



Chapter 3

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

This chapter describes military and nonmilitary agencies involved at the operational level of HA operations. Notional coordination frameworks are provided to illustrate potential connectivity at the operational level. Additionally, the strategic elements the CINC considers to organize his HA joint task force are presented as linkages to operational focus.

Readers will develop an understanding of how policy guidance leads to mission statements, implied tasks, and plans of action for both military and civilian agencies. With better understanding of these matters, action agencies and staffs can improve interoperability at their level. Military planners must be aware of the interagency operations associated with HA relationships and their impact on policy formulation.

THE UNIFIED COMMAND

The military's operational-level organization is the *unified command*, which is responsible for a region known as a *theater of operations*. The CINC establishes the operational objectives needed to transform national-level policy and guidance into effective HA operations. The CINC provides authoritative direction, initiates actions, sequences events, and applies resources to bring about and sustain the military contribution to HA.

SHAPING THE MISSION

Developing the HA military mission statement is a difficult but critical task for the CINC and his staff. The strategic mission statement should aim for an understandable and achievable strategic end state, even for a short-duration operation. The mission statement is normally coordinated through an interagency process that the CINC formulates with the assistance of USAID/OFDA.

During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, USCENTCOM was the unified command. It provided guidance and arranged support and resources for the operational commander. The commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) commanded a JTF/CTF composed of air, naval, Marine, Army, and special operations forces (SOF) components, in addition to the forces provided by countries contributing to the US-led, combined coalition.

As the responsible unified command, USCENTCOM performed numerous tasks contributing to the success of Operation Restore Hope. Key areas included shaping a clear, achievable mission statement for the operational commander, shaping an international coalition, and orchestrating the transition to eventual UN control.

Based on Operation Restore Hope—
A USCENTCOM Perspective

Mission Statement

Some key considerations in developing a mission statement include—

- Higher strategic direction.
- The desired end state.
- Security of the operation.
- Military assistance to USAID/OFDA and NGOs, PVOs, and IOs.
- Use of CA units.

The military command must have a clear and achievable statement so that the many participating military units can be tasked. The USCENTCOM mission statement for Operation Restore Hope is one example.

When directed by the NCA, the commander in chief, United States Central Command (USCINCCENT) conducts joint or combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major airports and seaports,

key installations, and food distribution points; to provide open and free passage of relief supplies; to provide security for convoys and relief organization operations and to assist UN NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.

Desired End State

The HA mission should produce a desired end state collaborated by strategic-level political, military, and humanitarian (response triad) participants. Whenever possible, the desired end state should be known before US forces are committed. However, this may not be possible. If the desired end state is not known and US forces have deployed, the unified commander may be required to formulate one. The concept of operations may include the desired end state and be used to develop the following:

- Measures of effectiveness (MOEs).
- Phases of the operation.
- Information used to transition JTF responsibilities to other forces, organizations, or governing bodies.

Mission Creep

Military forces will undoubtedly receive numerous requests to perform additional tasks, as was the case in Somalia. The UN, for example, wanted the multinational force to expand its operation beyond the area of greatest need to establish a presence in the northern part of the country. The UN also pressed the force to begin disarming factional militia.

These tasks represented the phenomenon labeled *mission creep*. In essence, due to political agendas, key participants in the operation sought to expand the unified task force (UNITAF) activities and AOs beyond the initial, carefully limited scope of securing the environment for humanitarian relief operations. USCENTCOM had to work through the

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interagency coordination process to respond to the mission creep tendencies.

The mission creep phenomenon underscores the importance of developing a definitive mission statement early on—a statement that ensures parties involved understand the limits of the commander's charter. The phenomenon also points out the difficulty of achieving consensus when other agencies with key roles in the operation have differing views of the desired end state . . . CINCCENT exercised patience and pragmatism in overcoming these attempts to change his mission without NCA directive.

Operation Restore Hope—A USCENTCOM
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SUPPORTING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The unified CINC for the affected region is responsible for developing the military response to HA operations. In addition to the Title 10 responsibilities (see Chapter 1), the CINC may create a JTF to accomplish the HA mission. Once the CINC decides to organize a task force to execute an HA operation, he may organize and send a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to the operational area to acquire information necessary to develop a clear mission statement and plan for the operation. He may also opt to establish offices at his headquarters to administer the unique requirements of HA. These could include a humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC) or similar crisis action organization to assist the CINC in planning and executing the operation, a logistics operations center (LOC), and a liaison section.

Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team

Assessment is a fundamental task for providing effective disaster relief and HA. The HAST deploys to the area of responsibility (AOR) to assess the existing conditions and the need for follow-on forces. Normally, the CINC deploys the HAST, which is made up of personnel from staff sections appropriate to

the mission. If possible, the HAST leader coordinates with other staff sections prior to deployment to determine relationships and responsibilities. Additional details on situation and needs assessments is provided in Appendix E. The HAST should—

- Conduct reconnaissance to determine the nature and extent of the food and water supply; loss of life, injury, and illness; numbers of displaced persons; disruption of the government; presence of medical representatives; status of communications and facilities; and destruction of property and infrastructure.
- Formulate recommendations on HA missions and desired capabilities.
- Establish liaison and coordinate assessments with host nation agencies, supported commanders or their representatives, US diplomatic personnel, and other relief agencies.
- Arrange for the reception of US personnel, supplies, and equipment in concert with the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

In emergency cases, to relieve suffering and life-threatening situations, the CINC can direct the HAST to begin HA-type missions. In such cases, the CINC and his staff identify relationships and authority with the host nation, embassy, and USAID personnel. Such emergencies require specific support arrangements for the delivery of food and medical supplies (NGO, PVO, and IO materials or military supplies). Prior to deployment, the CINC and his staff provide the HAST with the following

- Current HA operations.
- A threat assessment, to include any medical threats.
- Mapping, charting, and geodesy support.
- Terms of reference for HA operations.
- Persons to contact at embassies and DOS before contacting relief agencies.
- PA guidance.

Logistics Operations Center

Logistics support requirements vary, depending on the magnitude of the operation

and the type and amount of relief the host country requests. The LOC is the point of contact for implementing a timely and flexible logistics response for the CINC. This response includes alerting key logistics agencies, locating and releasing required supplies, moving supplies to departure airfields and seaports of embarkation, and delivering supplies to the required area.

Movement of initial relief supplies and equipment is, in most cases, accomplished by airlift resources. These movements should include the coordination of types of supplies and arrival times with other US and foreign agencies involved in the effort. The LOC is also responsible for planning and coordinating aspects of force deployment and sustainment operations.

Coalition Unit Liaison Elements

In conjunction with US operations, other nations might deploy military forces to operate with the JTF. Some coalition units may provide liaison elements at the CINC as well as the JTF level.

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center

The CINC may establish an HACC to assist with interagency planning and coordination. Staffing for the HACC should include a USAID and OFDA advisor/liaison officer who serves as the HACC director, an NGO/PVO advisor, a CA officer, a legal advisor, a PA officer, and other augmentation as required. The HACC provides the link among the CINC, USAID and OFDA, NGOs and PVOs, and other agencies that might participate.

Each CINC will establish an organizational structure to meet the humanitarian needs of that particular theater and operation. USCENTCOM established an HACC within the J5 Politico Military Division at the headquarters level to support Operation Restore Hope.

An example of an operational-level unified command, with appropriate sections unique to HA, is shown in Figure 3-1.

The HACC's mission was to provide Operation Restore Hope coordination and liaison between HQ, USCENTCOM and NGOs, PVOs, and IOs. The HACC assisted with US interagency planning and implementation of humanitarian assistance activities in Somalia, including the transition to UN control. The HACC helped facilitate the timely interagency staffing of actions regarding NGO, PVO, and IO (UN) concerns that were elevated to the international headquarters level. The HACC also served a unique advocacy role, supported by its interagency staffing, by being able to represent both military-specific as well as NGO- and PVO-specific issues and concerns.

FORMING A JOINT TASK FORCE

Based on the size and nature of HA operations, a CINC may designate a JTF to conduct the military's operation. Creating a JTF is one option available to a CINC. This paragraph provides an overview of a typical JTF headquarters staff and addresses CINC-level considerations in organizing the JTF and in selecting specialized forces for an HA response.

The CINC develops the HA mission statement and concept of operations based upon the direction of the NCA. Input—including requests from USAID/OFDA, situational factors (crises caused by man, weather, volcanic, or seismic activity), and the time military forces enter the disaster area—affects the mission statement. The CINC develops a list of requisite capabilities, based upon analysis of the foregoing, and tasks his components to identify forces for a specified set of capabilities. The components establish a force list (personnel, equipment, and supplies) with associated movement requirements. The CINC approves or disapproves the components' force lists,




Figure 3-1. Unified Command Structure

establishes the JTF headquarters, and assigns approved forces to the JTF.

Where one commander may choose to use a JTF to accomplish a given mission, another may choose an alternate course of action; however, JTFs are ideally suited to perform the HA mission. They are successful due to the adaptive nature of their command and control organization, the unique capabilities of service components, and the ability to quickly deploy personnel and equipment to execute any number of diverse HA missions.

The JTF may be a two-tier command, which simplifies the chain of command between the CINC and JTF commander and minimizes potential confusion and logistics problems that could surface during joint force operations. The CINC determines the command relationships for the JTF. This command relationship may include a subunified commander or a service component commander who, based on CINC guidance, establishes a JTF.

The CINC establishes the JTF when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned a JTF requires execution of responsibilities and close integration of effort involving two or more services. The JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created is achieved.

Joint Pub 3-0¹ provides general guidance relating to joint operations and Joint Pub 5-00.2² discusses the JTF. Joint Pub 4-0³ provides general guidance for logistics support of joint operations.

To enhance coordination and execution, the JTF commander may define various geographical AOs under the operational control of a component commander or a particular nation's forces as in the case of multinational operations. Chapter 4 contains details concerning administration and operation of geographic areas.

Organization

The JTF organization resembles traditional military organizations with a commander, command element, and forces required to execute the mission. The primary purpose of the JTF headquarters is command, control, and administration of the JTF. During HA operations, the JTF headquarters must provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution. Unique aspects of the HA mission compel the JTF headquarters to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities and limitations of the components

¹ *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, September 1993.

² *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, September 1991.

³ *Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations*, September 1992.

of the JTF. Additional and specific functional areas may be added to the JTF headquarters as necessary. See Figure 3-2 for a typical HQ JTF staff organization. Areas that may be augmented by additional personnel include—

- Staff judge advocate (SJA).
- PA.
- Health services.
- CA.
- Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC).
- Meteorology and oceanography (METOC).
- Communications.

Staff Judge Advocate. HA operations present unique requirements in regard to international and operational law. SJAs may be required to have expertise regarding—

- Refugees.
- Displaced and detained civilians.
- Rules of engagement.
- Psychological operations (PSYOP).
- Medical support.
- Laws of war.
- Civil affairs.
- Local cultures and customs.

- Government and international laws and agreements.
- Military-political liaison.
- Claims and contingency contracting.
- Humanitarian operations center (HOC) and civil-military operations center (CMOC) operations.

Consistence of legal advice is imperative. Attorneys from coalition forces should be integrated into the planning and relief effort at all phases of the operation. See Appendix B for additional information on legal issues.

Public Affairs. In most HA operations, the JTF establishes a joint information bureau (JIB) to coordinate the release of information and news media requests for information. JIB personnel provide command information (internal information) on the activities of US military personnel engaged in HA operations and facilitate civilian news media representatives in their coverage of JTF activities. Additionally, JIB personnel offer training in media relations for commanders, staffs, and other JTF personnel. The JIB prepares and executes the JTF PA strategy. This strategy serves the public's right to be informed while minimizing risks of disclosing




Figure 3-2. Typical HQ JTF Staff Organization

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unauthorized information through effective security at the source.

PA supports the policies of maximum disclosure with minimum delay; open and independent reporting; and full and balanced coverage of operations. PA provides factual information on all aspects of the operation. A good PA plan fulfills the military's obligation to keep the public informed, minimizing the risk through security at the source and operational security awareness.

Staff Surgeon. The surgeon is a critical JTF staff member during HA efforts. HA missions are often conducted in areas where the biggest enemy is disease. The JTF surgeon's advice is critical for the commander to protect the force and determine relief requirements.

Special Staff Sections. The JTF commander may establish additional sections within the JTF to emphasize important functions such as coordination, logistics, security, and liaison. Chapter 4 elaborates on the tasks and functions of these sections. Sections tailored for HA include the coalition liaison section, the CMOC, and the LOC.

Coalition Liaison Section. This section is developed within the JTF. Its primary purpose is to coordinate and manage the high volume of military contributions offered by various countries. This responsibility may be assigned as an additional duty within the J3 section.

Civil-Military Operations Center. This section is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

Logistics Operations Center. If formed, the LOC has the additional duty of tracking and managing coalition forces logistics needs and coordinating logistics management and flow with other agencies in the operation.

Special Operations Forces. SOF have capabilities well suited to the requirements of HA operations. However, their capabilities are often misunderstood. Certain SOF are well qualified to assist in US Government-sponsored HA activities

in remote areas, especially in a conflict environment. SOF teams are adaptable and capable of operating effectively in remote areas and urban areas isolated by disaster events. The teams may be able to provide detailed reports and assessments on conditions in the area. They deploy rapidly, have excellent radio communications capabilities, and work well with indigenous ethnic groups.

If SOF are assigned to the JTF, the CINC must clearly delineate their roles, missions, and functions. SOF have two inherent disciplines that can best be applied toward HA requirements: CA and PSYOP. CA units, PSYOP forces, and Army Special Forces operational detachments-A (SF ODA) comprise the SOF team.

Civil Affairs Units. Army CA units are special operations forces. They are designed to perform a variety of functional area skills to support HA. Most CA units are in the reserve components and thus require a presidential call-up. These units are organized to provide support to all levels of government. Reserve CA personnel routinely perform their functional area skills as part of their civilian jobs. This working knowledge is especially useful in assisting civil governments and their citizens in disasters.

The units' functional specialty capabilities are normally tailored to particular situations. They assess the damage to the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and manage a CMOC. CA units also serve as liaison between the military and local relief organizations; PVOs, NGOs, and IOs; the UN; and OFDA DART.

CA units are usually attached to the various maneuver commanders assigned to the JTF. When the JTF is employed, CA units establish and maintain relations between the JTF and host nation populace and authorities, as well as with NGOs, PVOs, and IOs. Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations may include interaction among US, allied, and indigenous security forces; the host nation; and NGOs and PVOs.

CA units can provide the JTF with expertise on factors that directly affect military operations in foreign HA. These factors include-

- Host nation agencies and other civil centers.
- Ethnic differences and resentments.
- Linguistic regions and subregions.
- Social structures (familial, regional, generational).
- Religious and symbolic systems (beliefs and behaviors).
- Political structures (power distribution and entrenchment).
- Economic systems (sources and distribution of wealth).
- Linkages among social, religious, political, and economic dynamics.
- A cultural history of the area.
- Historic relations with the west.
- Attitudes toward the west/military forces.

CA units may include military forces carrying out activities that are normally the responsibility of the local or indigenous government. Selection of CA units must be based on a clear concept of the CA mission requirements for HA. Joint Pub 3-57¹ provides specific guidance. The CINC should consider the following when employing CA units—

- Most CA units and personnel need to be activated from the reserve establishment.
- If the JTF conducts civic action programs, CA units should be assigned as a primary staff element.
- CA units support the unified commander, other JFCs or subordinate components of the JTF, and the CMOC.

Psychological Operations Forces. Military PSYOP constitute a planned, systematic process of conveying messages to and influencing selected foreign groups. These messages are intended to promote particular themes that can result in

¹Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, November 1993.

Both the UN and relief agencies were proponents of UNITAF conducting civic actions projects. USCINCCENT supported the field commander's position of limiting this activity to short-term projects that did not compromise the UNITAF primary mission. A specific issue that surfaced during the initial stages of force development was the requirement for a large CA contingent.

USCENTCOM, in coordination with the interagency and UNITAF commander, determined that deployment of large numbers of CA personnel was unwarranted, given the limited scope of the operation. Future operations may involve mission tasks related to rehabilitation and reconstruction of civil administration. In such cases, a larger CA force may be appropriate for inclusion in the force list.

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desired foreign attitudes and behaviors. Such information may include safety, health, and public service messages, as well as messages designed to favorably influence foreign perceptions of US forces and operations.

PSYOP units are equipped with portable printing presses, loudspeakers, radio broadcasting stations, and other equipment that enables them to deliver messages in many diverse media. PSYOP personnel can provide a commander with real-time analysis of the perceptions and attitudes of the civilian population and the effectiveness of the information being disseminated.

PSYOP can play a significant role in HA operations. US and/or coalition forces may have to overcome hostile attitudes of the local populace. Forces involved in HA operations must avoid any hint of favoritism. The image to be projected is that of sympathetic competence; military forces are there to reduce the suffering of the indigenous people. The CJTF determines the requirements for a joint PSYOP task force to

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support a JTF in the earliest stages of planning for the operation. PSYOP forces can begin to shape the perceptions of foreign audiences prior to the introduction of forces. Their early introduction into the theater can reduce hostile attitudes and increase the acceptance of US forces supporting the HA operation. Joint Pub 3-53⁵ provides general guidance.

Army Special Forces Operational Detachments-A. Because only one active duty CA battalion exists for short-notice commitment worldwide, planners must have contingency options to have other forces fulfill critical functions based on the limited availability of these active duty and reserve personnel. SF ODAs are a possible alternative and can contribute to the HA effort in the following manner:

- By identifying HA needs (areas and specific requirements) during the conduct of reconnaissance or advance force operations.
- By being cross-trained to perform CA liaison functions.
- By serving as coalition support teams (CSTs) to provide liaison with coalition units.

Augmentation

It may be beneficial to augment the CJTF's staff with a group of experts from the regional CINC's staff. For example, the commander in chief of Pacific Command (CINCPAC) would deploy his staff to the forward area and work directly with the CJTF for the duration of the HA operation.

The deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC) consists of designated experts in communications, coordination, logistics, planning, and PA. The DJTFAC is equipped with the necessary Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) computer terminals and communications equipment to enter movement data and transportation requirements into the system or data base. The DJTFAC is tailored to complement the normal staff of the CJTF.

Another augmentation example is the HAST employed by USCENTCOM. The HAST is made up of representatives from various sections of the CENTCOM staff. This advance team is normally temporal and may be subsumed into the JTF. Augmentation by the HAST can provide critical continuity between the advanced party and the main task force.

OTHER KEY ORGANIZATIONS

Coordination of the military and civil aspects of HA operations is imperative. Interagency cooperation, planning, and connectivity are essential for success of the operation. Interagency frameworks introduced at the operational level better enable the key organizations to orchestrate the total HA effort within the theater. An array of civilian agencies coordinates with military forces conducting HA. Some of these agencies represent concerns of their respective governments, while others represent high-profile international organizations. Essential interactions take place at the operational level. Key organizations may include—

- US Government agencies (USAID/OFDA).
- NGOs, PVOs, and IOs.
- Country team.
- Unified commander (CINC).
- Joint task force.
- UN agencies and multinational forces.
- NGOs, PVOs, and IOs.
- Host nation.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE

USAID/OFDA administers the President's authority to coordinate the provision of assistance in response to disasters, as declared by the ambassador within the country or higher

⁵ Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, 30 July 1993.

DOS authority. USAID/OFDA has the authority to provide assistance, notwithstanding any other provision of law. This authority allows USAID/OFDA to expedite interventions at the operational and tactical levels through the use of NGOs and PVOs and other sources of relief. USAID/OFDA is responsible for—

- Organizing and coordinating the total US Government disaster relief response.
- Responding to mission requests for disaster assistance.
- Initiating the necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation.
- Coordinating assistance efforts with operational-level NGOs and PVOs.

The authority to provide foreign disaster relief comes from the *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*, as amended, which provides for assistance to—

- Preserve life and minimize suffering by providing sufficient warning of natural events that cause disasters.
- Preserve life and minimize suffering by responding to natural and man-made disasters.
- Foster self-sufficiency among disaster-prone nations by helping them achieve some measure of preparedness.
- Alleviate suffering by providing rapid, appropriate responses to requests for aid.
- Enhance recovery through rehabilitation programs.

USAID/OFDA can coordinate directly with DOD for matters concerning defense equipment and personnel provided to the affected nation and for arranging DOD transportation. DOD Directive 5100.46⁶ establishes the relationship between DOD and USAID/OFDA. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs (DASD HRA) is the primary point of contact. When USAID/OFDA requests specific services from DOD (typically airlift),

⁶ *Foreign Disaster Relief*, 4 December 1992

USAID/OFDA pays for those services/commodities. The CINC should have a coordination linkage with OFDA to correlate military and civilian assistance efforts. USAID/OFDA provides an excellent means for military and civilian operational-level coordination. For details on OFDA and coordination with DOD, see Appendix F.

USAID/OFDA has the capability to deploy a DART into the AOR to manage the US Government humanitarian relief effort. For details on the OFDA DART, see Appendix G. Once committed to an operation, USAID/OFDA should establish liaison with an HAST assembled by the appropriate CINC.

USAID/OFDA has operational links and grant relationships with many NGOs and PVOs that have relief programs outside the US. Other frequent USAID/OFDA collaborators include ICRC, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), UNHCR, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations World Food Program (UNWFP). OFDA also coordinates with other governments responding to disasters through donor country coordination meetings to solve operational or political problems. Figure 3-3 depicts operational-level connectivity.

US CHIEF OF MISSION (AMBASSADOR)

As the President's representative, the senior US diplomat in country is responsible for the overall coordination of US foreign HA. OFDA assists the embassy and USAID in coordinating and conducting operational assessments. These assessments vary in their results from provision of funding to the provision of supplies and services and/or the deployment of an OFDA DART. Also, depending on the nature of the situation, OFDA may request logistics support from DOD. If the SECDEF, through the CJCS, supports the OFDA request, a CINC can provide military assistance.

CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS

Relationships with nonmilitary agencies should be based on an appreciation of missions, lines of communication, and standardization of




Figure 3-3. Operational-Level Connectivity

support. Not all NGOs, PVOs, and IOs appreciate military involvement in HA operations. Because of fundamental mandates or human rights beliefs, some NGO, PVO, and IO charters do not allow them to collaborate with armed forces.

Cooperation among military and civilian activities is imperative for a successful operation. When joint operations occur, military and civilian leaders must outline clear roles and

responsibilities. Cooperation can be gained and maintained if agencies understand one another's missions. Commanders may find it beneficial to employ third parties for liaison and coordination with those NGOs and PVOs that are reluctant to establish direct contact. OFDA representatives have proven invaluable in providing coordination and linkages among NGOs, PVOs, IOs, and the military at the operational level.

AREAS FOR COOPERATION OF EFFORT

Planners may obtain information concerning relationships with government agencies, NGOs, and PVOs through lessons learned documents published by joint and individual service agencies. Logistics data bases, legal requirements, communications, existing support agreements, and desired end-state conditions provide basic areas for cooperation to ensure unity of effort in HA operations.

LOGISTICS DATA BASES

Military forces and NGOs and PVOs may gain some benefits from sharing automated data bases while executing the HA mission. Three tracking systems used in HA include the Disaster Assistance Logistics Information

System (DAMS), the Commodity Tracking System (CTS), and a Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) computer tracking system designated SUMA. One method of accessing these data bases is through the OFDA DART.

Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System

DALIS was developed during Operation Provide Comfort by a joint team comprised of US Army Reserve (USAR) personnel, who worked closely with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and OFDA DART in conceptualizing and developing an easy-to-use, automated logistics management information

system. Subsequently, the USAR team, at OFDA's request and funding assistance, upgraded the software program.

DALIS is a comprehensive crisis-management tool that can be used to plan, track, identify, and locate resources; identify requirements; reduce redundancies; facilitate coordination; and produce reports. It tracks all aspects of UNHCR, governmental, and NGO and PVO logistics—including commodities-by source, type, quantity and cost; human resources; donor; location; status; required-by and due dates; and destination. It also automatically converts measurements to the metric system and costs into US dollars. Many of the DALIS capabilities have been incorporated into the systems of disaster-relief organizations in western nations. However, DOD has not completed its review of this prototype system for fielding.

Commodity Tracking System

OFDA developed CTS for UNHCR as a total commodity tracking, warehouse management, logistics data base designed to support the relief effort in the conflict in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. CTS is written in FoxPro and uses DALIS for its initial design. CTS has networking capabilities, which DALIS lacks.

SUMA System

PAHO designed SUMA—an initial commodity-sorting and inventory system—to sort the initial distribution of sorted and unsorted in-kind donations. PAHO has taken a different approach to distribution of an emergency relief system. PAHO trains and supports local government ministries and local PVOs on the use of the SUMA system.

Legal Requirements

A mutual understanding of governing regulations and other legal requirements applicable to military forces and NGOs and PVOs is essential to promoting harmonious relations and preventing undesirable incidents. For more discussion on legal issues, see Appendix B.

Support Requirements and Agreements

Clarifying support requirements will reduce misconceptions between the military and outside agencies. The JTF is usually tasked to support

other agencies. Standardized support agreements and memorandums of understanding should address finding considerations. The JTF may need to establish a cost center for each supported agency. Appropriate authorities should negotiate support agreements through proper channels. Agreements may include air and surface transportation, petroleum products and fuel, telecommunications, labor, security, facilities, contracting, engineer support, supplies, services, and medical support.

Public Affairs Operations

The global visibility of HA operations, the presence of large numbers of civilian media representatives, and the intense interest of the media in covering HA operations requires careful coordination among military PA elements. The JIB, Combined Information Bureau (CIB), or Allied Press Information Center (APIC) coordinate information policies and procedures to ensure a synchronized PA effort, to prevent misunderstandings, and to facilitate HA operations.

Donation Assistance

A donation assistance program addresses the receipt and distribution of donations such as gifts and foodstuffs made by US civilians and organizations in response to the humanitarian effort for the country receiving HA. Donation programs are best coordinated at office of the secretary of defense (OSD) level through the unified command, which provides guidance to the JTF.

At the JTF level, any donation program should stress that donations be sent to NGOs and PVOs that are better suited to determining the priority of providing donations to the affected area. The executive agent for the JTF donation program has typically been the command chaplain. Donations should only be accepted against identified needs, with an identified receiver, and with plans for the storage, transport, and distribution of the donated goods provided.