore, interpreters are often required to be employed even at lower levels.

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<sup>23</sup> Following the command principle of composite force operations, tasks of the combat, control and consolidation categories as well as the other tasks may well be conducted in parallel and during one single operation. An operation to eliminate a threat may therefore run concurrent with a combat mission, efforts to exercise control, and consolidation measures.

The military leader on the ground will regularly brief his soldiers on what to pay special attention to. Particularly after concluding tasks with personal contact with the population the relevant military leader will, as a matter of principle, hold an after-action review to ask his soldiers about their impressions and information.

#### **Protection<sup>24</sup>**

Protecting forces and installations on operations is a general operational task at all levels of command where responsibility rests with each military leader. The aim is to sustain operational readiness of the forces and consequently ensure own freedom of action.

Active and passive self-protection in general are permanent operational tasks of all forces and will remain unchanged even against the background of the military role in establishing security and state order in crisis areas. Every soldier must be vigilant in all situations, observe his environment and identify and report changes in the situation at an early enough stage (situational awareness).

The requirements of protecting own soldiers, on the one hand, must permanently be weighed against the need for contact with the population and the inherent hazard. Excessive routine and getting stuck in the daily rut within a seemingly peaceful environment can lead to boredom or cause failures in procedures. Commanders at all levels must prevent that.

#### **Operating in the information environment**

The desired effects of information activities contribute considerably to successfully establishing security and state order. Information activities are not rigidly associated with particular assets but may be performed by all forces. Within their scopes of capability all forces have dialogues at their respective levels to promote more understanding of military operations in general and to convey the value and possibilities of consensual conflict resolution. Dismounted forces address the local population to achieve understanding, mutual respect and peaceful solutions to end conflicts. By doing so, they contribute to the development of mutual trust and to the protection of friendly forces. This requires sufficiently developed communicative skills and intercultural competence.

Furthermore, soldiers must be given guidelines as to what to say in conversation while on a mission to improve their security and confidence.

Pocket cards containing key information are available for distribution among the troops. All soldiers must assimilate this information enough

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<sup>24</sup> Protection as defined in German Army Regulation (*HDv*) 100/100, chapter 34.

to hold conversations as set out in their pocket cards. In this context they must also be aware of the significance of appropriate facial expressions, gestures, and wording and use them during conversations.

### Using the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)

In electronic warfare (EW), the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is available to military and civilian users as well as adversaries (INS) to almost the same extent. Hazards from the EMS usually appear in the form of

- active optronic components (LASER) for measuring, reconnaissance, target marking, weapon guidance and dazzling purposes ;
- active and passive electronic components (radio, radar) for reconnaissance, detection, and command and control;
- radio or optronic components for triggering or jamming of weapons or ammunition (mines, IED<sup>25</sup>, fuses);
- the employment of active electronic and optical components for jamming and deception;
- the use of passive electronic components for protection by means of sensor-controlled automatic protective installations.

Moreover, the EMS is used for communication purposes. In this context, further threats may arise if

- opposing forces use the EMS to coordinate attacks and/or to make arrangements, and
- friendly means of communication are jammed by electronic components.

If the threat posed by the utilisation of the EMS is not identified and countered at an early enough stage, the INS will benefit from it. This is why the EMS is such an integral part of the military role in establishing security and state order. The aim is to sustainably support their own conduct of operations by taking measures to use the EMS as effectively as possible, to protect friendly forces and to impair the opponent's capabilities of utilising the EMS. Electronic warfare measures comprise:

- electronic protective measures
- electronic support measures (see chapter 6.2.17), and
- electronic countermeasures (see chapter 6.2.17).



Electronic warfare personnel will advise the military leader on planning and conducting such measures.

Electronic protective measures encompass activities and procedures of employment, operation by friendly forces, and technology in the fields of communication and detection/command and control installations. They ensure that the EMS can still be utilised by friendly forces even when exposed to enemy electronic warfare measures, which is why they constitute an essential contribution to the own command and control capability, effective engagement as well as survivability and protection. Electronic protective measures also extend to laser protection of optics and eyes as well as steps to reduce platform signatures in all detectable ranges of the EMS. In this context electronic protective measures are key ingredients of signature management.

### Terrain reconnaissance

On their return from tasks outside military camps and installations, friendly forces will immediately report their findings on the condition of routes, bridges and defiles, particularly to update current maps at the relevant operations centre accordingly.

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<sup>25</sup> Improvised Explosive Device

## 5.2 Combat tasks

The tasks to be performed in the category of combat comprise conventional forms of military force, applied directly to destroy opposing forces, namely INS, and to seize or hold ground. In principle, the traditional terms of conventional combat shall apply. Combat tasks are e.g.:

- seizing
- destroying
- securing
- defending
- holding
- containing
- fixing
- pursuing
- directing fire support
- providing fire support
- conducting combat patrol operations
- encircling

## 5.3 Control tasks

Control tasks cover forms of military tasks performed to supervise an area and particularly the population therein and to control their behaviour. The main tasks required in this context are:

### **Conducting patrols**

Patrolling<sup>26</sup> is a task given to a subunit usually performed with at least three vehicles. Conducting patrols is an essential key element of the military contribution to establishing security and state order. A distinction must be made between heavy (armoured), medium (protected) and light (unprotected) patrols. Furthermore, patrols can be conducted mounted and dismounted (with combat vehicles in the immediate vicinity, e.g. in small towns) or on foot (e.g. in terrain unsuitable for vehicles). The patrol commander may have combat and service support assets attached to his subunit.



<sup>26</sup> See German Army Regulation (HDv) 100/100, Nos. 13060, 13105, 13108.

The core mission of the patrol is mobile area surveillance while demonstrating one's presence on the ground. By doing so, information on and contact with the population may be gained, which may add to the situation picture. Unlike scout teams, patrols usually proceed openly and visibly so as to deter INS and to have a reassuring effect on the population.

Depending on their operational directives, patrols may take on other tasks independently and without prior planning.

### **Operating checkpoints**

Operating a static checkpoint<sup>27</sup> is a task given to a subunit which may be reinforced as necessary.

Checkpoints serve to check persons and vehicles along a route. They may also be set up to channel civilian traffic.

There are permanent and temporary checkpoints. The soldier in charge of operating the checkpoint may have combat support and combat service support forces attached to his subunit.

The underlying principle of a checkpoint is to check – either continuously or at random – persons or vehicles passing its location; that is, to check the relevant personal particulars and to search a person and/or vehicle for illegal objects (e.g. weapons, explosives, contraband goods, drugs) or wanted persons (e.g. wanted criminals, war criminals, ringleaders).

### **Operating/reinforcing facilities of local security forces/police stations**

Depending on the given mandate, facilities of local security forces (police stations) may be operated and/or reinforced by friendly forces, unless and as long as original police forces are available only in insufficient numbers or completely unavailable. In situations like this, such forces are usually employed at a static facility and on a permanent basis to be available at all times as points of contact to the people to assure public order.

### **Operating combat outposts**

To enhance their sustainability on the ground even at long distances from the base, units or subunits at platoon level may operate their own combat outposts as a starting point for other tasks.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> See German Army Regulation (HDv) 100/100, No.13108, 13041, 13148, 32036.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency, Chap. 6, page 9.

The outpost is then operated as a camp with all inherent requirements of military security. Where the situation permits, the camp is to be developed, structurally reinforced as necessary; containers or tents must be provided to serve as accommodation, command posts or medical facilities, for instance.

If existing infrastructure is used, lease agreements must be concluded.

Among other purposes, the combat outpost may serve to

- permanently protect vital infrastructure;
- maintain permanent contact to the local population;
- sustainably deny INS access to an area;
- demonstrate commitment at a crucial location;
- gain information, and/or
- support local security forces.

Depending on the intended duration of the operation, the combat outpost may be developed into a camp.

#### **Detaining**

Detaining persons is a task assigned to a subunit – in exceptional cases even to individual soldiers – to detain a person or a group of persons; i.e. to disarm them and to restrict and control their freedom of movement. The right of friendly forces to arrest and detain a person as well as details on where detainees will be remain in custody are governed by the Rules of Engagement applicable to the specific country of deployment.

#### **Searches**

Searching<sup>29</sup> is a task to try and find certain objects (e. g. weapons, explosives, drugs) on a person or inside a structure (vehicles, buildings etc.).

#### **Combing**

Combing<sup>30</sup> is a task assigned with the aim to locate persons in hiding or illegal material.

#### **Interdicting**

Interdicting<sup>31</sup> is a task to prevent unauthorised persons (including occupants of vehicles) from passing a road, a passageway or a terrain section.

#### **5.4 Consolidating**

Consolidating covers all military tasks intended to enable state organs – especially security forces, but above all armed forces – to perform sovereign and particularly military tasks. This is essentially achieved by own forces who provide

- training,
- guidance,
- consultation, and / or
- supervision

to the corresponding state organs. As cooperation with local security and armed forces is part of the basic principles of any military contribution to establishing security and state order (see chapter 3.1), the tasks to be performed in the category of consolidation also play a major role in this context. During all operations conducted jointly with armed and/or security forces of the country of deployment it is crucial to fulfill these tasks in line with the given situation.

Furthermore, where a safe and secure environment is to be consolidated (chapter 4.4) training support teams and/or advisory teams are tailored which, in a structured manner and at their respective levels, will assist the armed forces of the country of deployment – now required to operate independently – with their tasks and also in combat situations and explain to them ways of improvement.<sup>32</sup>

Wherever feasible, soldiers with operational experience who serve as instructors in their home units should carry out training and consulting functions. In this context it is essential to employ them at their relevant levels.

#### **5.5 Other tasks**

Other tasks are tasks that neither refer to the combat, nor control or consolidation categories. As a rule, they are to be performed separate from establishing security and state order; that is, they are carried out in any conceivable operational scenario of the land forces. They do, however, considerably enhance the effectiveness of the armed forces as they prepare, facilitate, flank or supplement tactical tasks.

That is why mainly special-to-arm tasks of a supporting, accompanying or preparing nature fall into this category. Chapter 6 specifies them in closer detail.

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<sup>29</sup> See German Army Regulation (HDv 100/100), No. 13148, 24019.

<sup>30</sup> See German Army Regulation (HDv 100/100), No. 24019.

<sup>31</sup> See German Army Regulation (HDv 100/100), No. 23018, 24019.

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<sup>32</sup> See German Army Regulation (HDv) 100/100, No.13225.

## **6. Contributions and training provided by the forces**

### **6.1 Land forces in general**

#### **6.1.1 Tasks for all forces**

To face the challenges within a dynamic changing environment, to avoid unnecessary losses and to perform tasks as efficiently as possible, some of the latter must be carried out as cross-cutting tasks; this means that all land forces (Bundeswehr Medical Service personnel may be subject to restrictions resulting from international law or deployment orders) directly involved with executing and enforcing the mission must be capable of performing such tasks. This is required, on the one hand, to cope with an emergency situation at a certain location and to save and/or protect life, and, on the other, to give the force commander the opportunity to detail forces independent of the capabilities of their specific arm or service, and to establish points of main effort at short notice.

The tasks of all land forces directly employed in executing and enforcing the mission (forces of the Bundeswehr Medical Service may be subject to restrictions resulting from international law or deployment orders) encompass:

- **Combat**
  - o action to be taken in the event of an ambush
  - o defence of installations/facilities
- **Control**
  - o conducting mounted and dismounted patrols in low-level threat situations
  - o monitoring and securing overstretched areas in low-level threat situations
  - o setting up and operating checkpoints in low-level threat situations



- o searching persons and vehicles
- o controlling access to small towns
- o basic crowd and riot control (CRC) capability



- **Consolidation**
  - o Cooperating with local security forces
- **Other tasks**
  - o securing camps
  - o contributing to the consolidation of the military intelligence situation by conversations and scouting
  - o conducting road moves in varying threat situations
  - o administering self and buddy aid (first aiders A or B on operations)
  - o ensuring appropriate action in mass casualty situations
  - o participating in convoy operations
  - o participating in rescue and evacuation operations focusing on combat recovery on the ground.<sup>33</sup>

#### **6.1.2 Individual basic capabilities**

The requirements profile to be met by every single land force soldier results from the tactical demands illustrated above. Service personnel must be capable of accomplishing their tactical mission within their respective small combat team.

Every soldier taking an active part in establishing security and state order is required to have special knowledge, capabilities and skills, all of which will hereafter be referred to as **basic capabilities**. Such basic capabilities are a prerequisite for successful operations and must therefore be trained throughout the arms and services. Moreover, it provides the foundation to master new situations under changed conditions and to successfully carry out any given task. This calls for expedient methodology in the conduct of training coupled.

The overarching training objective is to qualify the soldier to act self-reliantly and in line with the higher commander's intent, and to quickly adapt to changes in the situation while keeping his focus on accomplishing the mission even in complex situations. The warfighting capability ensures survivability and sustainability of friendly forces on operations and must therefore remain the focus of soldiers' basic capabilities. Another key factor

<sup>33</sup> See German Army Regulation (HDv 100/100), No. 25003.

in training is to teach soldiers to cope with stress situations continually. Avoiding unintended damage by precisely planning the employment of weapons, for instance, is as much an integral part of training as dealing with uninvolved civilians and facilities/goods to be protected.

Individual basic skills such as

- safe and secure handling of personal small arms;
- excellent physical fitness;
- distinct physical and mental stamina/robustness;
- mastering of self and buddy aid of all soldiers (combat lifesavers A or B on operations), basic NBC defence and basic fire fighting capabilities, as well as
- observing and reporting

are indispensable prerequisites to acquire the basic capability required for any military deployment on operations to establish security and state order in crisis areas.

DEU soldiers usually acquire these basic capabilities during basic military training, which also comprises “Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Training (EAKK)”, on “advanced and assignment-related training” as well as in the scope of operational training including EAKK advanced training. All these training segments must also address the requirements of operations intended to establish security and state order in crisis areas. These training segments have to be fully pursued and/or successfully completed.

Follow-up training is already mandatory for military personnel of the Army and the Joint Support Service. It involves elements of the following training subjects up to crew/team level:

- mission-oriented combat duty;
- all-arms NBC and explosive ordnance defence;
- all-arms engineer and signal service;
- (extended) self and buddy aid;
- weapons/marksmanship training.

These training subjects are to be tailored as follows to match the needs on operations concerning the military role in establishing security and state order in crisis areas:

- firing with the TOE weapon at short and very short range;
- detecting and tackling ambushes and booby traps;
- utilising special GeoInfo data/products;
- foot marches especially in urban areas during daytime and in limited visibility, using navigation means;
- action to be taken during and after attacks;

- immediate decontamination with organic resources;
- recovery of wounded and trapped persons;
- measures in case of imbalances between the number of casualties and the medical support capacities;
- combat lifesaver measures (including self and buddy aid) to be conducted until hand-over to the organic medical service or airborne medical evacuation assets;
- casualty evacuation by non-medical personnel;
- interaction with (possibly assigned) forces of the organic medical service/medical service at tactical level;
- communication with the population;
- basic knowledge of the national language;
- mastery of the communication and information systems on operations required for mission accomplishment;
- knowledge and application of protective and active measures within the electromagnetic spectrum, and
- general demeanour and intercultural competence.

These competences must be supplemented by practical skills in the use of non-lethal force. Not only must soldiers master available, non-lethal weapons and close combat techniques; they must also be conversant with the implications of using coercive force and be able to safely apply current legal provisions on operations.

## **6.2 Contributions by land forces**

A key factor for success of the military role in establishing security and state order is that the principle of mission command is consistently applied.

Military leaders at all tactical levels must be capable of taking action rapidly, flexibly and on their own initiative, and, if required, without any contact to the higher commander and in line with his intent.

Given the spread-out deployment of forces, operations are generally conducted as composite force operations even at low levels of command; military leaders must be capable of employing attached forces in line with their capabilities, strong and weak points and doctrines. Forces of one single arm or service only will not be able to cope with upcoming challenges. Instead, all available assets even at low levels of command – and across all armed and joint services – must be brought to bear in a synchronised manner. This must be taken into account during pre-deployment training.

As a matter of principle, tactical tasks to be performed are specified in the existing doctrines of the arms and services and various (command) echelons. Consequently, there is no need for fundamental changes in the capability profiles of the arms and services of the Army.

Therefore, no further requirements to training will be necessary beyond the basic capabilities of all land forces, adjustment of leadership training as well as pre-deployment training as illustrated in the above section.

### 6.2.1 Infantry

The infantry comprises the three arms of light, mountain and airborne infantry. The infantry is one of the key military actors in establishing security and state order. With its three arms, the infantry is capable and trained to conduct operations in difficult and very complex terrain as well as in severe climatic and weather conditions. Its forces lend themselves to seizing and holding ground denying normal movement. Thanks to the large number of dismounted forces their presence comes to bear particularly in urban areas or villages. This is why infantry forces are especially qualified for employment in the immediate vicinity to and above all directly among the population. Having direct contact to the population, the infantry has immediate access to information.

Infantry forces remain sustainable and fully operational even when employed in areas controlled by the enemy, at remote locations and in independent missions. Provided with protected transport capacity or aerial vehicles, infantry forces are highly mobile and rapidly deployable.

The “**Enhanced Future Infantryman System**” gives the infantry substantially improved C3, comprehensive night vision, and combat capabilities; considerably improved individual protection with high-performance protective vests lends it noticeably enhanced robustness across all ranges. The infantry has its maximum operational effectiveness when employed in areas with short lines of sight and at small-arms combat range. It is operational in any climatic conditions.



Apart from those soldiers armed with G36 the **infantry company** has sniper teams, automatic grenade launcher teams as well as antiarmour teams with guided missiles and/or long-range, large-calibre weapons. These teams with stand-off support weapons are organisationally integrated in the heavy platoon.

Furthermore, each infantry company is equipped with an **ALADIN Reconnaissance Drone**, permitting aerial combat reconnaissance at a range of up to 5,000 metres. In the future, infantry platoons will also be equipped with the **MIKADO Reconnaissance Drone** which is capable of hovering in flight over an operational range of up to 1,000 metres in unrestricted terrain for 20 minutes. It can also be employed within buildings.

As a matter of principle, infantry assets operate dismounted, however, they use their **protected transport vehicles** wherever possible. Depending on the situation, mission and availability these may include:

- the Fuchs armoured transport vehicle – to be succeeded by the Boxer MRAP equipped with mixed weaponry such as a heavy machine gun and automatic grenade launcher;
- the MUNGO protected vehicle of the specialised forces;
- the BV 206 S;
- the DINGO and/or DINGO 2, mine-protected, but with a reduced transport capacity.

Usually, further infantry forces are organisationally pooled in the heavy company to support (sub)units on operations. These include:

- **Joint Fire Support Teams (JFST) corresponding** to those of the artillery;
- **mortar support** along with the fielding of the mortar system (from 2012), also available as terminally guided ammunition with a range of up to 8 km;
- **airmobile weapon carriers** with machine guns and antiarmour guided missiles;
- **reconnaissance platoons** with additional airborne and ground-based reconnaissance means mainly to support combat reconnaissance, for scouting operations, area surveillance and monitoring of gaps and flanks as well as for establishing and maintaining contact.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, infantry forces are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Combat:**
  - combat patrol operations
  - seizing/gaining ground, but also of objects and lines of communication, chiefly in urban, difficult and most complex terrain

- o defending/holding ground, but also of objects and lines of communication, chiefly in urban, difficult and most complex terrain
- o defending friendly forces, civilian personnel, forces of the host nation as well as cultural assets
- o reinforcing inferior forces by land or air
- o directing fire support in conjunction with joint fire support (JFS)
- o providing fire support with own mortars
- **Control:**
  - o conducting patrols as a show of force
  - o conducting patrols to enforce public order, ideally supported by military police assets
  - o monitoring/securing areas, objects, lines of communication, civilians, forces of the country of deployment as well as cultural assets
  - o establishing and operating permanent and/or temporary checkpoints
  - o supporting civilian and military police forces interdicting, searching, and sweeping areas
  - o operating tactical combat outposts
  - o conducting crowd and riot control (CRC) operations.
- **Consolidation:**
  - o training local infantry forces
  - o supporting relief operations in the event of humanitarian emergencies
- **Other tasks:**
  - o collecting information and scouting during combat reconnaissance
  - o escorting convoys
  - o conducting overt force collection activities.

### 6.2.2 Army Specialised Forces

Army specialised forces primarily consist of airborne infantry forces. Being part of the infantry arms and services they possess all the capabilities of the infantry described under 6.2.1. Their special, in-depth training and their equipment qualifies them for flexible, remote and to some extent isolated operations of forces of various strengths and with changing areas of main effort. Thanks to organic JFST, airborne medical service and airborne engineer forces, Army specialised forces have direct capabilities at hand that enhance their operational effectiveness and allow rapid operations. Their fire control capability enables them to keep off and precisely engage their opponents by pin-point attacks while avoiding collateral damage to uninvolved parties. In this respect they can also support operations of local armed forces. Organic reconnaissance elements (two airborne reconnaissance companies, one long-range reconnaissance company) give

Army specialised forces their inherent intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities.



All elements of Army specialised forces are capable of conducting air-assault operations as well as airborne operations and, on account of their training and their technical means, can directly interact with air crews.

Army specialised forces are only employed in a modular system made up of forces of the Special Operations Division and its own medical assets (at NATO level Role 1), elements of the Bundeswehr Joint Medical Service and – organisationally – with forces provided by various armed and joint services.

As a contribution to establishing security and state order they may be tasked to conduct the following operations/ take the following measures:

- **Eliminating a threat**
  - o direct tactical support of specialised forces operations (only by Army specialised forces with advanced basic capabilities<sup>34</sup>)
  - o operations to capture INS
  - o rapid, airmobile reinforcement of inferior friendly forces
  - o attacks on INS
  - o reception and recovery of stragglers and encircled forces in critical situations.
- **Establishing a safe and secure environment**
  - o Monitoring/securing and defending remote areas/infrastructure
  - o conducting patrols especially in high-threat situations posed by INS
- **Consolidating a safe and secure environment:**
  - o Training local armed forces
  - o forming local specialised forces
- **Enabling/accompanying measures:**
  - o Concealed observation and observation posts
  - o Human Intelligence
  - o airborne unmanned imaging reconnaissance

<sup>34</sup> See also *EK SpezlOp*, (Specialised Forces Concept), Chapters 3.2.1.5 and 3.3.1.

### 6.2.3 Armoured forces

Armoured forces are made up of armour and armoured infantry. Their main features are the interaction and high firepower of their primary weapon systems as well as their high mobility on the ground and heavily armoured vehicles. Generally, armour and mechanised infantry cooperate in battle; however, in military activities to establish security and state order, the sole employment of mechanised infantry assets is possible, particularly so in the HOLD phase.



Armoured forces are capable of rapidly changing their method of fighting (from mounted to dismounted and vice versa) and may be employed in open as well as in urban terrain and in any weather conditions.

With their superior armour and firepower and the resulting continuous command and control capability in combat they may prevent violence from breaking out. Their observation equipment and weapon systems enable them to keep main lines of communication and supply routes open. Armoured forces are capable of settling escalating situations at a minimum risk to themselves, thus helping to establish security and state order. In situations where commanders or tactical leaders on the ground are required to respond to lethal threats quickly, main battle tanks and armoured infantry fighting vehicles are the proper means to rapidly produce the intended effect in almost all kinds of terrain. They enable the troops to maintain or regain their initiative.

The armoured forces' **reconnaissance and liaison platoons** have additional airborne and ground-based reconnaissance means to support combat reconnaissance, conduct scouting operations, area surveillance, monitor gaps and flanks as well as to establish and maintain contact.

The **ALADIN reconnaissance drone** provides the reconnaissance and liaison platoons of the armoured forces with an imaging reconnaissance system allowing airborne reconnaissance at a distance of up to 5,000 metres.

The **armoured infantry** is equipped with the **MARDER Infantry Fighting Vehicle** and will be fielding the **PUMA AIFV** in due course.

Armoured infantry fighting vehicles give the crew a fast and protected means of transport. They also allow them to quickly change the method of fighting and enable the fire team to join mounted combat.

The infantry fighting vehicle with its rapid-fire weapon system, the coaxial machine gun and the antitank guided-missile system, and the PUMA with its extra turret-independent secondary armament are capable of supporting the employment of dismounted mechanised infantry by delivering highly-effective and precise fire. The rapid-fire weapon system, among others, supports the fire fight of the dismounted fire team. With its flexible operational arc and traverse, targets in upper storeys of buildings can also be engaged.

In the future, the PUMA Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle will be capable of directing its air-burst ammunition against targets behind cover without significantly increasing the risk of collateral damage to uninvolved parties. The optical means of the PUMA will allow for omnidirectional close-range field observation under armoured protection.

Generally, dismounted mechanised infantry fight in the immediate vicinity of the armoured infantry fighting vehicle; employment at a distance from the vehicle is the exception.

In special situations, mechanised infantry fire teams may also be deployed aboard helicopters.

The "**Enhanced Future Infantryman System**" lends the infantry substantially improved C3 as well as extensive night vision and combat capabilities, considerably improves individual protection thanks to high-performance protective vests and, owing to the provision of new small - particularly short-range - arms has noticeably enhanced robustness across all ranges.

At company level mechanised infantry forces have a **sniper team** which is qualified, amongst others, for monitoring and reconnaissance tasks at immediate and very short range as well as for the accurate engagement of individual targets while minimising the risk of collateral damage to uninvolved parties.

The **armoured forces** are equipped with the **LEOPARD 2 Main Battle Tank**. This vehicle is a highly-mobile, well-protected weapon system with long range and high firepower. Long range and magnifying optical devices allow for reconnaissance by day and night at long distances and in poor visibility.

The armament consisting of a 120-mm main gun as well as one coaxial and one anti-aircraft machine gun enables the crew to support the employment of dismounted forces by delivering highly effective and precise fire.

Equipped with comprehensive ballistic as well as mine and CBRN protection, MBT crews are highly survivable even in asymmetrical threat situations where the enemy often cannot be prevented from being the first to fire. The main battle tank is even capable of immediately engaging the enemy even if exposed to direct hostile fire. Enemy forces can also be effectively engaged inside buildings, hardened positions and at long distances. This will also enhance the survivability of forces interacting with main battle tanks but less well protected than the latter.

The considerable side effects of the vehicle weapon systems on own forces but also on the civilian population (sound, blast, fragments and ammunition parts) must be considered – especially in urban environments. Due to the confined elevation of the tank gun, main battle tanks in such an environment may be restricted in bringing the effect of their weapon system to bear. Furthermore, the gunner's field of view at short range is restricted owing to the powerful magnification of the sight so that engaging targets and orienting at a distance of less than 400 m is complicated.

Wherever possible, main battle tanks must not be employed in urban environments without accompanying infantry and mechanised forces.

Since INS frequently rely on ambushes and urban infrastructure and can therefore hardly be engaged at long ranges, main battle tanks operated on missions to establish security and state order are usually employed to reinforce fire in interaction with light infantry and/or mechanised infantry forces. In situations like this, the psychological effect of their presence primarily comes to bear. In combat situations their level of protection, their mobility and fire power are of particular importance. In this context it must be considered that employing the tank gun and using the MBT's high mobility especially in urban areas may cause considerable destruction. This is why the employment of main battle tanks must be reviewed for proportionality at an early enough stage and, if applicable, be limited by corresponding rules of engagement.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, armoured and/or mechanised infantry forces are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Combat:**
  - o seize/gain/reach ground;
  - o destroy/encircle opposing forces;
  - o pursue withdrawing forces;
  - o relieve encircled forces;
  - o extract/evacuate threatened/isolated personnel (civilian/military) by road;
  - o destroy individual targets (combat ranges of up to 5,000 m);
  - o provide direct fire support to dismounted troops;
  - o defend/hold ground;
  - o reinforce forces in combat;
  - o carry out combat reconnaissance.
- **Control:**
  - o interdicting areas;
  - o securing areas/area surveillance;
  - o sweeping areas;
  - o searching persons and vehicles;
  - o conducting mobile and foot patrols;
  - o operating (temporary) observation posts;
  - o operating combat outposts;
  - o operating (temporary) checkpoints.
- **Consolidation:**
  - o Training mechanised forces;
  - o giving advice to mechanised battalion-size units
- **Other tasks:**
  - o conducting reconnaissance in all weather conditions;
  - o collecting information and scouting as part of combat reconnaissance;
  - o conducting elicitation through dismounted forces;
  - o escorting convoys.

#### 6.2.4 Army ISR Forces

Army ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) forces gain and provide whatever information is required on forces, resources, intents, activities and possible courses of action of INS and other groups of the population as well as on the area of operation to establish security and state order.

To achieve this, Army ISR forces are employed throughout the commander's area of responsibility.

In the process they are frequently required to observe particular OPSEC standards. Units with responsibility for specific areas are informed accordingly – and often subject to constraints - by their superior command. The actual form of cooperation and support in reconnaissance activities by Army ISR forces is specified in orders. Wherever possible, Army ISR forces will keep their tactical commanders in the area of operations informed about the conduct of their missions. In this context they will coordinate restricted areas (black boxes) and operations by

their forces employed within that area as cover and concealment for reconnaissance activities.

Army ISR forces gain information by synergistically drawing on their sub-capabilities:

- ground-based scout reconnaissance (including battlefield radar reconnaissance);
- airborne unmanned imaging reconnaissance;
- long-range reconnaissance, as well as
- intelligence collection by field intelligence forces.

Army ISR forces provide intelligence and reconnaissance results for situation, target, and battle damage assessment. In terms of JFS essentially contribute results on target data, target verification and for monitoring battle damage.

**Ground-based scout reconnaissance** forces with their lightly armoured reconnaissance patrols, light reconnaissance squads, airmobile reconnaissance patrols and mountain reconnaissance patrols have specific capabilities tailored to match the special requirements of the given mission and terrain. They are capable of operating under severe climatic conditions as well as in difficult and hardly accessible terrain including urban areas. Ground-based scouting reconnaissance operations in the scope of wide-range situation, target and poststrike reconnaissance as well as during surveillance and scouting missions throughout the area of operations produce detailed reconnaissance results for the tactical and, if required, operational level of command. At the same time, information and findings gained by other reconnaissance forces and means are consolidated, verified and updated by reconnaissance activities on the ground. Ground-based scout reconnaissance forces mainly gain their intelligence and reconnaissance results by relying on human perception and tactical conversations held directly on the ground, supplemented by optical and optronical reconnaissance assets, military tracking as well as ground-based and air-based sensors.

This allows the forces on the ground to assess the results of intelligence and reconnaissance directly and at the relevant levels. They are capable of operating in areas controlled by INS and, by the sustained employment of sensors and through observation from concealed positions, of gaining information without being detected by the enemy.

Scout reconnaissance forces have the capability of identifying targets even in remote areas beyond friendly control and of fighting them by directing fire support.

**Combat patrols** perform ground-based reconnaissance by means of sensor systems. FENNEK reconnaissance patrols as well as

airmobile and mountain combat patrols are provided with:

- ground-sensor equipment;
- one ALADIN minidrone system;
- one nerve agent alarm device;
- one set of radiation detection equipment, and
- their on-board observation and reconnaissance equipment.



In the future, they will be additionally equipped with mobile sensor systems (MoSeS). Until the command, control, information, and weapons control system of the relevant arm or service is fielded, data will be provided by the FENNEK command and control component. Combat patrols are equipped with long range command and control means. Moreover, their radiation detection equipment enables them to pick up N/C combat agents and N/C hazardous substances.

To complement combat patrols, **light reconnaissance squads** are especially qualified for dismounted and sensor-aided reconnaissance and surveillance in hardly accessible and rough terrain as well as under unfavourable weather conditions. Performing their function in establishing security and state order, they may also be employed both self-sufficiently and in teams to support other ground-based forces in their intelligence and reconnaissance efforts. In the process they provide support by observations from remote positions, the additional employment of sensors and tactical human source contact operations. The light reconnaissance squad has a higher dismounted strength and always consists of two light combat patrols, their transport vehicles, accessory kit for dismounted operation (e.g. portable observation equipment, laser range finder) and subsystems issued for the mission. They usually comprise:

- one set of ground-sensor equipment with six sensor packages;
- one MIKADO microdrone;
- one mobile sensor system with up to two sensor platforms.

**Battlefield radar reconnaissance** forces gain information on mobile and static objects and facilities of interest, and are essentially capable of classifying targets. The identification of targets and reconnaissance of the target environment usually call for further reconnaissance equipment to be employed. Radar reconnaissance is capable of detecting movement patterns and deviations therefrom within a certain area. Information is chiefly gained during periods of bad weather, poor visibility as well as from a distance and/or over wide ranges. Battlefield radar reconnaissance forces are capable of surveiling extensive areas, terrain sections as well as low-level airspace at day and night for long periods of time and, above all, in unfavourable weather conditions. In addition to this they extend the area covered by reconnaissance and/or facilitate the surveillance of areas and flanks if no other reconnaissance assets are available. The range of radar sensors depends on the prevailing weather and terrain conditions. To this end, a quasi-optical line of sight is required to the target to be reconnoitered.

**Long-range reconnaissance forces** are mainly involved with deep operations and conduct reconnaissance self-sufficiently and independent of the intensity of the operation; they strive to remain undetected when scouting from static or mobile positions, i.e. on foot and in vehicles, in impassible terrain, buildings and/or structures and in areas not immediately visible to the eye, such as natural and man-made caves and canal systems, as well as in all climatic zones. Using their optic and optronic special equipment they contribute to situation reconnaissance, target acquisition and, if required, to poststrike reconnaissance. They observe and monitor objects as well as areas and/or persons and/or groups of persons of special importance, use their optronic devices for documentation even from distant positions during day and night, analyse the results and forward the information gained without delay in target data quality to the superior command/requesting agency via hard-to-decipher transmission systems. Chiefly on account of their observation activities they contribute to situation and target reconnaissance as well as to post-strike reconnaissance, if required.

With their forward air controllers, long-range reconnaissance forces are capable of directing long-range, ground-based weapon systems as well as close air support by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. They belong to Army specialised forces and thus support operations as described in chapter 6.2.2. They are capable of providing direct support to special forces. Moreover, they can conduct force collection activities in isolated areas and high-threat situations. Long-range reconnaissance forces are especially capable of conducting reconnaissance for extended periods

while remaining undetected (sustainable without follow-on supplies up to 7 days depending on the climatic prerequisites) during day and night and in almost any weather conditions. Since they operate away from any platforms they can deploy by airlanding or parachute to the area to be reconnoitered for the requesting entity. As a rule, long-range reconnaissance forces are intended to work from a fixed position. For the surveillance, reconnaissance or scouting of areas, however, they may proceed on foot or use very light vehicles.

Information gained by **field intelligence forces** may provide information that would otherwise be impossible or almost impossible to obtain. Performing their specific function in establishing security and state order, field intelligence forces collect information on the mindset and intentions of the population especially by objective-oriented conversations with local key sources. Specialist support may be required to obtain technical information. This approach seems promising particularly in sustained operations as it depends on mutual trust to be established first.

In addition to that, field intelligence forces gain information by interrogating INS/persons detained by the Bundeswehr as well as by document analysis and initial visual examinations of property.

They also analyse open sources and may conduct briefings/debriefings of friendly units, as requested/directed. Field intelligence forces are especially qualified to describe facilities.

Reconnaissance flights can be conducted at any time and in almost any weather conditions by **airborne unmanned imaging reconnaissance** systems into the depth of the area; moreover, they can consolidate reconnaissance results within the very short range of a scout reconnaissance subunit. That is how large areas can quickly be covered with optronic sensors. Thanks to the results of airborne unmanned imaging reconnaissance, ground, air and sea vehicles and also groups of persons are detected, categorised and often even identified. Moreover, information on the state of the existing infrastructure can be gained.

Airborne unmanned imaging reconnaissance is suitable for temporary surveillance of areas and targets. Data thus gained and transmitted in near-real time need to be further analysed by qualified air photograph interpreters. This information not only serves to develop a military intelligence situation as required but is also important for the subsequent consolidating and verifying employment of other intelligence and reconnaissance assets.

Data gained by airborne unmanned imaging reconnaissance can be stored, analysed and transmitted onward. Comparing such with data collected during earlier overflights allows for changes to be detected, for instance of the surface of the earth or of structures on the ground. Since the course may be altered at any time during the given flight time, corresponding measures can be taken almost instantly in case the main effort is shifted or reconnaissance requirements occur elsewhere.

As a rule, unmanned aerial vehicle operations are subject to regulations under civil law and military requirements of airspace control. Since UAV in flight can be seen and heard, OPSEC implications must be considered.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, Army ISR forces are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Combat:**
  - o directing fire support
- **Control:**
  - o conducting patrols in exceptional cases
  - o carrying out area surveillance
- **Consolidation:**
  - o training and advising reconnaissance forces
- **Other tasks:**
  - o situation, target and post-strike reconnaissance in any weather and climatic conditions
  - o provision of reconnaissance results concerning impacts on the environment, infrastructure and population
  - o aerial reconnaissance
  - o surveillance of areas, objects and opposing forces
  - o reconnaissance in urban terrain
  - o tactical human source contact operations
  - o overt conversations.

### 6.2.5 Artillery

Forces of the artillery have a broad spectrum of skills for the employment of standoff-capable, precise weapon systems and for conducting reconnaissance.

To ensure efficient fire support, the Artillery tasks **Joint Fire Support Teams (JFST)** to cooperate with combat subunits. As a matter of principle, these teams will have the same level of mobility and protection as the units they support. Compared to classical observers the JFST have far enhanced capabilities inasmuch as they not only employ artillery and mortar strike resources but also other weapon systems (land-, air- and sea-based) to satisfy the need for fire support to requesting units.

The **ABRA Artillery Surveillance Radar** is capable of reconnoitering moving targets as long as there is a quasi-optical line of sight between the radar and the target to be reconnoitered. ABRA allows reconnoitering persons at a distance of up to 14 km, small vehicles up to 24 km and large vehicles up to 30 km.

That is how most of all remote tracts of terrain used by the INS as smuggling or supply routes can be surveilled.

The **COBRA Counter Battery Radar** is capable of reconnoitering firing mortar, tube and rocket artillery systems up to a distance of 40 kilometres. It takes two minutes to reconnoiter up to 40 hostile firing positions. It is even possible to determine the firing and target points of the shells.

The **KZO Target Acquisition UAV** is suited for target, situation and post-strike reconnaissance at a penetration depth of up to 100 km. One particular advantage of the KZO is its capability of collecting information by day and night and transmitting it in near-real time without any risk to friendly forces. It is, however, unable to reconnoitre inside any infrastructure. For the time being, no target discrimination capability is available either.

On account of its performance specifications and the endurance of 3.5 hours the KZO lends itself especially to escorting convoys and patrols as well to conducting pre-deployment reconnaissance of an operational area. Thus INS can be reconnoitered and monitored until finally engaged with indirect fire.

The **Armored Howitzer 2000** is the strike resource of the tube artillery. It offers superior firepower to support combat troops, long-range fire to avoid duel situations as well as opportunities to concentrate and rapidly shift fires with an element of surprise and quick response. With its precision-guided ammunition it permits highly accurate engagement of targets while at the same time minimising any collateral damage to uninvolved parties.



From a firing position within the camp perimeter, the Armoured Howitzer 2000 is capable of supporting own forces within a radius of 30 kilometres. The weapon system is responsive, precise and combat serviceable in any weather conditions. Combined with the COBRA system, hostile artillery and mortar positions can be engaged quickly and effectively.

**Rocket launchers** with guided missiles as weapon system of the rocket artillery are suitable for precision engagement of individual targets at long range. The firing range is some 16 to 85 km depending on the munition used. Accuracy is at approximately 5-10 m. The UNITARY rocket is suited to engage static targets (e.g. command posts, bunkers, bridges as well as INS emplacements).

Like the Armoured Howitzer 2000 the rocket launcher is capable of delivering fire support for own forces so that INS attacks can be effectively countered without exposing own forces to any increased threat. This can be achieved at any time and in almost any weather. Because of the enhanced range the area covered is also extended to 85 km. The rocket is equipped with a SMART warhead and used against armoured targets. Aborting a mission and discriminating targets, however, is not possible.

The **ADLER command, control, information, and weapons control system** assists the artillery commander in exercising command and control and employing his artillery assets. It is the heart of the Artillery System and ensures immediate interaction of all command and control, reconnaissance and weapon systems within the Artillery System.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, artillery forces are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Combat:**
  - o fire support
    - to counter attacks
    - to eliminate threats during operations
  - o direction of fire support
- **Control:**
  - o area surveillance
- **Consolidation:**
  - o training artillery forces
  - o giving advice to battalion-size artillery units
- **Other tasks:**
  - o aerial reconnaissance
  - o reconnaissance of hostile firing positions
  - o reconnaissance of movements

### 6.2.6 Army Air Defence

The Army Air Defence Artillery has sensors and weapon systems that enable it to perform tasks to establish security and state order. It is capable of countering airborne threats at short and very short range, with the exception of tactical ballistic missiles.

Active reconnaissance assets of the Army Air Defence comprise the **air surveillance radar, the short range radar as well as the reconnaissance, command and fire control vehicle**. They ensure airspace surveillance by day and night and locate, identify and report aircraft at low and medium altitudes. They contribute to the preparation of a recognised air picture.

The radar groups/teams must always be given priority in selecting their positions to achieve their maximum reconnaissance depth.

The weapon systems of the Army Air Defence comprise the **MANTIS**<sup>35</sup> Air Defence System and the **STINGER Fliegerfaust 2** which can be employed both as **MANPADS**<sup>36</sup> (shoulder-fired weapon) or be fired from the **OZELOT SAM Missile Platform** (light air defence system).

The target spectrum of the **Light Surface-to-Air-Missile Forces** encompasses manned and unmanned aerial vehicles. MANPADS even allows the use of positions in impassable terrain and inside buildings. Owing to its technical design the **STINGER Fliegerfaust 2** MANPADS may be subject to limitations in terms of effectiveness, for instance in weather-related poor visibility or by insulating window edges of buildings in built-up areas.

The **MANTIS Air Defence System** is a system designed to protect facilities/objects and capable of countering rockets, artillery and mortar grenades especially at very short range. It is also capable of calculating the point of launch<sup>37</sup> as well as the point and time of impact.

The **Army Air Defence Surveillance and Command and Control System (AADSACCS)** is the centrepiece of the Air Defence System. The AADSACCS allows the preparation of a fire-control-capable real-time air situation by interconnecting the sensors, providing the air situation picture and ensuring fire control.

<sup>35</sup> Modular, automatic and network capable targeting and interception system

<sup>36</sup> Manportable Air Defence System

<sup>37</sup> With artillery and mortar grenades; given the ballistic trajectory of rockets, however, this applies to them to some extent only.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, Army Air Defence forces are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Combat:**
  - o protecting
    - objects (static and deployable infrastructure);
    - areas (strategically and tactically vital ground), as well as
    - forces (units as well as civilian actors) against airborne threats.
- **Control:**
  - o airspace surveillance
- **Consolidation:**
  - o training air defence forces
  - o giving advice to air defence units
- **Other tasks:**
  - o coordinate the use of airspace
  - o contributing to the overall air situation

### 6.2.7 Engineers

The forces of the corps of engineers have assets and capabilities that enable them to provide direct support to establishing security and state order.

Manoeuvres such as ensuring friendly movements (e.g. clearing of obstacles, construction or reinforcement of bridges, improving the capacity of roads and routes) also add to gaining trust among the population. Engineers make their effective contribution to enhancing survivability by structurally reinforcing camps and facilities.

Echelon-tailored expert advice given by the relevant senior **engineers** provides military leaders and task force commanders with an immediate, situation-oriented and technically qualified suggestion on how to commit scarce engineer resources. The chief engineer of the brigade-size unit makes sure that all aspects of military engineering are taken into account during the estimate of the situation. This also includes engineer capabilities of other armed and joint services. Depending on the mission, these capabilities can be made available within an engagement network as required.

As early as during the preparation and the start of an operation **engineer reconnaissance** forces ensure that information is obtained on the physical characteristics of roads and bridges, dimensions of tunnels, soil trafficability as well as on explosive ordnance defence. All engineer-specific information provided will supplement the common operational picture of the higher command. Based on this information the chief engineer will prepare and permanently update digital engineer top level information and deal with specific engineer reconnaissance tasks.

Operating from armoured transport vehicles, **armoured engineer squads** provide direct engineer support to combat units. They can also provide engineer support inside buildings (e.g. by using breaching charges and mechanical aids to force doors open) and in underground systems. The inventory of weapons and equipment held by armoured engineer squads is to some extent similar to that of the infantry. Thus, they are especially qualified to afford direct support during operations in an urban environment. If required in a given situation, they can operate checkpoints or carry out point defence tasks. Independent infantry-type operations, however, must remain an exception.

**Armoured engineer vehicles** can be employed to clear debris and barriers or to open breaches and develop positions. If capacities permit, they may also directly and quickly support civilian tasks (digging, clearing, recovery, grading, pushing/spreading etc.).

**Armoured vehicle-launched bridges (AVLBs)** and other bridging materiel (e.g. folding girder bridge) may be used to restore destroyed bridges over bodies of water and terrain gaps for military use or to create additional crossings at short notice.

They can also be used to cross craters in destroyed road sections.

When armoured engineer vehicles, AVLBs and other engineer equipment are used, their protection and movements must be carefully coordinated. The hazards to the equipment must be weighed against the necessity of its rapid availability. Individual pieces of engineer equipment cannot provide for their own protection while performing engineer tasks; instead, additional forces must be kept available for that purpose.

**Camp construction/camp support forces** are skilled to set up and operate camps (by doing so they cater for: infrastructural security, accommodation, water supply, power supply, fire protection, dining and recreation facilities). Besides their original tasks these forces make their military contribution to establishing security and state order by setting up and operating tactical combat outposts (Chapter 5.3).

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, engineers are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Combat:**
  - o ensuring access by means of explosives and mechanical tools
  - o clearing barriers under enemy fire

- o employing own weapon systems to impede enemy movement and to block areas of retreat
- o using weapon systems to canalise enemy forces
- o providing reinforcements to inferior forces in infantry battle situations (tactical reserve at company level)
- **Control:**
  - o supporting infantry control tasks, especially crowd and riot control, interdicting areas, conducting dismounted patrols, operating checkpoints
- **Consolidation:**
  - o training/instructing civilian workforce on how to improve civilian infrastructure and obtain construction material
  - o training and instructing civilian workforce in matters of environmental protection
  - o training engineers
  - o giving advice to battalion-size engineer units
- **Other tasks:**
  - o contribution to the operational picture by engineer reconnaissance and scouting of
    - environmental, infrastructural and population influences
    - local resources;
    - communication and traffic networks;
    - natural obstacles;
    - engineer action taken by the enemy (e.g. barriers, IED)
  - o collection, analysis and provision of engineer command and control information;
  - o provision of advice on explosive ordnance defence;
  - o explosive ordnance clearing (if necessary even at the risk of incurring collateral damage to uninvolved parties);
  - o contribution to the explosive ordnance situation;
  - o facilitation of friendly movements by improving the infrastructure;
  - o increase of own operational effectiveness by preparing positions, field fortifications, reinforcing command posts etc.;
  - o surveillance of lines of communication with explosive ordnance disposal forces (route clearance);
  - o ensurance of access by means of breaching charges;
  - o employment of Army engineer divers (e.g. in sewage systems).

### 6.2.8 Explosive ordnance disposal forces (EOD<sup>38</sup>)

In crisis areas friendly forces as well as the local population are threatened by unexploded ordnance as part of asymmetrical warfare – especially by IED.



To counter this threat EOD forces and explosive ordnance clearance experts of the engineer corps pursue a holistic approach in line with the Bundeswehr Subconcept for Explosive Ordnance Defence

Compared to explosive ordnance clearing experts EOD forces have different capabilities of detecting, localising and countering a threat by explosive ordnance. EOD forces can, for example, render unexploded ordnance safe, recover munitions and destroy it without causing collateral damage to uninvolved parties. They also have special qualifications to recover, dispose of and neutralise IED and, when dealing with threats posed by hazardous CBRN substances, interact with CBRN defence forces. Explosive ordnance disposal teams must always be supported by securing and medical forces to fulfil their mission.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, Army EOD forces are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Consolidation:**
  - o training and instructing civilian personnel in matters of EOD defence
  - o providing support during large-scale EOD activities in order to improve the quality of life and security of the local population (direct support of the population and civilian organisations, however, can be afforded only if capacities permit and if the possible risk to employed personnel and, in particular, operational requirements have been duly taken into account).

<sup>38</sup> Explosive Ordnance Disposal

- **Other tasks:**
  - o operating EOD control centres to exercise command and control of explosive ordnance disposal forces;
  - o giving advice on explosive ordnance defence;
  - o updating the explosive ordnance defence situation;
  - o performing explosive ordnance disposal tasks.

### 6.2.9 CBRN Defence

CBRN defence forces including CBRN medical defence forces of the Bundeswehr Joint Medical Service are equipped and skilled well enough to support employed forces both under CBRN threat and in CBRN conditions, i.e. they can detect and identify hazardous substances and subsequently decontaminate personnel and materiel and/or provide medical care to contaminated casualties.

Apart from the threat of INS using CBRN munitions and/or actually doing so, another hazard may be posed by industrial CBRN substances.

**CBRN defence advice** also extends to systematically collecting, analysing, assessing and processing any information associated with a CBRN incident. In this context it is essential to identify, at any early enough stage, and to assess particular hazards posed by industrial installations, laboratory and research facilities as well as natural hazards.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, the forces of the CBRN Defence Corps are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Control:**
  - o monitoring the security of local facilities with a potential CBRN risk
- **Consolidation:**
  - o giving advice on CBRN defence to local personnel
  - o giving advice on CBRN defence to local personnel
  - o conducting water treatment to provide the population with drinking water at short notice if necessary as an emergency relief measure



- **Other tasks:**
  - o contributing to the operational picture by CBRN reconnaissance and CBRN analysis/effects information on
    - CBRN munitions
    - industrial and natural CBRN hazardous substances
    - possible CBRN threats posed by the enemy/terrorists
  - o decontaminating;
  - o decontaminating and affording medical care to casualties;
  - o supporting EOD forces in disposing of CBRN munitions;
  - o taking prophylactic measures against epizootic diseases to prevent epidemics from entering Germany.

### 6.2.10 Army Aviation

As the bearers of air mobility of land forces, Army Aviation assets are employed in their military role to establish security and state order under the same principles as for any other land operation. Helicopters are the most agile and flexible ground support assets. Since they operate away from the ground they can avoid obstacles such as barriers, debris, craters, mountains, valleys or even crowds of people and use the airspace for command and control, reconnaissance, combat and combat service support purposes.

By making use of their sensors **combat helicopters** are to some extent capable of compensating natural limitations of ground-based reconnaissance means due to vegetation, buildings and terrain.

The same goes for the employment of kinetic munitions. From their elevated position helicopters leave the enemy little chance to find cover and to evade the effects of fire.



**Transport helicopters** have special air drop and recovery equipment **for** inserting/extracting friendly forces at places where rotary wing aircraft cannot land (e.g. on rooftops, in forests, on steep slopes). They support ground forces even over long distances by ensuring the rapid transport of material. Transport helicopters specially equipped as **MEDEVAC helicopters**, **once** fitted with the necessary material and /or the relevant conversion kits and carrying qualified medical personnel, **can** be employed for aeromedical evacuation as forward (FWD) or tactical (TAC) AIRMEDEVAC missions. In this context, the Army Aviation Corps closely cooperates with the Bundeswehr Medical Service.

Support helicopters use the airspace as airborne command and control assets, aerial liaison vehicles, for reconnaissance, observation and scouting purposes, as a relay station, for personnel and material transport as well as for air surveillance.

Their agility and altitude in flight allow helicopters to quickly evade the effects of enemy weapons. That way, they considerably extend the tactical scope of action. At the same time, however, they are particularly exposed and attract hostile fire. Helicopters are vulnerable and high-value targets, even for small-arms, light rocket launchers and MANPADS. It is imperative that helicopter crews cooperate directly with the forces on the ground, even down to the level of single weapon systems, as may be necessary.

Near real time situation data, especially accurate information on the position of friendly forces as well as whatever target acquisition data may be available are a prerequisite for reliable identification. This is the only way to minimise the risk of fratricide.

Outside the perimeter of operational facilities, helicopters are particularly at risk during takeoff and landing. Therefore envisaged landing zones must be secured by ground forces to provide best possible protection from direct fire. As a rule this affects the availability of operational forces.

Because of their special capabilities helicopter forces cannot perform all-arms tasks as those covered under 6.1. In their role to establish

security and state order, they perform the following tactical tasks:

- **Combat:**
  - destroying targets
  - providing direct fire support
  - rapidly inserting infantry forces into contested areas
- **Control:**
  - conducting airborne patrols as a show of force
  - ensuring area surveillance
- **Consolidation:**
  - training and giving advice to pilots and (as directed by and under training responsibility of the Air Force) to aircraft technicians
  - supplying the population with relief goods in states of emergency
- **Other tasks:**
  - providing transport capacity for personnel and material
  - conducting aerial reconnaissance
  - transporting casualties
  - acting as airmobile command post
  - interacting with the forces of the CBRN defence staff of the Bundeswehr Joint Medical Service to ensure qualified aeromedical evacuation in a CBRN environment.

#### 6.2.11 Logistics

The basic procedures remain unchanged even in the logisticians' role in establishing security and state order. Logistic support is ensured in an integrated network of Joint Support Service (JSS) logistics, service logistics and services provided by third parties.<sup>39</sup>

Army service logistic assets are the **logistic services** of the units and elements as well as the **logistics battalions** and/or the supply battalions or the airborne command support battalions of brigade-size units. Mobile JSS logistics forces ensure initial and follow-on supply for the operational contingent and are therefore largely independent of the actual mission of the forces on deployment. .

Wherever possible, JSS and service logistics assets can be pooled under organisational, procedural and geographic aspects. The necessary military expenditure in terms of manpower and material can be reduced by:

<sup>39</sup> See Joint Service Regulation (ZDv) 31/1 *LogUstg von Einsätzen der Bw* Nos. 2006 and 3004.

- the organisational concentration of logistic assets as an opportunity to
  - benefit from identified synergy effects, and to
  - reduce and/or avoid duplications;
- the reduction of theatre operational stocks;
- the performance and sharing of logistic tasks on a multinational scale;
- the usage of logistic services provided by third parties.

Proactive planning and requests for logistic services made at an early enough stage are indispensable ingredients in this context to avoid supply bottlenecks.

If no point defence personnel is available, JSS logistic forces themselves must provide security of their own logistic facilities; consequently, fewer logisticians are thus available to perform their original logistic mission.

As a rule, logistic forces in their military role in establishing security and state order work from fixed facilities, and, due to poor or destroyed infrastructure, supply routes are far and few between, which makes activities along the remaining routes predictable to the enemy. Therefore, they are easily reconnoitered and rewarding targets to INS.

Depending on the given situation and logistic mission, additional assets may be required to perform security-related tasks.

**Maintenance forces** belong to the logistic services of units/elements and are the repair assets of the logistic battalions of brigade-size units as well as the mobile repair and maintenance forces of JSS logisticians.

**Maintenance and repair forces** are capable of performing service and maintenance work, preventive maintenance as well as standard, short-term repairs of vehicles and/or materiel on charge units and/or elements and that do not require special tools and spare parts. They have their own equipment to recover disabled or damaged vehicles and/or materiel and to carry out battle damage and improvised repair to restore the basic functions of moving, communicating and firing, as well as conducting repair work not requiring special tools or spares.

Mobile/deployable military **maintenance and repair forces** of the service and JSS logistic services generally carry out maintenance work in the shape of damage-specific materiel tests, time-consuming service and scheduled maintenance, modifications, damage repair as well as final inspections of materiel.

The maintenance and repair forces of the logistic battalions are capable of carrying out system repairs in line with tactical requirements and at a given location. This is done by tactically mobile maintenance and repair forces who usually combine the test and repair process as one cycle with the use of easily replaceable spare part packages of the respective level of maintenance and/or system-specific spare parts. Moreover, they are capable of conducting improvised and battle damage repair and may, as required and ordered accordingly, even modify defence materiel.

In addition, they provide recovery services as required by the units to be supported. The responsibility for the recovery of damaged materiel, however, generally devolves upon the units.

The evacuation of materiel to the receiving repair facility and/or to the service provider is initiated by the responsible logistic control element (disabled-materiel control), to be performed by mobile logistic forces.

**Materiel management assets** of units/elements and of the logistic battalions generally have tactical mobility and are capable of supplying their own forces in the area.

In the scope of their military role in establishing security and state order, deployed forces are usually supplied inside camps. Depending on the nature of the mission and on how long and where operational forces are deployed, however, it may be necessary to reinforce them with logistic assets and/or to supply them with goods.

With their low level of protection, supply and recovery vehicles (driver's cabin protection, lack of protection of the loading platform) and given the fact that such vehicles are "less" well armed, they are vulnerable and rewarding targets to INS. They are particularly jeopardised. This is why logistic forces in particular require protected transport capacity as well as protected recovery and transport means. Depending on the situation and the threat posture, logistic transports by road must be conducted as self-protective transports, as transports with extended self-protection or as convoy operations.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, Army logistic forces are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Consolidation:**
  - supporting the provision of relief supplies to the population, as needed
  - training logistic leaders, technical and employed personnel
  - giving advice to battalion-size logistic units.
- **Other tasks:**
  - providing logistic support

### 6.2.12 Armed Forces Joint Medical Service

Forces of the Armed Forces Joint Medical Service cooperate with the armed services' organic medical assets to ensure medical support of the troops. In this context, all elements of the different levels of treatment (roles) of the Armed Forces Joint Medical Service may be involved. Depending on the situation and the availability of capacities, security forces of the host nation and civilian personnel may also be afforded medical support. Usually, however, no extra assets are provided for and kept available for this particular purpose.

Nevertheless, the Armed Forces Joint Medical Service is essentially suited to meet the medical requirements of the local population and may thus temporarily support parts of the civilian health system on a subsidiary basis, for instance by providing medical supplies and conducting vaccination programmes as well as by taking over medical treatment temporarily. Subsidiary medical support of the local population may become necessary and be granted for a specific period of time if the capacities of the state concerned and of the civilian organisations on the ground turn out to be insufficient. What is crucial in this context is to involve the local health system, if existent. The concept of "help for self-help" has first priority. This kind of assistance may be beneficial in winning the support of the local population. Support provided to the civilian population, however, must not prejudice the main mission, i.e. the support for own forces.

Furthermore, Medical Intelligence Forces (MEDINT) help to consolidate the situation picture and advise the force commander while closely interacting with the Senior Medical Officer (SMO) in theatre.

Moreover, the Armed Forces Joint Medical Service may assist in establishing a military medical service and training of medical personnel; this applies particularly to training non-medical service personnel in the subject of self and buddy aid.

The service logistics of the Armed Forces Joint Medical Service ensures the operational readiness of materiel of own deployed units/facilities in interaction with JSS logistics and, if required, service logistics.

It supplies medical material for all deployed forces and provides direct logistic support to units and facilities of the Armed Forces Joint Medical Service.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, forces of the Armed Forces Joint Medical Service are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Consolidation:**
  - emergency and general medical care of the local population
  - training of medical personnel
  - training of local armed forces and security forces in of self and buddy aid
  - assistance with setting up and operating medical facilities (hospitals etc.)
  - support and training of local forces in epidemics control and hygiene



- **Other tasks:**
  - the SMO in theatre advises the force commander on all medical matters
  - medical support provided to own forces in all types of operation with mobile/highly mobile medical forces and medical facilities (Roles 1-3)
  - medical support and care of own forces (Roles 1-4) inclusive of "Strategic Aeromedical Evacuation"
  - organisation and conduct of casualty control in all Roles
  - medical support provided to EOD forces during the disposal of CBRN munitionsground-based medical evacuation and ensuring all relevant organizational measures
  - interaction with Army Aviation and Air Force assets in tactical and strategic aeromedical evacuation, as may be the case
  - supply of medical materiel
  - CBRN medical defence and casualty decontamination
  - MEDINT.

### 6.2.13 Command and Control Support

Drawing on the Bundeswehr IT system, efficient command and control support provides the necessary information technology to ensure the rapid and uninterrupted supply of information tailored to meet the needs on and across the command and control levels of all participating units and allies.

Command and control support encompasses the management, supply and security of information and related technology. These functional tasks are performed by a network of command and control support forces, signal forces including all-arms signal communications as well as non-military service providers.

One prerequisite to be successful in establishing security and state order in crisis areas is that the relevant forces have access at all times to a common role-based and up-to-date operational picture.

The Army Command, Control and Information System (FüInfoSysH) and the future **command, control, information, and weapons control system** (FüWES) provide the necessary technical basis. The automated exchange of information with the command, control and information systems of other armed and joint services, allies, partners or even civilian actors with systems of their own must be improved step by step.

The transfer of information as part of information supply is realised via the core network/system establishing a network both between areas of operation abroad and to the home base. There are access networks connected to this core network/system which are set up and operated by command support and signal forces.

On Bundeswehr operations abroad satellite communication, radio relay, HF, VHF and trunked radio are used; their available maximum data and voice transmission rates, however, may vary depending on the system employed.

Physical challenges such as insufficient range or terrain obstacles may require the dismantled operation of signal forces and command and control support forces, for instance radio or relay teams positioned at terrain points crucial for network operations.

Since incoming information usually exceeds the the volume of information that can be processed (information overload), the necessary exchange relations must be permanently analysed and adjusted by a powerful and quick-response information management.

Only by mission- and situation-related assessment and specification of the actual information requirement will crucial information be made available in good time without encumbering

military decision-making processes and corresponding procedures as well as the Bundeswehr IT system.

On account of the large number of different forces IT security gains special importance. Following the principle of proportionality, all measures must be taken and enforced to deny INS any possibility to affect friendly communication and command and control systems and related data so as to rule out any risk to an operation to establish security and state order.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, signal and C2 support forces are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Consolidation:**
  - o training and giving advice to telecommunications personnel
  - o providing advice and assistance in setting up a communications infrastructure within the host nation
- **Other tasks:**
  - o ensuring and improving the command and control capability

### 6.2.14 Military Police

Performing their policing and technical tasks with their vehicles, materiel and equipment issued, Military Police forces lend themselves well to help establishing and maintaining security and state order, especially so for standard police tasks. Their command and control equipment permits quick-response, coordinated and mobile employment.

Military Police forces are an indispensable part of the force package not only in maintaining public order but also in restoring it. Military Police support is particularly important in securing actionable evidence, clarifying and documenting the facts of a conflict to be subsequently dealt with in court, and for crowd and riot control. The equipment available to the Military Police includes a number of non-lethal weapons whose controlled employment enables intervening forces to provide fast and qualified support in operations of that nature. Depending on the situation, Military Policemen and women may be directed to cooperate with the combat units.

To avoid friction, any employment of the Military Police must be coordinated with the military leader responsible for a specific area.

Military Police forces help compile the military and civil situation picture by contributing, via their standardised reporting system, any findings gained through their operational reconnaissance.



Acting as mediators and performing training functions, Military Police forces closely cooperate with authorities and organisations entrusted with policing and security tasks in the area of operations as well as with other military and civilian host nation authorities and agencies responsible for public order. Particularly by training security forces such as national military police and civilian police forces, the German Military Police make a sizable contribution to establishing and maintaining state structures.

- **Combat:**

The Military Police provide dedicated support to operations by committing military police capabilities as required by the given situation, mission and operation. In addition to their ordinary tasks they supply specific and common capabilities in direct tactical support of special forces and in support of special operations.

- **Control:**

Where the mission – depending on the mandate – encompasses establishing and maintaining public security and order by military forces, the German Military Police will, by virtue of their police-specific skillset and training, assume such tasks vis-à-vis the civilian population in the area of operations. This also includes:

- o operating and backing up facilities of local security forces (police stations) if and as long as regular police are not available in sufficient strength
- o conducting patrols and operating checkpoints to help with the surveillance and protection of areas
- o assisting in matters of custody and detention
- o conducting search-and-seize operations and searches with the aid of service dogs, as the case may be
- o assisting with crowd and riot control (CRC)
- o making inquiries and investigations to clear up crimes
- o performing other policing or police-like tasks.

- **Consolidation:**

In the context of establishing and/or supporting authorities and organisations entrusted with security tasks, the technical qualification, command and control organisation and equipment of Military Police forces make them particularly eligible for such tasks. This includes (among others):

- o training security forces
- o giving advice to security forces
- o partnering security forces

- **Other tasks:**

- o carrying out military police tasks in the scope of the national/international force package

### 6.2.15 Military Information Support Operations (MISO)

PsyOp assets and activities enable military leaders at operational and tactical levels to address – directly and straightforward – the mindset and sentiments of adversaries, parties to a conflict, and the civilian population in the area of operations to influence their demeanour, attitude and intentions in favour of the conduct of the operation.

Thus, they add to the military leader’s spectrum of influence and his scope of action the opportunity of being effective without resorting to lethal or kinetic weapons.

PsyOp forces contribute to a common situation picture with their findings on the psychological and socio-cultural situation, their analyses and assessments of the communication situation among target audiences, the media situation in the area of operations, and information activities by the enemy.

PsyOp forces provide **cross-cultural advice on operations**. Cross-cultural operational advisors deal with, in a dedicated and demand-oriented way, any information on social, political, cultural, ethnic, religious and historical facts and conditions that is needed to assess the security situation and to plan and conduct operations. On behalf of the responsible military commander they exert influence on key individuals and groups within their networks for the purpose of the operational objective.

Information supplied by such advisors is necessary for the early identification of conflicts and timely de-escalating measures. Maintaining constant and direct contact to formal and informal local leaders also helps enhance the level of protection of own forces. Information gained must be regularly exchanged with military intelligence personnel at the relevant HQ, and resulting assessments coordinated.

Cross-cultural operational advice encompasses:

- advice to military decision-makers with the preparation and conduct Bundeswehr missions;
- advice to soldiers who establish and maintain contacts with decision-makers and the local population in the area of operations, as well as
- the development and cultivation of human contacts with relevant persons and the use of such contacts for information collection.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, PsyOp forces are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Control:**
  - o effective, target group-specific activities within the information environment to influence the population and INS via all available media (TV, video, radio, printed material, internet etc.) while drawing on the assistance of tactical PsyOp groups, and in that process
    - analysis and assessment of the psychological situation of the target groups
    - analysis, assessment of and countermeasures against hostile information activities
    - supply of information to the local population on unlawful acts/consequences of hostile actions
    - demotivation of INS
    - mobilisation of the local population's support against the INS
    - measures to win understanding for military efforts to establish security and state order among the local population
    - support of the host nation with the publication of official statements
    - information of the population on the situation and guidelines on how to behave appropriately.
- **Consolidation:**
  - o training and counseling of local military and civilian actors performing public relations functions
- **Other tasks:**
  - o reducing the effects of hostile information activities
  - o assessing the effects of operations on the information environment
  - o providing cross-cultural operational advice to military leaders

#### 6.2.16 CIMIC Personnel

With a view to the prevailing situation and the stance of the civilian population, movements of refugees, critical infrastructure including sensitive areas, the assessment and conduct of flanking support measures by own forces, and the assurance of permanent and approachable availability, CIMIC constitutes an essential element in the conduct of operations.

CIMIC personnel have special capabilities of communicating and cooperating with civilian authorities and actors. The level of protection and tactical mobility of their vehicles as well as their command and control support equipment ensure that they are integrated well into the operational forces and adapted to the requirements of the operation concerned. CIMIC staff elements provide advice to military leaders in all matters of civil-military cooperation. Moreover, CIMIC staff elements assess, display and evaluate the civilian situation; during the estimate of the civilian situation they assess the influence factors of the civilian environment. By doing so, they contribute to a holistic estimate of the situation. CIMIC functions relating to the (civilian) medical and health services are fulfilled by assets of the Bundeswehr Medical Service.

As far as the **estimate of the civilian situation** is concerned, those factors of the civilian environment are evaluated which may impact on the conduct of operations and/or put the success of own operations at risk. When encountering factors viewed as critical it has to be decided how the mission can be accomplished and how unwanted effects of the own conduct of operations on friendly forces, the population or specific population groups could be prevented or reduced.

The influencing factors of the civilian environment must be duly investigated with regard to possible correlations.

If the estimate of the civilian situation produces a direct/indirect threat to own forces or if any such threat cannot be ruled out, the relevant influencing factors will be dealt with by the J2/G2 division of the HQ in question. Information gained must be exchanged with intelligence personnel of the HQ at regular intervals.

The situation and stance of the civilian population may be sustainably influenced in a positive way by dedicated CIMIC activities, which may ultimately contribute to an overall success. This is achieved particularly by CIMIC activities conducted at short notice and with immediately visible results. Usually this requires support by other forces (e.g. engineers, CBRN defence, logisticians or medical staff). In this context, CIMIC activities are always directly linked to the objectives of the operation.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, CIMIC forces are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Consolidation:**
  - o providing advice and training to relevant, civilian actors of the host nation also involving CIMIC specialists on capabilities in the following fields of activity:
    - public affairs,
    - civilian infrastructure,
    - humanitarian aid,
    - trade and industry, as well as
    - cultural affairs
  - o cultivating contacts, exchanging information and coordinating measures with civilian actors
- **Other tasks:**
  - o giving advice to military leaders with regard to
    - civilian influences on the conduct of operations,
    - the effects of military measures on the civilian environment
  - o the development, improvement, consolidation and cultivation of a network of information and relations with civilian actors
  - o effective, professional cooperation, coordination and consultation with civilian authorities and actors;
  - o coordination of humanitarian emergency relief measures
  - o update, display and estimate of the civilian situation with the exception of the (civilian) medical and public health system
  - o contribution to the military decision-making process, among other things, by
    - identifying and rating facilities with protecting (critical infrastructure and sensitive areas);
    - finding key personnel and multipliers in civilian organisations, authorities, facilities and among the civilian population
    - assessing options for CIMIC support activities
    - supporting the process of rating the availability and utilisation of civilian resources
  - o taking part in operations, among other things, by
    - ensuring emergency relief supplies to the civilian population in interaction with other forces;
    - participating in measures by third parties during humanitarian disaster relief operations

### 6.2.17 Electronic Warfare Forces

To conduct electronic warfare (EW), the force commander is provided – besides weapon system-specific electronic warfare assets – with EW assets to conduct EW not specific to a weapon system as an EW Task Force that carries out electronic support measures and electronic countermeasures. With the aid of electronic support measures (ESM) the EW Task Force directly contributes to the operational picture by situation, target and post-strike reconnaissance. Furthermore, they ensure that the automatic ESM systems for platform protection are supplied with reference data.

Automatic ESM systems detect and identify electromagnetic emissions of adversaries and/or parties to a conflict and their weapon systems as threats and, where needed, trigger protective systems. The sensor data produced in the process may then be evaluated further.

**Electronic countermeasures (ECM)** not only affect the adversary's command and control capability but also the employment options of enemy weapon systems. Countermeasures comprise electronic deception, jamming and neutralisation of enemy reconnaissance and weapon sensor systems as well as detection and command and control systems by using electromagnetic jamming transmitters, false targets or LASER operation. Furthermore, the effects of electronic countermeasures come to bear against military and especially against civilian communication means and systems used by INS.

EW Task Forces are occasionally employed in isolated operations and generally cater for their own security. Depending on the threat situation, however, they must be supported by extra security forces. The military commander must take this into account in his task organisation and operation plan. Commanders conduct EW specific to a weapon system for platform protection within their areas of responsibility.

The EW Task Force is capable, among other things, of reconnoitering hostile communication links including cellular networks, jamming such networks and detecting radar emissions.

The aim of these activities is to detect INS network structures and to identify individuals. Furthermore, under certain circumstances, the information transfer of INS may be impeded to such an extent that INS can barely take action in time or no action at all. Communication, detection, navigation, command and control and guiding systems may be influenced in such a way that their effect is reduced, the commander's intent remains unclear and wrong assumptions by the INS are caused or confirmed.

Apart from the all-arms tasks outlined under 6.1, EW Task Forces are capable of performing the following tasks as a military contribution to establishing security and state order:

- **Consolidation:**
  - o providing training and advice to local electronic warfare forces
- **Other tasks:**
  - o reconnoitering and identifying electronic signals
  - o impeding the enemy's communication possibilities
  - o facilitating own communication possibilities
  - o protecting march serials and convoys against RCIED by means of RCIED jamming systems

### 6.2.18 Computer Network Operations Forces (CNO)

INS frequently use computer networks to communicate with each other and to deliberately spread incorrect information. This can be countered by friendly CNO. To this end, gaining control over key areas and objects (command and control systems, centres and systems of communication, among other things) plays a decisive role as CNO could easily be initiated from such points.

One particular advantage of employing CNO lies in the fact that it can be brought to effect at a long distance from the target, depending on the situation and mission. This means, that CNO forces may operate from their camp or even from the home country, which means that they would be exposed to a very low threat or none at all. If, for technical reasons, CNO forces have to be employed directly within danger zones, however, they will be under severe threat and hardly able to protect themselves.

With regard to the military role in establishing security and state order it must be borne in mind that as far as requests for effects to CNO forces are made, the time needed to conduct CNO and to satisfy the requests can hardly be predicted. That is why CNO forces are more suited to conduct missions that are not under any acute time limit or linked to follow-up operations, but are of a more flanking nature.

For that reason, CNO forces are usually not placed under the command of the tactical commander on the ground but directed to support in strategic or operational regard.

Due to limited resources, CNO forces are available for effects only and not for further tactical measures to help establish security and state order.

### 6.2.19 Geoinformation Forces

The military role in establishing security and state order is significantly dependent on the area and prevailing environmental conditions.

As part of geographic information support such data are assessed by geographic information staff.

At national level the provision of geographic information on operations is the responsibility of the Bundeswehr Geoinformation Service; this is done in cooperation and coordination with multinational regulations on geoinformation support. The document to be observed in this context is ANNEX T<sup>40</sup> to the OPLAN of the operation concerned. Other German organisations operating in the area must be furnished with geoinformation across departmental boundaries.

The Bundeswehr Geoinformation Office (AGeoBw) may assist with the preparation of operations by providing

- material on fundamental regional studies (e.g. regional military-geographic information), and
- geoinformation data and products for planning operations (e.g. selected map series, high-resolution satellite images, information on climate and weather, etc.).

In the future, geoinfo data will be made available largely iaw the NATO concept for the Recognised Environmental Picture (REP). The REP is to become the Bundeswehr Geoinformation Service's contribution to the common relevant operational picture for network-enabled operations.

Geoinfo personnel at the headquarters and local staffs are employed at the Military Intelligence Cell and the Geoinformation Centre. Such personnel may assist with preparing special products. This also includes presenting information collected on operations.

If required, the Bundeswehr Geoinformation Office may assist with modular Geoinformation task groups that may, for instance, provide support in the field of terrain survey and terrain geology on operations.

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<sup>40</sup> In accordance with SHAPE J5PLANS/COPD(T)FEB10 "Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive"

### **6.3 Contributions made by Special Forces**<sup>41</sup>

Special Forces are especially suited to conduct operations in the course of which collateral damage to uninvolved parties and any escalation must be kept under control, limited or avoided, or which require particular secrecy.<sup>42</sup> Special forces operations comprise<sup>43</sup> (if applicable, in interaction with Army forces with advanced capabilities for special operations<sup>44</sup>) for example:

- offensive action to counter terrorist threats and to fight subversive forces by the precise elimination of such threats before they become effective;
- combat operations even in the depth of the area against targets of strategic or operational relevance;
- covert operations;
- detention of target persons as well as confiscation and documentation of important material.

What is particularly important in the scope of the military role to help establish security and state order is not only the Special Forces' capability of conducting special reconnaissance but also of taking discriminate offensive action such as eliminating, fixing or detaining opposing high-value targets, but also their capability of rescuing/freeing own or friendly high-value targets. Special Forces are mainly effective against command and control structures of INS and able to carry out precise attacks.

In the scope of supporting sovereign measures they may provide assistance in the development and training of special forces of the host nation.

If Special Forces' operations need to be coordinated with those of other forces, it must be considered that the sensitivity of information concerning the Special Forces must at all times be weighed carefully against the information requirement of the other forces involved.

Special Forces' operations must always be harmonised particularly in an overall operational approach to ensure that the image established among the local population through the entirety of own information efforts is not impaired.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Ratification Draft 2) and the Subconcept for the Employment of Special Operation Forces.

<sup>42</sup> Army Regulation HDv 100/100, para. 10043.

<sup>43</sup> See "Special Forces Operations" Subconcept, 2004, Chapter 1.3.

<sup>44</sup> See "Special Operations" Subconcept, 2004, Chapters 3.2.1.5 and 3.3.1.

### **6.4 Contributions made by Air Forces**

Air power essentially characterises almost all military operations. Because of their inherent characteristics air forces are particularly flexible and thus in a position to establish main efforts and be effective even at short notice and over long ranges.

Air forces with their special capabilities act as force multipliers and as such support forces employed on the ground.

In detail, they contribute to the military role in establishing security and state order by:

- airborne aerial strike/air defence forces,
- ground-based air defence,
- point defence forces,
- airborne reconnaissance forces, as well as
- air transport forces.

#### **6.4.1 Airborne aerial strike/air defence forces**

Because of their capability of being deployed flexibly and in area-wide operations, airborne aerial strike forces and air defence forces decisively contribute to gaining and maintaining the initiative even over opponents appearing quickly and unexpectedly, and deny them possible areas of retreat.



Moreover, instead of directly making use of their weapon systems they may also have a deterring effect to INS and supporters by simply showing force in the area of operations.

In the scope of the military role to help establish security and state order, airborne strike and air defence forces may be effectively employed by:

- **Threat elimination:**
  - providing precise and responsive support of own forces (including those of the host nation) by Joint Fire Support when directly countering of attacks (Close Air Support)
  - supporting the interdiction of areas and/or disrupting lines of communication of the INS (Air Interdiction)
  - precisely and timely engaging ground targets from the air

- **Establishing a safe and secure environment:**
  - combat air patrol operations (both to support the host nations in their efforts to perform sovereign tasks as well as to show force)
- **Consolidating a safe and secure environment:**
  - contributing to the establishment and training of air forces of the host nation
- **Enabling/supporting measures:**
  - making available command and control facilities (Air Operations Centre, Deployable Control and Reporting Centre) needed for the coordination and command and control of air operations
  - surveilling (possibly even remote) areas from the air.

#### 6.4.2 Ground-based Air Defence

Flying platforms (e.g. drones) used by INS will increasingly get into focus. Ground-based air defence forces are equipped with powerful sensors, effective weapons and command and control systems so that they can contribute to providing protection in the scope of establishing security and state order. They can be brought to bear against the overall spectrum of potential aerial threats including defence against tactical ballistic missiles in the lower intercept layer. Ground-based air defence forces with their organic sensors are able to perform tasks such as searches, detection, identification, tracking and target illumination and thus contribute to the recognised air picture.

Ground-based air defence forces employed in the scope of the military contribution to help establish security and state order be effective as follows:

- **Threat elimination:**
  - air defence
    - protection of individual objects
    - protection of groups of objects
    - area defence
    - protection of mobile operations
    - static employment even for camp security especially for countering tactical ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles
- **Consolidating a safe and secure environment:**
  - training air defence forces
  - giving advice to air defence units
- **Enabling/supporting measures:**
  - airspace surveillance
  - contribution to the overall air situation

#### 6.4.3 Air Force Ground Combat Support Forces

As a matter of principle, Air Force ground combat support forces perform the following tasks on operations:

- **Main tasks of the Air Force ground combat support forces on operations**
  - protection of facilities of the Air Force and the adjoining area
    - protection of mobile and static objects of the Air Force
    - protection of special infrastructure of the Air Force on operations
    - support in setting-up and operating a remote operational basis
    - protection of special weapons
  - protection of approaching or departing airborne platforms and those on the ground
  - protection of the ground-based air defence forces of the Air Force
  - protection of air transport assets on the ground
  - support of the task of Combat Search and Rescue
  - tactical and technical advice to the command echelons on the ground
  - support of Air Force field intelligence forces
- **Secondary tasks of the Air Force ground combat support forces on operations**
  - creating a stable environment inside and, if required, outside the adjoining area of the installation
  - supporting special operations such as evacuation operations etc.
  - supporting the process of securing of evidence
  - participating in Fact Finding/Site Survey Tasks
  - supporting humanitarian aid and urgent emergency aid missions

As a matter of principle and on account of their equipment and training, Air Force ground combat support forces in the scope of the military role in establishing security and state order are eligible to perform the following tasks – along the lines of chapter 6.2.1 infantry:

- **Threat elimination:**
  - seizing, gaining and reaching of confined areas and mission-essential infrastructure within the respective area of operations and/or adjoining area of the installation even in urban and difficult terrain.
  - surveilling, securing and defending confined areas and mission-essential infrastructure within the respective area of operations and/or adjoining area of the installation even in urban terrain.

- **Establishing a safe and secure environment:**
  - conducting patrols
  - setting up and operating checkpoints
  - searching; area screening
  - operation of combat outposts
  - interdicting areas
- **Consolidating a safe and secure environment:**
  - training local armed forces

This task devolves upon the Air Force ground combat support forces and must be carried out in coordination with other employed forces responsible for that area.

#### 6.4.4 Airborne Reconnaissance Forces

Manned and unmanned airborne reconnaissance forces have a broad spectrum of various sensors – high-resolution cameras, thermal-imaging devices, radar etc. Depending on the system used they are capable of transmitting reconnaissance results to ground forces in real time and/or near real time. . By doing so, they provide information as a basis for target allocation, planning/conduct of other missions or even for the protection of own forces, for instance by giving warnings on emplaced IED.

Manned systems (for example TORNADO RECCE) are able to cover long distances within little time and allow the main effort to be shifted instantaneously. They may enhance their range and endurance by air-to-air refuelling and are capable of transmitting sensor data in near real time. Unmanned systems (e.g. HERON 1) compared to manned systems are rather slow, however, thanks to their extended loiter time they allow for continuous and detailed reconnaissance and assessment of the situation in the area of operations (>24 h depending on configuration and flight profile). Aided by highly sensitive reconnaissance technology (electro-optical, infrared, radar) reconnaissance results needed for the estimate of the situation can be provided via radio and/or satellite communication in near real time and almost independent of the weather and light conditions.

In the scope of the military role to help establish security and state order, airborne reconnaissance forces may be assigned the following tasks:

- **Consolidating a safe and secure environment:**
  - contributing to the establishment and training of the air forces of the host nation
- **Enabling/supporting measures:**
  - performing reconnaissance tasks including reporting and transfer of sensor data
  - monitoring areas of high interest; developing a “Pattern of Life”

- monitoring movement routes, patrols etc. and consequently detecting/preventing ambushes, IED attacks etc.
- detecting and observing military, paramilitary and mission-relevant non-military groups
- supporting in fire fights by moving forces towards the enemy, preventing hit-and-run tactics
- collecting data and information on target and post-strike analysis
- monitoring (possibly even remote) areas from the air.

#### 6.4.5 Air Transport Forces

Operational and tactical air transport is provided by means of transport aircraft and helicopter assets (cf. Chapter 6.2.10) ensuring mobility of own forces within the area of operations. Air transport forces continue to be available for MEDIVAC and only in exceptional cases for CASEVAC missions, too.



In addition, helicopter crews of the air transport forces provide their capacities in the field of search and rescue as well as in the overall spectrum of personnel recovery with a focus on Combat Search and Rescue of isolated personnel.

Outside the perimeter of operational facilities, helicopters are particularly threatened during takeoff and landing. Therefore envisaged landing zones must be secured by ground forces to provide best possible protection from direct fire. This can not always be guaranteed for Combat Search and Rescue operations due to the constraints of the mission and situation. This is why situation-oriented freedom of decision as well as the capability of self-protection are indispensable for Combat Search and Rescue forces.

Air transport forces may be assigned the following tasks in the scope of the military role to help establish security and state order:

- **Establishing a safe and secure environment:**
  - supporting transports of security forces, medical personnel, casualties, injured or sick persons as well as transports of relief supplies

- **Consolidating a safe and secure environment:**
  - assisting with the establishment and training of air forces of the host nation
  - assisting with setting up an aeronautical search and rescue organisation in the host nation
- **Enabling/supporting measures:**
  - performing operational and tactical air transport for quick deployment of reserves and/or reinforcements allows for the point of main effort to be shifted rapidly even over longer distances (which is an important contribution to create of moments of surprise and thus to gain the initiative) (this measure encompasses, besides airland operations, delivery and/or airdropping of personnel as a method of insertion).
  - ensuring follow-on supply of own forces even over longer distances (resulting in enhanced sustainability even of isolated and/or remote units as well as to relieve the burden on the land forces so the number of convoys moving by road can be reduced)
  - conducting qualified aeromedical evacuation in the scope of FWD and/or TAC AIRMEDEVAC
  - planning/conducting operations within the overall spectrum of personnel recovery

### **6.5 Contributions by Naval Forces**

Naval forces are capable of developing maritime space adjacent to an area of operations so that it can be used as a base for joint operations. In the scope of the military role in establishing security and state order they usually act as force enablers and multipliers for the composite forces and thus raise the number of tactical and operational options for the conduct of operations.

Even ahead of military ground operations can naval forces be deployed in the intended area of operations. In the scope of Maritime Security and Maritime Interdiction Operations they may prepare the employment of land forces by displaying commitment and resolve, performing sea-based reconnaissance and carrying out surveillance tasks.

Using sea-based platforms, naval forces also allow headquarters required for command and control of the operation to be based early enough close to the area of operations and to contribute to the development of a joint situation picture. Land operations close to the coast can thus be led by a command based in a secure and logistically self-sufficient environment.

On the whole, naval forces can be effectively employed in any suboperation aimed to help establish security and state order. Their tasks may include:

- **Threat elimination:**
  - disrupting maritime supply lines and lines of movement of INS
  - engaging land-based targets by the JFS engagement network
  - supporting special operations and Special Forces operations
- **Establishing a safe and secure environment:**
  - countering direct attacks, in particular from the sea and from the air
  - assuming sovereign maritime policing tasks by conducting sea-based patrols (establishing public order)
  - supporting civilian organisations in the context of subsidiary aid, providing goods and services:
    - transporting and delivering relief goods to distribution agencies/organisations ashore to help people in distress
    - supporting and contributing to the provision of medical supplies to the civilian population in a safe and secure environment
- **Consolidating a safe and secure environment:**
  - helping with establishing and training naval forces of the host nation
- **Enabling/supporting measures:**
  - contributing to intelligence and reconnaissance efforts
  - providing convoy escorts
  - transporting own forces (personnel, materiel, ammunition) by sea into the area of operations or the vicinity thereof
  - ensuring supplies to friendly forces by sea to enhance their sustainability
  - providing medical care aboard sea-based platforms
  - employing sea-based platforms to exercise command and control of initial operations by land forces
  - keeping open sea routes (incl. of harbour installations) and merchant shipping routes as a basis for the deployment of own forces and the provision of supplies to the local population.

# Part C

## Annex

### **C1 Guiding principles on the conduct of military measures to establishing security and state order in crisis areas**<sup>45</sup>

Security and state order are established in an extremely complex environment where – on the assumption of the classical conduct of operations – employed military forces often have to change their way of traditional thinking. The following guiding principles shall provide food for thought – but not restrain it. The situation on the ground determines to what extent individual guiding principles can be applied in practice.

***The more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.***

The success of military measures to establish security and state order is, among other things, achieved by affording protection **to** the population. In this context, military forces must visibly show their commitment throughout the area. If they keep to their (protected) facilities they will inevitably lose contact with the population and give the insurgents freedom of action. Therefore, the commander's challenge is to strike a balance between integrating his troops firmly into the population and giving them maximum protection.

***The more force is used the less effective it may be.***

The use of coercive force or even violence has side effects the extent of which can not be anticipated. Any collateral damage to uninvolved parties or other mistakes will help the insurgents find a basis for propaganda that will depict the forces on operation as troops bent on brutality.

***Approaches that work well today need not necessarily do so tomorrow. If it is successful in one particular area it will not necessarily apply to others.***

Insurgents are very flexible and often part of a busy communication network. They quickly adapt to identified tactics of opposing actors and are just as fast at spreading all relevant information among fellow fighters. Local problems often require local solutions: "All COIN is local!"

***A tactical success may be a strategic defeat.***

Western armed forces will certainly win most tactical battles on account of their superior training, equipment and command and control. Strategically this may be irrelevant and in the worst case distract from impending strategic defeat. Likewise, tactical success – for instance a village stabilisation operation – may have strategic effects as it may serve as a reference for future developments and provide an example for a sustainable defeat of insurgency.

***Military success in itself is no guarantee at all.***

Military measures alone, however important they may be, cannot ensure success in establishing security and state order. In some situations, a local teacher or doctor may turn out to be more efficient at tackling insurgency than an entire infantry company.

***Sometimes "doing nothing at all" is the best response.***

Frequently actions taken by insurgents primarily aim to make operational military forces overreact, which can subsequently be exploited for propaganda purposes. In this context, measures by friendly forces that have a high symbolic value or the potential of being misconstrued must be carefully considered beforehand to avoid triggering hostile propaganda and thus thwart the overall objective of the operation.

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<sup>45</sup> Cf. Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Ratification Draft 2), Chapter 5 – The Military Contribution, Section III – Paradoxes.

***Some of the most suitable weapons cannot even fire.***

Military measures with regard to establishing security and state order are often most effective and sustainable if the focus is not on eliminating INS. The crucial fight is not the one against INS but the one to win the minds of the population. Depending on the concrete local situation military forces must therefore work towards establishing security and state order by rather non-kinetic measures.

***It is often more beneficial to have forces of the host nation take a measure with imperfection than to have own forces do it with exactitude and precision.***

With a view to consolidating the local authority's legitimacy it is essential to give measures a "local touch". Failing that, a feeling of dependence may emerge, impairing the reputation of the host nation government.

***Many crucial decisions are not made by generals.***

Successful military measures and operations require the competence and judgment of servicemen and women of all levels. In practice, decisions at tactical level are often made by young military leaders and sometimes even by the rank and file ("*strategic corporals*"), which sometimes has strategic consequences (e.g. at checkpoints when a decision is to be made whether to open fire or not).

**C2 List of abbreviations**

<b>Abbreviation/ Acronym</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
ABRA	<i>Artilleriebeobachtungsradar</i> – artillery surveillance radar
ADLER	<i>Artillerie Daten-, Lage- und Einsatzrechnerverbund</i> – artillery information network
AGeoBw	<i>Amt für Geoinformationswesen der Bundeswehr</i> - the Bundeswehr Geo Information Office
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
ALADIN	<i>Abbildende luftgestützte Aufklärungsdrohne im Nächstbereich</i> - airborne close-in range imaging reconnaissance drone
CNO	computer network operations
COBRA	counterbattery radar
COIN	counterinsurgency
CRC	crowd and riot control
EAKK	<i>Einsatzvorbereitende Ausbildung für Konfliktverhütung und Krisenbewältigung</i> - predeployment training for conflict prevention and crisis management
EK/EW	<i>Elektronischer Kampf</i> - electronic warfare
EloGM	<i>Elektronische Gegenmaßnahmen</i> – electronic countermeasures
EloSM	<i>Elektronische Schutzmaßnahmen</i> - electronic protective measures
EloUM	<i>Elektronische Unterstützungsmaßnahmen</i> – electronic support measures
EMS	<i>Elektromagnetisches Spektrum</i> – electromagnetic spectrum
EOD	explosive ordonance disposal
FAC	forward air controller
FüInfoSysH	<i>Führungsinformationssystem des Heeres</i> – German Army Command and Control and Information System
FüWES	<i>Führungs- und (Waffen-)Einsatzsystem</i> – command, control, information, and weapons control system
Geo Info	Geoinformation
GeoInfoDBw	<i>Geoinformationsdienst der Bundeswehr</i> – Bundeswehr Geoinformation Service
GeoInfoW	<i>Geoinformationswesen</i> - Geoinformation Affairs

Abbreviation/ Acronym	Meaning
GO	governmental organisation
HAufklKr	<i>Kräfte der Heeresaufklärungstruppe</i> – Army ISR Corps
HFlaAFüSys	<i>Heeresflugabwehr-, Aufklärungs- und Gefechtsführungssystem</i> – Army Air Defence Surveillance and Command and Control System
HUMINT	human intelligence
IEB	<i>Interkulturelle Einsatzberatung</i> – cross-cultural operational advice
IED	improvised explosive device
InfoOp	<i>Informationsoperationen</i> – information operations
INS	insurgents
IO	international organisation
JFST	joint fire support team
KZO	<i>Kleinfluggerät Zielortung</i> - small air vehicle for target location
leSpähGrp	<i>Leichte Spähgruppe</i> – light reconnaissance squad
LuSK	<i>Luftstreitkräfte</i> - air forces
LSO i. E.	<i>Leitender Sanitätsoffizier im Einsatz</i> – force surgeon
MANPADS	manportable air defence system
MANTIS	modular automatic and network-capable targeting and interception system
MEDINT	medical intelligence
MIKADO	<i>Mikroaufklärungsdrohne im Ortsbereich</i> - micro drone for local area reconnaissance
MilNachrL	<i>Militärische Nachrichtenlage</i> - military intelligence situation
MilNW	military intelligence
NG&A	<i>Nachrichtengewinnung und Aufklärung</i> - intelligence and reconnaissance
NGO	non-governmental organisation
ObjSKrLw	<i>Objektschutzkräfte der Luftwaffe</i> – Air Force ground combat support forces
OpInfoKr	<i>Kräfte der Operativen Information</i> – military information support operations
OPSEC	operations security
OSINT	open sources intelligence
REP	recognised environmental picture
RFI	request for information
SanDstBw	<i>Sanitätsdienst der Bundeswehr</i> - Bundeswehr Medical Service
SpezKr	<i>Spezialkräfte</i> - special forces
SpezKr H	<i>Spezialisierte Kräfte Heer</i> – Army Specialised Forces
STF	<i>Streitkräftegemeinsame Taktische Feuerunterstützung</i> – joint fire support
TTP	tactics, techniques and procedures
ZMilNW	<i>Zentrales Militärisches Nachrichtenwesen</i> – military intelligence centre
ZMZ/A	<i>Zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit/Ausland</i> - civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)
ZSanDstBw	<i>Zentraler Sanitätsdienst der Bundeswehr</i> – Bundeswehr Joint Medical Service

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