

CHAPTER 1

FACING THE FUTURE

*"We cannot face the future simply by walking into the past backwards."
(President Dwight Eisenhower)*

The world's strategic security environment has changed dramatically in the last decade and will continue to change in the future. In order to respond to these changes, our national military strategy is built upon the four key foundations of *strategic deterrence and defense*, *forward presence*, *crisis response*, and *reconstitution*. The essence of our strategy is to deter aggression and defend the nations's vital interests against any potential foe.

*"Today we again find ourselves in the wake of great successes on the battlefield. We are at peak effectiveness. Victories in the Cold War, Panama, and the Gulf War demonstrate that the Army holds a warfighting edge—an effectiveness advantage—over our opponents."
(Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, Army)*

NATIONAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION

The end of the Cold War has resulted in a reworking of the national security and military strategies, the essential foundations of which are —

- **Strategic Deterrence and Defense.** Deterring a nuclear attack remains the number one defense priority of the United States. A growing priority is to provide a defense system against limited nuclear attacks, a mission in which the Army will have a major role.
- **Forward Presence.** Multiple forms of forward deployments, pre-positioning/rigged equipment and supplies, governmental and military visits, shows of force, multinational training exercises, and military-to-military relations/exchanges are required to maintain a positive influence in distant regions of the world.
- **Crisis Response.** If our best efforts at deterrence fail, the Army must be able to respond quickly

and effectively to meet a wide variety of potential adversaries who may possess a full range of modern weapons.

- **Reconstitution.** Beyond the crisis-response capabilities provided by active and reserve forces, we must have the ability to generate additional forces should a global threat reemerge. The Army must be able to reconstitute a credible defense by generating required forces and equipment faster than any potential opponent can generate an overwhelming offense. We must pay particular attention to the ability to activate the industrial base on a large scale.

POWER PROJECTION

The Army performs its missions within the context of the national security and military strategies. One of the key strategic principles of the national security and military strategy is crisis response through power projection. *Power projection* is the ability of the United States to apply all or some of the elements of national

power (political, economic, informational, and military).

Credible power projection rests, among other things, on our ability to deploy rapidly forces to perform missions spanning the continuum of military operations. *Force projection*, therefore, is the capability to —

- Mobilize, deploy, and sustain the employed force.
- Redeploy and demobilize military forces from or back to the continental United States (CONUS) or other locations for missions across the continuum of military operations.

Force projection is specifically the military component of power projection. A highly credible Army force projection capability will contribute significantly to deterrence and the overall national military strategy.

ADAPTIVE JOINT PLANNING

Adaptive joint planning significantly influences the Army's planning for mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization. To counter future threats to vital US interests, a smaller total force requires flexibility and adaptability in planning, training, deploying, employing, redeploying, and recovering.

The military must develop multiple regional response options for various scenarios, ranging from a slowly developing crisis, through a rapidly deteriorating situation that threatens to erupt into armed conflict, to a no-warning attack. These options must be planned and gauged to meet a wide range of crises. Plans to meet various scenarios must be flexible enough to give decision makers the ability to redirect resources from one planned response to another and to react to unforeseen circumstances.

Combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs) must provide a range of planned military response options that integrate the military element with the other elements of national power to demonstrate the United States' resolve, to deter threats, and, if necessary, to project a viable joint force to fight and win decisively against an aggressor. Force projection is, therefore, the military crisis-response option.

FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

To respond to a slowly building crisis, CINCs will develop a range of options short of engaging in combat. These are called flexible deterrent options. Flexible deterrent options are activities that send a clear signal to a

potential aggressor of the United States' intent to defend a threatened vital interest.

A key characteristic of flexible deterrent options is that they do not put US forces at risk until the political decision has been made to apply decisive military force. In a no-warning scenario, when the decision has been made to deploy US forces, the CINC's response should call for projecting sufficient force to win quickly, decisively, and with minimal friendly casualties.

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

At the national level, military planning is conducted within the framework of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The JSPS establishes the administrative framework for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to advise the National Command Authorities (NCA) and to provide strategic direction to the combatant commanders. JSPS also considers the projected force contributions of our allies.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is charged by the National Security Act of 1947 with preparing strategic plans and providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. The JSPS provides the framework for strategic planning and direction of the armed forces.

Joint strategic planning begins the process which creates the forces whose capabilities form the basis for theater operation plans. It ends with planning guidance for the CINC to develop strategic and contingency plans. JSPS constitutes a continuing process in which each document, program, or plan is an outgrowth of preceding cycles and of documents formulated earlier and in which development proceeds concurrently.

The Army staff supports the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) in his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by performing analyses and providing input to the JSPS. Furthermore, the Army fully participates in the planning phase of the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, through the Secretary of the Army, by planning efforts that support development of the defense guidance.

THE FUTURE ARMY

The Army is required to provide forces capable of executing a wide range of missions across the continuum of military operations. These forces must be in carefully tailored combinations of active units, reserve components (RC), civilians, and industry. The forces

must maintain agility, lethality, mobility, and versatility not only during the conduct of combat operations but also during peacetime training, mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization. The future Army will be smaller and primarily CONUS-based. More than ever, the massing of Army combat power will rely on the Army's ability to mobilize, deploy, and sustain a crisis-response force and reinforcing forces, if required.

Force projection operations will be conducted from CONUS or forward-presence locations in response to requirements from the NCA. Forces will be provided to supported CINCs and theater joint force commanders (JFCs) who are responsible for planning and executing campaigns or operations within their theaters. These forces, most likely in conjunction with allied forces or coalition partners, must have the strategic agility to mass decisive force to end the crisis swiftly on terms favorable to US interests.

The role of the Army in these operations will be as the strategic land force. The Army must be configured and trained to take full advantage of advancements in strategic airlift, fast sealift ships, and pre-positioned materiel. Increased strategic lift capability provides the CINC greater access to additional resources required to respond to crises within his theater.

Army units, active and reserve components, deployed for training or in response to a crisis must be prepared for any contingency operation and follow-on combat deployment.

The 1138th Military Police Detachment (EPW), Missouri Army National Guard, was in Panama during December 1989 conducting annual training. Upon initiation of Operation Just Cause, the company was retained in active duty status and operated an enemy-prisoner-of-war camp for the duration of the operation.

Being prepared implies that a unit's mission load, to include ammunition, should accompany or be available to the unit during all deployments (including training missions—CONUS or OCONUS). Where this is not feasible, commanders must have access to prestaged materiel or have predesignated procedures for obtaining their unit mission load. Further, logistical automated systems designated to provide peacetime management and control must also parallel or easily transition to wartime configuration/use.

Upon cessation of training activities or hostilities (as directed by the NCA), the Army normally redeploys and begins to demobilize forces as necessary. However, the forces must be continually prepared for immediate redeployment in response to a follow-on contingency mission. This preparedness requires a heretofore unprecedented level of planning for all elements of the Army of the future.

THE THREAT

*"Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to changing circumstances."
(President George Bush)*

The world has changed to include multiple centers of military, political, and economic power. The continuing and expanding conditions of radical nationalism, religious and cultural rivalries, boundary disputes, sophisticated weapons proliferation, and competition for scarce resources makes the world less predictable and less stable. The net effect is a dangerous world—a world no longer constrained by the bipolar competition under the nuclear shadow of the cold war.

The regional contingencies the Army could face are many and varied. They require a wide range of capabilities to operate across the continuum of military operations. The Army must prepare for differences in terrain, climate, and the nature of threatening forces, as

well as for differing levels of support from host nations or other nations. The Army must also be able to respond quickly and effectively to adversaries who may have missiles; modern air defenses; chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; and large army, sea, or air forces.

FORCE CONFIGURATION

Active Army and reserve component forces must be configured for force projection missions across the continuum of military operations. This configuration may include Army civilians and contract personnel who provide combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS). On short notice, the Army must be prepared to deploy a mix of forces rapidly as part of a joint or combined force to a wide range of major and lesser regional contingencies.

This requirement is based upon an international arena that changes constantly. To respond to these major and lesser regional contingencies, all units in the Army must be in an appropriate deployment posture. Units must maintain the capability to deploy rapidly in accordance with assigned contingency plans, OPLANs, and so forth, in a *ready-to-fight* posture that projects power to end crises quickly and decisively.

Force projection missions for a tailored Total Army force place a premium on planning, speed, and precision. This premium demands that the Army streamline the mobilization and deployment processes and develop the capability to respond swiftly and return in an orderly manner from any crisis.

The total force must be configured for force projection missions. This configuration includes—

- Preparing doctrinally-based force packages to meet the needs of combatant CINCs.
- Maintaining rapidly deployable AC and RC crisis-response forces.
- Establishing Armywide readiness standards and cycles that will enable the Army to tailor a force rapidly to respond to the needs of a CINC or JTF commander.

- Ensuring that the force can expand quickly, based on the circumstances of a particular contingency.

Force projections will usually begin as a contingency operation—a rapid response to a crisis. Contingency operations may be required for combat or noncombat situations and may be opposed or unopposed. Contingency operations may involve forcible entry with simultaneous deployment and employment in depth of joint and/or combined forces in combat operations.

A rapidly deploying contingency force may be capable of resolving the situation and achieving the combatant commander's desired end state for the operation. If not, the operation may evolve into a major force projection requiring additional mobilization of reserves, extensive deployments of active and reserve component elements, and establishment of capabilities for prolonged operations of a campaign. The size of the contingency force may range from as small as a single psychological operations team to as large as a theater army.

To effectively conduct combined arms combat operations, brigade task forces are the basic building blocks for force projection missions. Brigade task forces may initially deploy independently; however, they must be able to —

- Reassemble rapidly into a division-size force, even if they originally came from different divisions or were separate brigades.
- Establish the basic command and control (C²) and liaison functions of the highest headquarters expected to establish itself in theater.

The lead brigade of such a force projected for combat operations will be capable of being on the ground by C+4¹ (airlift), the lead division by C+12 (airlift), and two heavy divisions deployed from CONUS or OCONUS by C+30 (air/sealift). By C+75, the full corps (remaining two divisions), with its corps support command (COSCOM) and appropriate echelons above corps (EAC) logistics support, will be on the ground. These forces, depending on the mission of the required force, will require use of RC, civilian support elements, and possibly coalition forces for success. Early deployment of CS and CSS units may

¹C-day is the unnamed day on which the first strategic movement from any origin begins or is to begin in support of a specific operation plan or operation order.

be required to maintain flexibility, survivability, and lethality of the committed forces.

The deploying units must have sufficient supplies that are either pre-positioned afloat/ashore, purchased locally, or deployed with the force. Follow-on logistics are properly sequenced to arrive and support deployed forces until lines of communication (LOCs) are established. When applicable, the commander must also consider the status of the coalition force (equipment, supplies, forces). See Figure 1-1.

CONTINGENCY FORCE PACKAGES

Relative combat power is the crucial consideration in power projection operations. Rarely will our actions be unopposed. Our opponents will attempt to increase all aspects of their combat power for the same reasons that we will; therefore, relative combat power ratios will change continuously.

STABILITY

A 1-to-1 ratio will normally ensure that the Army does not lose, but this ratio will barely give the Army the capability to stabilize the crisis situation. Moreover, as the enemy generates its in-theater combat

power over time, Army force requirements will increase correspondingly.

Analytical data suggests that a 1.4-to-1 ratio throughout the theater is sufficient to ensure the Army has enough force available to stabilize a crisis comfortably. However, this ratio will not give the Army enough of an edge to create conditions for attaining the end state—namely conditions favorable to US interests.

The time available to reach a suitable force ratio is critical. The longer a crisis exists, the less favorable the chances are to successfully end it on US terms. The Army must stabilize a crisis early in order to win.

FLEXIBILITY

In order to stabilize, the Army must have flexible contingency force packages available to deploy on short notice. Therefore, the design of the contingency force—force packaging—is a key consideration to preparing the Army for the power projection era.

In designing the task organization of a contingency force, the Army must consider how the force is being phased into the theater—often a function of available strategic lift. The Army must consider, to the maximum extent possible, linking standard packages of support forces, in reasonable groupings, to major combat




Figure 1-1. Strategic Mobility Objectives for the Army

forces. *Reasonable* means that World War II and Korean War era doctrinal formulas may no longer apply to computing required numbers and types of units at echelons above division and corps. The Army must also consider the capabilities and requirements of other services and fellow alliance or coalition members, as the Army will not respond to contingencies in isolation.

Flexibility in the design of the force will allow for the early availability of those critical capabilities in theater that are required to carry out the CINC's campaign plan once the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) conditions have been defined. The operational concept, the support concept, and the logistics concept of the campaign plan determine how well the contingency force package can follow the critical path to achieve a favorable relative combat power ratio.

BALANCE

A key to the design of the contingency force packages is balance. Joint capabilities must be balanced to maximize complementary effects of the actions of other services. CS and CSS capabilities must be in balance with combat capabilities, maintaining flexible, effective, and efficient support to the fight.

Capabilities, however, generate costs. The benefits of additional capabilities must be balanced against the costs of additional sustainment requirements to support those capabilities. Capabilities shortfalls must be balanced by substitutes and alternative arrangements.

Balancing the relative trade-offs of competing capabilities, and mentally updating his METT-T analysis is a key responsibility of a service component commander when defining, for supporting CINCs or commanders, the force needed for rapid deployment to a crisis situation.

EXPEDIENT DESIGN

Expedient design of contingency forces must include a METT-T analysis, the attendant campaign plan, and a detailed capabilities assessment of functions, constraints, and balance. During deployment, the contingency planners will continually revise these analyses.

The joint and combined aspects of warfare, coupled with the uncertain world environment, will influence every level of military operation to an unprecedented extent. The resulting demands placed on a force projection army will thus fundamentally alter our assumptions and processes for warfighting.

Fundamental changes must occur in the Army's doctrinal focus in this era of contingencies. In the past, the

focus was on combat in a mature theater—10 divisions to Europe in 10 days—with the METT-T reasonably defined. Additionally, the support mechanisms and C² facilities were in place and functioning. Today, the focus must be on —

- Power projection to theaters of varying maturity, either from CONUS or other forward-deployed unit locations.
- The incumbent difficulties associated with such a requirement.

ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR CRISIS RESPONSE

The Army designs its force structure to achieve the agility and versatility necessary to execute a variety of operations plans (OPLANs) and concept plans (CONPLANs), to include campaigns. That is, the Army responds to the requirements of the JSCP as voiced by the CINC and approved by Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

***All forces are considered
contingency forces.***

Army units are configured to allow force expansion through designation as *forward-presence*, *crisis-response*, *early reinforcement*, *follow-on reinforcement*, and *reconstitution forces*.

FORWARD-PRESENCE UNITS

Forward-presence units are those US active component forces and reserve forces assigned or deployed overseas in a specific theater. These forces display the resolve of the US in supporting its national interests around the world. They are the initial forces available to an OCONUS CINC to counter potential threats. The reduced size of the US Army dictates that forward-presence units, including CS and CSS units, be trained and prepared to deploy to other regional areas in support of our national defense policies.

CRISIS-RESPONSE FORCES

Crisis-response forces (CRFs) are AC and RC, CONUS-based units, but also include forward-presence units. They are trained and configured to deploy anywhere in the world, based on the unit's deployability posture. All AC units, including combat, CS, and CSS

units, must be prepared to deploy and support a combatant unit that has a mission to respond to a crisis.

Units conducting Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations and subsequent stand-downs must maintain the capability to deploy when required. Reserve component CS and CSS units must be prepared to support all deployment operations.

EARLY REINFORCEMENT FORCES

Early reinforcement forces (ERFs) consist primarily of AC divisions (CONUS and OCONUS-based) and associated echelons above division (EAD) and EAC support elements (both AC and RC). RC round-out and round-up brigades are available to add combat power to AC divisions designated as ERFs. Additional reserve component CS and CSS units will provide support to ERFs. ERF units may be required to respond to a second major regional contingency in another theater.

FOLLOW-ON REINFORCEMENT FORCES

Follow-on reinforcement forces (FRFs), primarily National Guard divisions, brigades, and associated EAD and EAC support elements, are trained and deployed for protracted operations. These forces include units that replace or augment forward-presence units that have deployed to other regions for protracted operations.

RECONSTITUTION FORCES

Reconstitution is the ability to maintain continuously, in sufficient measure, the capability to create additional forces beyond those in the active and reserve units retained in the base force. Reconstitution is also the process of creating additional forces to deter an emerging global threat from competing militarily with the United States, and, should such deterrence fail, to provide a global warfighting capability. Reconstitution forces may be comprised of regeneration assets, industrial/technology base assets, and manpower assets.

SUPPORT TO CAMPAIGN PLANS

The Army's response to the requirements based upon the CINC's campaign plans is provided through mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization.

The campaign plan establishes the end state-strategic aims such as control of geographical

area, reestablishment of political boundaries, or the defeat of an enemy force in the theater of operations and the CINC's vision of how this end state is reached. Accordingly, the campaign plan normally provides both a general concept of operations for the entire campaign and a specific plan for the campaign's first phase.

The development of the supporting deployment plan is based on METT-T and is updated continuously as METT-T evolves. Forces deployed to the theater in support of a campaign plan will normally be joint; therefore, commanders and staffs of other services will be involved in the development of the deployment plan.

Throughout the deployment phase of a campaign, host nation support may augment a base of operations. Additionally, the increased likelihood of combined operations requires the Army to be ready to integrate commanders and staffs of other nationalities in the planning process. Although all phases are critical to the combatant commander's campaign plan, this manual concentrates on mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization.

MOBILIZATION

The authority to order mobilization resides with the President and/or the Congress. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), with the advice and recommendation of the service secretaries and JCS, recommends to the President and the Congress the required mobilization to support a given OPLAN, CONPLAN, or national emergency.

Joint Publication 1-0² defines mobilization as follows:

1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the reserve components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.

Crisis response will initially be met with Active Army units. Developing METT-T may require the mobilization of resources to handle unique situations and requirements. This mobilization may include activating all or part of the RC as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.

²Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 December 1989.

Ready manpower includes both retired soldiers who have completed 20 years of active service and members of the individual ready reserve (IRR). Retirees are subject to recall to active duty at any time with Secretary of the Army approval. These individuals and volunteer reservists are available under all levels of premobilization or mobilization. Volunteers from troop program units (TPUs) must be accepted very judiciously so they do not degrade follow-on units.

The President, invoking Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) authority, may order to active duty 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve (Reserve/National Guard unit members, individual mobilization augmenters [IMAs], and active guard/reserve members [AGR]) for 90 days with authority to extend an additional 90 days.

In addition to the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up, four other levels for augmenting the active forces by mobilization of the RC are *selective*, *partial*, *full*, and *total*. A selective mobilization is normally in response to a peacetime domestic crisis that is not the result of an enemy attack and should not be considered for military operations in response to external threats. The other three levels of mobilization are in response to external threat.

National conscription (the draft) may be invoked at any point in the mobilization sequence to support the expanding force structure, as determined by the Congress and the President.

Ready supplies are limited to stocks of critical supplies for issue as the industrial base expands to support anticipated sustainment requirements.

A critical element of mobilization is the acceleration of the industrial base mobilization. As the Army moves closer to being a force projection army, future conflicts will require unprecedented logistical support from CONUS.

With crisis (come-as-you-are) response the most likely scenario, the Army can no longer depend on bringing up cold production lines to manufacture ammunition or end items. The Army must depend on warm production lines to produce consumables and repairable and on war reserves and other on-hand stocks to provide those items that cannot be supplied by the industrial base.

Joint Publication 1-02 defines industrial mobilization as follows:

The transformation of industry from its peacetime activity to the industrial program necessary to support military operations.

Industrial mobilization includes the mobilization of materials, labor, capital, production facilities, and contributory items and services essential to the industrial program.

DEPLOYMENT

Deployment comprises those activities required to prepare and move the force and its sustainment equipment and supplies to the area of operations (AO) in response to a crisis or natural disaster. Deployments may be from CONUS, OCONUS, or both and may take the form of an opposed or unopposed entry. In either event, deployments are conducted in five phases: pre-deployment activities, movement to the ports of embarkation (POE), strategic lift, reception at the ports of debarkation (POD), and onward movement.

REDEPLOYMENT

Redeployment is preparation for and movement of the force and its materiel deployed from a theater to its follow-on designated CONUS or OCONUS base or to another location within the area. Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that optimizes readiness of redeploying forces and materiel to meet new contingencies or crises. The phases of redeployment are —

- Reconstitution for strategic movement.
- Movement to the redeployment assembly areas.
- Movement to the POE.
- Strategic lift.
- Reception at the POD.
- Onward movement.

DEMOBILIZATION

Demobilization is the act of returning the force and materiel to a premobilization posture or to some other approved posture. It also involves returning the mobilized portion of the industrial base to peacetime conditions.

Demobilization is executed to assure rapid reconstitution and subsequent mobilization to meet other contingencies that may arise. Demobilization is conducted in the following phases:

- Demobilization planning actions.
- Demobilization actions in the AO.

- POE-to-demobilization station or POE-to-CONUS demobilization center actions.
- Demobilization station/CONUS demobilization center actions.
- Home-station or home-of-record actions.

SUMMARY

This chapter discussed the changing environment and the resultant national military strategy. It addressed the importance of planning and executing mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization to support the combatant commander's campaign plan.