



Port and Harbor Terminal Security



Theft and pilferage of cargo are extremely serious problems in terminal operations. A seemingly insignificant bit of laxness in security operations and procedures may provide a clever thief an opening to steal as much as a loaded container.

Physical protection requirements are the same in terminal areas as in warehouse and open storage areas. The need for personnel identification and control is, if anything,

greater. Many of the problems encountered or physical security procedures and techniques used in storage and intransit security (ARs 190-11, 50-5) are equally applicable in terminals.

There are, however, some different and frequently more demanding aspects of physical security due to the very nature of a terminal. The exposure to pilferage and sabotage is intensified and broadened because ports and harbors are prime targets for enemy and criminal activities, plus the perimeter areas of these activities are more

vulnerable because of extensive distance and exposed beach or pier areas.

Terminal areas may include modem piers and warehouses, or may be an unimproved beach on which logistics-over-the-short (LOTS) or roll-on/roll-off (RORO) operations are conducted. The water-side may be anything from a broad and deep harbor to a narrow and shallow river, either of which may be under constant or intermittent enemy attack, either open or covert. All of these elements contribute to problems especially attendant to physical security of terminals.

Frequently Overlooked Functions

Section I

10-1 Military Police Participation

a. There are three important functions in terminal operations in which the physical security aspects are frequently overlooked and military police participation is not always sought. Provost marshals and military police commanders should be particularly aware of these functions, and should seek out all opportunities to participate in them. They are ship destination meetings, boarding parties, and reconnaissance and site selection in LOTS operations.

(1) Ship destination meetings. Ships, especially those en route to a theater of operations, usually sail from their ports of origin with only a tentative destination, since it is not always possible to determine the most desirable point of discharge until the ship arrives in the theater. The final destination is determined at a ship's destination meeting conducted by the appropriate commander. Many factors

that must be considered in this determination include characteristics of the:

- Ship.
- Ship's cargo.
- Capabilities of the terminal.
- Capabilities of the land transportation system.

(a) Military police interest includes advance determination and planning for the provision of MP support required during unloading/debarkation operations while the ship is in port.

(b) A most important item for determination at this time is the nature of the cargo-whether it is dangerous or hazardous, sensitive, or highly susceptible to pilferage. This information should be used to determine the amount and types of MP support required, and for briefing all persons assigned.

(2) Boarding parties. When the ship's manifest and cargo disposition instructions have been received, plans are made for unloading. Before any movement or

unloading begins, a boarding party goes aboard to inspect the cargo and its manner of stowage, and to check on troop units or individuals to be debarked. This boarding party is normally led by the terminal operations officer. A military police representative should be included, to obtain information necessary for planning for MP support (such as hatch and/or deck guards, patrol boat escorts for lighters, etc.) and to observe, or receive reports on, any indications of pilferage or sabotage of cargo en route.

(3) Reconnaissance and site selection in LOTS operations. Logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations require selection of suitable sites, based initially on a study of maps and hydrographic charts and analysis of aerial reconnaissance reports by the terminal group or brigade commander.

(a) Final determination is based on detailed ground and water reconnaissance by representatives of the engineer, signal, amphibious and landing craft units, and others as required.

(b) Military police representation

should be included in these meetings and functions to determine the support need for:

- Traffic control operations
- Security of the pier and dock
- Beach security
- Convoy escorts and route selection
- Other MP activities.

b. Another activity in which the military police should be represented is the daily review of ships in port and en route. (This review may be conducted as a part of the ship's destination meeting, or it may be separate.)

(1) Progress in unloading/loading of each ship is reviewed so that an estimate can be made of clearance of a ship from the port and its replacement by another.

(2) Reviews may also be made of any factors that would affect plans previously made at ship's destination meetings, such as the necessity to reschedule a ship due to the nature of its cargo, delay en route, or similar factors. All such reviews will provide information essential to the provision of adequate military police support.

Responsibilities and Functions

Section II

10-2 Who's Responsible

a. The entire responsibility for a US Army terminal is that of the transportation terminal commander. He is responsible for:

- Safety and security of the entire terminal.
- Personnel assigned to, passing through, or working within the terminal.
- Security of all cargo from time of arrival in

terminal to departure, either inbound or outbound.

b. The **provost marshal, military police commander, or military police physical security staff officer**, assigned or attached to the terminal advises, recommends, and assists in preparation of physical security plans and implementing directives. He also either commands or supervises security guard forces assigned to the terminal

(military and civilian), and participates in the coordination of all security and defense activities of the terminal (tactical and nontactical).

10-3 Terminal Areas Defined

A terminal is composed of a number of distinct, although correlated, areas, such as storage areas (covered and open), piers (land and water sides), beach or shore areas, entrances/exits, anchorage areas, and ships tied up at piers. It may also include POL discharge points, pipelines, and POL storage areas.

10-4 Water Terminal Guard Force

The guard force is the key to successful security.

a. Guard posts are motorized, stationary, or walking, depending on the type of supplies and cargo on the wharves, types of ships, and location and nature of the posts.

b. Gate guards check passes and badges of all individuals entering or leaving the terminal facilities; issue and check badges of authorized persons entering or leaving restricted areas in the terminal, such as piers, wharf sheds, vessels, and ammunition areas; search bundles and packages being taken from the area; examine trip tickets and documentation of cargo vehicles; control vehicle, railroad, and pedestrian traffic; and direct persons without proper passes to the identification section.

c. Pier and beach guards may be assigned to stationary posts to guard certain cargo areas, or they may be assigned to walking posts.

d. Pier guards check passes and/or

badges, observe longshoremen, keep on the alert for evidence of pilferage or tampering, and assist or relieve other guards. Pier guards watch for small boats approaching the wharves. They check for proper identification of persons on board who desire to enter the pier or to board any vessel docked at the pier. These guards should have ready access to firefighting equipment and should maintain constant vigilance for fires under piers and heavy accumulations of oil next to pilings. They should not, however, fight fires at the expense of their security duties, but take only emergency measures while awaiting firefighting crews. Fires are sometimes started to distract security personnel.

e. Offshore guards, on stationary or walking posts, cover the harbor or stream end of wharves. They watch for trespassers in boats. They notify the officer of the day or the sergeant of the guard of the approach or a cargo vessel so that gangplank and ship guards will be on hand when the vessel docks.

f. Gangplank guards control longshoremen, terminal personnel, crew, and ship handlers boarding and leaving a vessel.

g. Hatch guards are posted as required in cargo hatches where longshoremen load or unload cargo. Requirement is based on the nature, value, or sensitivity of the cargo.

(1) Hatch guards stay on the same level as workmen, when possible, and report on damaged cargo and evidence of pilferage and sabotage. They must be alert for any attempts to divert, or "frustrate" cargo by changing destination markings. Damaged cargo must be set aside and guarded until it can be delivered to the terminal reoperation section for repair.

(2) Hatch guards must also coordinate with guards on deck to prevent dropping of cargo over the side of the ship.

10-5 Pier Security

The landward side of a pier can be protected by fencing and pass control; but the part of the pier that protrudes over the water cannot be protected in this manner. Not only is this part of the pier accessible from the sides and end, but also from the underside. Methods for securing the pier along its water boundaries are as follows:

- Patrols
- Protective lighting
- Booms
- Nets.

a. Patrols in small boats should be used in pier areas to prevent unauthorized small craft from operating in adjacent waters and to recover jettisoned cargo (figure 69).

(1) Patrol boats should be sufficiently narrow of beam to enable passage between the pilings when inspecting the underside of piers.

(2) Patrols walking along the end of the pier may be used separately or with boat patrols.

(3) All patrols should observe all debris floating on the water, as floating mines are sometimes delivered in this manner.

b. Protective lighting in the working area of piers should be adapted to construction and work needs. Slips and underpier areas should be lighted sufficiently to give night protection. Lights under a pier can usually be affixed to pilings close to the pier flooring. Wiring and fixtures in this area should be waterproof to insure safety in case of unusually high tides (chapter 6).




Figure 69—Pier security patrol boats should be able to move between pilings.




Figure 70—Example of boom and cable net protection.

c. Booms. Under certain circumstances it may be advisable to close off the waterside of a pier area by the use of booms (figure 70). A floating boom will prevent entry of small boats. To deny underwater access, a cable net must be suspended from the boom. An adaptation of the barrier described in chapter 5 may be used.

10-6 US Merchant Seamen And MP Authority

a. US civilians manning ships directly operated by a US agency, or any US civilian employed by a private business firm (foreign or US) under contract to one of the military department to support military operations in an oversea area are usually classified as Category I civilians.

b. Category I civilians are subject to US military police authority.

c. US military police exercise apprehension and detention authority over Category I civilians. Military police exercise this authority on a US Government installation or on US-controlled property or in combat areas and facilities under US control for offenses committed thereon or for protection of human life or property.

d. US-operated ports are considered facilities under US control. This includes vessels moored or anchored.

e. US military police are authorized to board a US Flag vessel to protect American citizens, US property or the US Flag vessel itself, whenever requested to do so by the master and in such other emergencies when

deemed necessary by appropriate lawful military authority. This police authority extends to US Flag ships at anchor, moored, moored by buoys, or at piers within prescribed distance (usually the three mile territorial limits) of the host nation.

10-7 Cargo Documentation

a. Cargo moving through terminals is documented in accordance with DOD Regulation 4500.32-R. The basic document used is the Transportation Control and Movement Document (TCMD), DD Form 1384. (See appendix T for details.) This form is a seven-part, pre-numbered document which is initiated by the shipper for each shipment, for example, a truckload.

(1) The form shows the cargo (type, number of packages, etc.), the consignee to whom it is being delivered, names of the cargo checker and truck driver, and the time the cargo left the shipping point.

(2) Its purpose is to insure accurate and quick delivery of the cargo, reducing the risk of loss, theft, or pilferage.

b. The MP or physical security guard is concerned with the TCMD, since he must check this document against the load on a truck leaving the terminal, unless the load is sealed and wired or locked, such as a van or CONEX container. Otherwise, he must check the itemized TCMD, verify the types and number of packages, and check the security of the load in accordance with local requirements.

(1) If all is in order, he writes his name and organization on the TCMD, and stamps it with a date/time stamp, all in the spaces provided. He also records the date, time, and TCMD number in the gate log, and returns the TCMD to the driver.

(2) If he does not find all in order (for example, less packages than listed on the TCMD or load security requirements not

met), he must hold the vehicle and report the circumstances immediately so that an investigation can be made and discrepancies corrected. He should know and be able to verify by a signature on the TCMD, the person(s) authorized to release the cargo. Signature cards or coded templates maybe used for this purpose.

c. Another instance of military police concern with the TCMD is a report from a consignee that he did not receive a shipment, or that there was a difference between the cargo as described on the TCMD and that actually received. Either case will probably require a military police investigation, using the TCMD as a starting point.

d. Two physical aspects of the cargo checking activity may be worthy of consideration:

(1) When the cargo vehicle gates are also used by other traffic, a turnout may be provided into which cargo vehicles can be directed for checking. This turnout, of a size appropriate to the volume of traffic, will eliminate congestion at the gate.

(2) To facilitate checking of cargo, a wooden platform may be built at the checking area. The platform should be as long as the vehicles being used (e.g., tractor-trailer) and provide a deck at, or slightly higher than, the level of the truck bed. Such a platform provides for easier and quicker checking since it permits better observation of the cargo.

e. Military police assigned to terminal cargo checking duties should be thoroughly familiar with the procedures for use of the TCMD and allied documents (see appendix T).

10-8 Container Operations

Cargoes intransit are vulnerable to overt hazards (such as pilferage, and enemy or guerrilla attack or ambush) and covert




Figure 71—Vulnerable stages for theft / pilferage of cargo.

hazards (such as sabotage). As one measure to provide additional security for supplies and equipment, the use of containers during shipment is widely used.

a. Containers must receive close security emphasis during:

- Filling
- Sealing
- Storage (shipper/receiver)
- Shipment (onloading and offloading),

b. Areas where security measures for containers must be stringent are (figure 71):

- On board ship
- Shoreline transitions
- Container marshaling area.

c. Knowledge is the keynote to security during container operations. It is important that security personnel be aware of the following to detect pilferage and theft:

- Packaging, labeling and placarding requirements.
- Cargo compatibility characteristics and segregation requirements.
- Container and cargo handling and safety measures.
- Actions to be initiated in case of suspected pilferage/theft operations.
- Special storage, identification and movement requirements.
- Pertinent regulations and publications.

d. Some basic measures for beefing up security are discussed next:

(1) Marshaling yard entrance/exit.

Control of vehicular and pedestrian traffic entering and leaving the area is a must:

- Establish a single control point for each.
- Man both points with US military personnel assisted, as required, by foreign national police and/or interpreters.

(2) At the vehicular control point:

- ☐ Prevent entry of unauthorized vehicles (only transporter and materials handling equipment, maintenance, and essential administrative vehicles may enter).
- ☐ Inspect inbound and outbound containers for:
 - Evidence of damage or unserviceability.
 - Presence and condition of container seal and/or lock.
 - Evidence of illegal entry into container (such as tampering with or removal of door hinges).
 - Stolen items, particularly with outbound containers (look on top and under container, and inspect transporter cab).
- ☐ Verify documentation for correctness, completeness, and legibility (check that the transporter number, container number, and container seal number match those shown on the TCMD).
- ☐ **No container (inbound or outbound)**

passes through the control point without a valid TCMD.

(3) At the pedestrian control point:

- Permit only authorized personnel to enter container marshaling area.
- Establish, maintain, control, and safeguard a pass system for persons authorized to be in the area:
- A photo-bearing, serially numbered, plastic-enclosed pass can be prepared for each individual authorized to be in the yard. The individual picks up the pass when entering through the gate and returns it to the security guard upon leaving.
- Further refinement of the pass system may be made by color-coding to indicate the specific area of the yard in which the bearer is authorized. Color-coding can be made even more visible by requiring hard hats that reflect the same color as the pass.

e. A physical security officer (military police) is authorized in the security, plans, and operations section of the transportation terminal battalion. He is responsible to the battalion S3 for developing, putting into effect, and monitoring the marshaling area security plans, procedures, and actions. His responsibilities also include determination and supervision of the force (for example, military police units) required for terminal security.

f. Perimeter security of the marshaling yard backs up gate security in keeping unauthorized people out of the area. Unauthorized people may engage in sabotage (particularly in an ammunition marshaling area) or petty theft. Or, to promote large-scale theft operations, they may establish inside contacts with people working in the yard. Perimeter security measures may include one or more of the following:

(1) Chain type fencing topped by strands of barbed wire. Inspect fence daily to assure there are no holes or breaks (chapter 5).

(2) Concertina wire (chapter 5).

(3) Flood lighting (chapter 6).

(4) When feasible, use of sensors and IDS systems (chapter 7).

(5) In a LOTS operation, mine strips on the land side.

(6) Use of motor patrols, dog patrols, and physical security posts, which, upon request, can be made available by the military police physical security company (TOE 19-97).

g. Security cargo. Though it may not be possible to fence the entire yard, the security cargo (that is, sensitive, classified, and high-dollar-value cargo) area should, as a minimum, be fenced with its own military guarded gate and MP patrol. An added security measure is the **stacking** of containers **door-to-door**, or with the door against a wall (also applicable to other types of cargo). (See figure 72 for example.) The break-bulk point and damaged cargo storage area are




Figure 72—Details of stacked containers for maximum security

also potential high loss areas and require close supervision and/or adequate perimeter barriers and lighting. Additionally, whenever possible, security cargo should be unloaded from the ship during daylight hours. Observation of unloading operations by MP security personnel is highly desirable.

h. Safeguarding and controlling TCMDs. Normally TCMDs are not accountable documents. If desired, TCMDs may be serially numbered locally to aid in control and to discourage pilferage of the form for illegal use. Regardless of other measures, blank TCMDs should be secured, with one individual responsible for their safeguarding and issue. Completed TCMDs should be kept in a vault file to prevent unauthorized alterations or destruction to remove evidence of cargo diversions/pilferage.

i. Safeguarding and controlling container seals. A container seal is a device applied to the container door fastening to indicate whether the door has been opened or the fastening tampered with and, if so, at what point in the movement system it happened. Seals are serially numbered to help identify the person who applied the seal and to provide control. Unless seals are strictly accounted for from receipt to application, their purpose (to pinpoint unauthorized entry into the container) is defeated. Container seal control and accountability is promoted by the following procedures:

- Maintain a record by serial number of seals—

- ☐ Received by the port operations officer.
- ☐ Issued to authorized persons for application to containers.

- Store seals under lock.

- Designate one person to be responsible for safekeeping, issue, and recordkeeping of seals applied at the port.

- Designate specific persons on each shift to apply seals (keep number of persons to a minimum).

- Enter serial number of seal on TCMD.

- Conduct periodic inventory of seals.

- Seals should be applied—

- As soon as container has been stuffed.
- As soon as a stuffed but unsealed or improperly sealed container is detected.

- An inventory of contents may be required if sufficient evidence exists that cargo has been pilfered. In any case appropriate entries must be made on the TCMD to identify any change in seals.

- Application of seals should be supervised. Failure to supervise, or allowing a yard hostler to move an unsealed container to the stacking area, offers opportunity to—

- Pilfer cargo prior to applying the seal.
- Apply a bogus seal, break the seal later, remove cargo, and then apply the legitimate seal.

10-9 Anchorage Security

When a port lacks sufficient pier space to accommodate traffic, ships may be required to anchor, or even to load and unload, offshore. Positions of ships in anchorage are assigned by local port authorities. Cargo is loaded or unloaded by lighters (large barges) which also transport stevedores to the ship being worked. This type of operation has advantages and disadvantages with respect to security of the ships. The trips to and from anchored ships give added time for inspection or surveillance of the laborers; but it is difficult to control movements of small boats that bring provisions to the ships. Such craft may be used in pilfering, smuggling, or sabotage activities. Military police water patrols and alert supervision of stevedoring offer the most effective protection.

a. Shipboard Guards.

(1) In addition to hatch guards, guards must be assigned, where appropriate, to the decks of ships at anchor.

(2) Deck guards may be assigned to either stationary or walking patrols. In addition to cooperating with hatch guards, the

following duties may be included:

- (a) Security of cargo stowed on deck.
 - (b) Security of cargo being unloaded onto lighters.
 - (c) Observation of small craft in the vicinity of the ships at anchor.
 - (d) Observation of surrounding waters to detect any attempted approach by swimmer sappers.
 - (e) Assistance in operating the anchor chain collars.
- (3) Deck guards must be able to communicate, preferably by radio, with harbor patrol boats either directly or through their operations center.
- (4) Deck guards must have appropriate foul weather clothing; binoculars are essential for proper observation of surrounding waters and small craft.

b. Anchor Chain Collar.

(1) Swimmer sappers use the anchor chains of ships to their advantage. They tie one end of a line to them and on the other end attach their mines. When the current changes, the mine moves alongside the ship and explodes. To prevent sappers from accomplishing this goal through this technique, anchor chains must be checked frequently. This can be done from aboard ship.

(2) A simple device has been discovered to help personnel aboard ship check the anchor chain. This device is the anchor chain collar (figure 73). It is built with two padeyes—one at the top of the collar and one at the bottom. The padeye at the top is used to connect the rope used to haul the collar up, dragging any attached sapper




Figure 73—Anchor chain collar details.

line out of the water. The lower padeye is used to connect an out-haul line which is threaded through the link in the anchor chain at the anchor ring. The collar can thus be raised by hauling the collar up, and lowered by pulling in the out-haul line. Raising and lowering the collar should be done every 15 to 20 minutes on an irregular basis. A detail of the collar (ring) is depicted at figure 74.

(3) No specific dimensions are set for the collar since one standard collar will not fit all sizes of anchor chains. Collars should be fabricated (by engineer, ordnance, or naval units) in sizes appropriate to the sizes of anchor chains most commonly in use in each area—preferably the largest

size since it can be used also on smaller sizes. The collar should be, generally, twice the length of the anchor chain link; the width should be sufficient to leave 3 to 4 inches of free space on each side of the link, to allow for accumulations of seaweed or debris.

(4) A port commander should have one of these collar devices available for each ship that anchors in his area of responsibility. Collars could be issued to each vessel as it arrives and returned to port authorities just prior to the ship's departure. Ships' captains should also be encouraged to fabricate their own collars for use while in hostile waters, thus insuring they will




Figure 74—Details of anchor chain collar design.

always have a collar available while they are at anchor.

(5) Personnel operating and checking these collars must be instructed that:

(a) Lines must be kept taut while the collar is in place. Any slack observed in the line must be considered as possible tampering with the line (cut by an underwater swimmer) and must be promptly investigated.

(b) If the line cannot be hauled in, an investigation must be made to determine the reason. It may have been cut by an underwater swimmer and tied to the anchor chain to prevent hauling in the collar.

(6) When mines are suspected or discovered, EOD personnel should be contacted immediately through the port commander so that mines can be detached and made harmless.

10-10 River and Harbor Patrols

a. Port and harbor security requires the use of patrol boats, not only for the open harbor area but for the water sides of piers, dock areas, and patrol of inland waterways and beach areas used in LOTS operations.

b. Missions assigned to military police water patrols may include the following:

(1) In port areas:

(a) Enforce port regulations.

(b) Suppress criminal activity.

(c) Provide offshore security for quays, piers, moorages, and anchorages.

(d) Provide offshore security for communication facilities, port security devices, and aids to navigation.

(e) Provide security for incoming and outgoing craft, moored or anchored craft, and lighter operations.

(f) Assist in circulation and control of individuals.

(2) In beach or river shore areas.

(a) Any of the missions in paragraph (1) above.

(b) Support beach or shore parties in regulation, control, and direction of watercraft near the beach or shore.

(c) Guide troop or cargo carrying small craft between larger craft and beach or shore points.

(d) Guide, escort, and guard small craft engaged in high priority movements of wounded personnel, emergency supplies, command and staff groups and designated persons.

(e) Guard craft transporting, loading, or unloading prisoners of war, and guard offshore areas at prisoner-of-war assembly points.

(3) At military installations. Patrol activity on waterways that form the boundaries of or pass through a military installation may include any of the missions in paragraphs (1) and (2) above applicable to the installation, and:

(a) Guard waterways to prevent their use for unauthorized entry or exit.

(b) Provide security for facilities and equipment, power and communications line, etc., located on or adjacent to waterways.

(c) Enforce hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, fire prevention, and forestry conservation regulations on and adjacent to waterways.

(d) Enforce off limits regulations pertaining to firing ranges, impact areas, demolition areas, restricted areas, and similar areas on or adjacent to waterways.

c. The MP company assigned the mission of river and harbor patrolling is the "Military Police Company River/Harbor Security," TOE 19-287. Review this TOE for personnel strength and unit operational capabilities and limitations.

d. Water Patrol Operations. River and harbor security operations require continu-

ous coordination and liaison with land-based MP organizations and with indigenous military or civil police operating in the same area of responsibility.

(1) Extent and nature of coordination necessary for effective use of this support varies with the activity supported. But the company commander and his physical security officer must also maintain close operational liaison with the headquarters staff element responsible for such physical security planning in order to implement operating instructions.

(2) Waterborne patrols provide the only practical means available to effectively protect arterial and smaller waterways and pier facilities (to include such sensitive installations as tank farms and pumping stations) against waterborne threat. In carrying out their security activities, personnel of this functional support unit assist the terminal commander in the discharge of his responsibility for the security of military cargo in terminal facilities and support the area commander in security of in transit supplies through his area of responsibility.

(3) Two additional platoons and supporting maintenance elements may be attached to this organization, depending on range of waterway areas to be covered. Conversely, platoons and their organic patrol craft sections may be detached where required for support of separate facilities.

(4) Water patrol operations should be conducted as an extension of and a supplement to shore-based MP operations. Operational procedures and techniques prescribed in military police training publications (FM 19-series) should be followed.

(5) Water patrol activity includes all the dangers normally encountered by military

police plus the possibility of encounters with dangerous waterfront criminals or enemy/insurgent forces and of accidents on the water. A thorough and continuous consideration of safety, communications, support, and reserve factors is a must in water patrol operations.

e. Planning. Water patrol routes and missions are assigned in accordance with the need for MP service. The need is determined by:

(1) A survey of actual and probable criminal or enemy activity that can be suppressed or prevented by water patrols.

(2) An estimate of the number, type, and location of water patrols required.

f. Prevention of waterfront criminal or enemy activity is based upon adequate physical security measures to provide protection for Government supplies and equipment. Physical security measures may be supplemented by water patrols that perform the following:

(1) Observe activities of watercraft and persons aboard watercraft.

(2) Observe activities of persons on the waterfront and shoreline.

(3) Suppress trafficking in controlled and pilfered items between the shore and watercraft, and between watercraft.

(4) Investigate and report any suspicious actions on the part of persons or watercraft.

(5) Enforce off limits regulations pertaining to, and provide offshore security for, communications facilities, port security devices, aids to navigation, dock facilities, moorages, and anchorages.