

PART ONE

Support: The Key To Operational Success

As part of a joint team, Army forces are central to the theater campaign. In today's force projection Army, planning and executing major operations to support a theater campaign are formidable tasks. Conditions are increasingly uncertain in a theater strategic environment with ambiguous and ever-widening threats. To assist the unified/combatant CINC in meeting these diverse threats, Army forces offer commanders a range of choices and options for designing theater strategy and campaigns. The challenge to an operational-level commander is to shape the military environment and set the conditions for unqualified success in all major operations. Success means decisive victory or achieving the desired political end state, whether in war or military operations other than war (MOOTW).

Chapter 1

Supporting Army Operations In Theater

Operational tempo toward achieving the CINC's strategic intent is maintained through the simultaneous application of combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS). The Army operational commander and his staff must develop comprehensive support plans focusing on the capabilities and integration of joint, interagency, and combined assets to achieve the desired operational effect and strategic results. Support at the operational level encompasses the integration of CSS assets, some combat arms organizations, and all army combat support assets in theater according to the CINC's priorities and strategic objectives. This requires the Army operational commander to integrate his allocated resources--communications, intelligence, military police (MP), engineer, civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) defense and smoke operations, supply and services, transportation, maintenance, medical, personnel, air defense (AD), and aviation—into his vision of operational battle space in consonance with the theater commander's strategic vision. The support portion of his battle space and the understanding of the higher intent encompass his own area of operations, the theater, and LOC, which will extend back to his rearmost support base but may also encompass the industrial infrastructure.

THE COMMANDER'S VISION OF SUPPORT

Today, the Army contributes to the effectiveness of our nation's responsiveness by maintaining versatile forces organized, trained, and equipped to operate across the entire range of operations in war and MOOTW.

To this end, one of the ASCC's most important responsibilities in theater operational areas on the behalf of the theater commander is to provide his forces joint and multinational force as required with effective and efficient support.

This support provides the resources to produce and support combat power in conjunction with the theater concept of operation. In other words, operational support is likewise theater strategic support and one of the key ingredients in planning and executing successful campaigns and major operations.

As the operational-level commander, the ASCC's over-arching vision of his operational area melds support, combat operations, and MOOTW into an inseparable combination. Through the exercise of battle command, the ASCC achieves the synergy required for successful simultaneous operations in depth.

In planning for simultaneity, the ASCC must understand that the army is part of a joint or unified force. The projection of army forces into theater relies on joint and multinational support in consonance with the theater commander's deployment priorities and the ASCC's recommendations. The availability of this support in the form of aircraft, ships, in-theater stocks, supplies from CONUS or another theater, and HN capabilities will affect both the CINC and subordinates' sequencing of units and the tempo of operations. Measures taken to achieve unity of effort and mutual trust with other nations—such as peacetime training exercises, interoperability, well-understood battle command structures, liaison, and

interpreters—greatly facilitate future operations.

The ASCC may find other governmental and nongovernmental agencies in theater. These agencies can act as force multipliers when the CINC delegates coordinating authority to the ASCC and his staff. Like army operations, agency operations may extend throughout the entire theater and may stretch back to CO NUS. Plans must consider including, not excluding, these valuable organizations. The CINC may direct the ASCC to assist other agencies; his responsibility for support operations may not be confined to one operational area.

Whether in war or MOOTW, split-based operations are likely. As battle space expands, the ASCC will be pulled by the equal demands of support and operations. While exercising battle command over maneuver forces, he must simultaneously track forces and equipment from mobilization stations to an intermediate staging area, if used, through the theater base and into the area of operations (AO). During this movement of forces and equipment, total asset visibility (TAV) and continuous force tracking allow the operational-level commander to exercise battle command. Establishing communications throughout his battle space allows the operational-level commander to allocate arriving forces at the point where they will have the most impact.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was a significant accomplishment for the Army. A key to this accomplishment was logistics that sustained the operational tempo by providing support where it was needed, when it was needed. Although logistics support was generally executed in accordance with current doctrine, some initial problems occurred in dealing with the mass quantities of equipment and supplies flowing into the theater. As port facilities became clogged and irretrievable decisions made

during the mobilization and deployment phases identified, support appeared to have a negative impact on operational tempo.

Improvising a solution on the ground, the ASCC formed the Army Central Command Support Command. Active and reserve component soldiers and Department of the Army civilians comprised the 22d Support Command (SUPCOM). At the peak of the operation, more than 75 percent of the soldiers were from the reserve components.

The 22d SUPCOM outlined an initial plan with three major tasks: reception, forward movement, and sustainment of all soldiers, equipment, and supplies moving into the theater. During the reception and movement phase alone, 22d SUPCOM units off-loaded more than 500 vessels and received more than 9,000 aircraft. The cargo amounted to more than 12,400 tracked vehicles, 114,000 wheeled vehicles, 1,800 Army aircraft, 33,000 containers, 1,800,000 short tons of cargo, 300,000 short tons of

Whether mobilizing for war or MOOTW, the operational-level commander tailors a force package to meet operational support requirements. Much of the operational-level CSS support structure is in the reserve components. Therefore, an MOOTW mission may require planners to build a support structure from available active component forces or through integration of reserve component forces made available from The National Guard and the Army Reserve, and in harmony with other present government and nongovernmental agencies.

In MOOTW, support forces may outnumber other friendly forces on the ground. While the basic mission of support forces remains the same across the range of military operations, the mission may dictate that the deployed support forces be the operation's main effort. Deployed combat forces may be limited to protecting support facilities, in which case, the ASCC must be even more cognizant of the strain this will impose on his battle command. Determining the correct force mix is essential to mission success.

PRINCIPLES FOR SUPPORTING CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR OPERATIONS

Support operations are designed and protected so they continue to sustain forces throughout a war or MOOTW, adapting as conditions change. At the operational level, support can be a dominant factor in determining the nature and tempo of operations. Support furnishes the means to execute the operational and theater strategic concepts. In this regard, a set of "first principles" form the basis for the ASCC to provide support to his forces during the course of a theater or subordinate campaign: operations and support integration; operational intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB); connectivity; logistics preparation of the

theater; and force protection. Details of these principles are found in Parts II, III, and IV of this manual.

OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT INTEGRATION

The integration of support concepts and operations with the ASCC's operational plan is a prerequisite to conducting successful major operations during the course of a campaign. While this integration will not guarantee theater strategic and operational success, victory is not possible without adequate support. An important step in the parallel planning process, which fosters the integration

ammunition, and 350,000 personnel. Simultaneously, the support command supplied portions of the XVIII Airborne Corps, which had arrived prior to the establishment of an infrastructure. They also planned future operations, including the movement and sustainment of two corps.

The task of moving two corps to their attack positions was an equally notable accomplishment. For example, in a single corps were more than 7,000 tracked vehicles and more than 40,000 wheeled vehicles, requiring 1,300 HETs,

450 lowboys, and 2,200 flatbeds for transportation.

These tasks could not have been accomplished if not for the SUPCOM's innovative force tailoring and the donations and loans of equipment from Europe, Japan, and Egypt and host nation assets. The uninterrupted lines of communication, coupled with the efforts of combined partners and the joint cooperation of sister services, allowed the SUPCOM to get combat forces where the operational-level commander needed them in an expeditious manner.

In addition to demonstrating the magnitude of activity the ASCC must incorporate into his vision of battle space, this example represents the total force at its finest. The enemy's passive attitude and inability to disrupt the logistical buildup gave the Army time and space to accomplish the support mission. As a power projection force with increased possibility of fighting a more aggressive enemy, the ASCC must ensure planners consider the "first principles" for supporting campaigns and major operations.

of operations and support, is the development of thorough staff estimates that compare the support capabilities required with the available assets. These assets are not limited to Army assets, but include joint and strategic assets available to the ASCC. The end result of these estimates is an accurate visualization of the current enemy and friendly situation, a succinct mission statement, a well-articulated statement of the ASCC's operational intent, and a clear expression of support alternatives. These alternatives will consist of tailored support packages that meet the ASCC's operational intent and the needs of his forces. By determining the capability to meet the totality of support requirements within the theater, the ASCC can accomplish two critical tasks: determine feasible courses of action for the campaign or major operation and build flexibility into his operational plan to shift priorities of effort, if and when this becomes necessary.

OPERATIONAL IPB

Operational IPB is a key tool available to the ASCC and his planners in determining feasible courses of action (COAs) and developing a concept for each major operation of a campaign. IPB at the operational level aids in identifying how to attain assigned military objectives based on the assessment of enemy capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities. These military objectives are the basis for determining intelligence requirements to support the operation. Intelligence planners develop a collection plan that assigns these requirements to the various joint and combined intelligence systems in the theater—systems that concentrate on collecting information, analyzing that information, and disseminating it in a timely manner.

Forces deploying into a theater during the early stages of an operation must have accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence to enhance their survivability, lethality, and overall effectiveness. Besides having an accurate picture of the enemy and terrain throughout the ASCC's battle space, these early deploying forces must obtain intelligence that addresses the significant political, economic, industrial, demographic, cultural, and psychological features of the operational

area. Thus, the ASCC must include how to satisfy his overall intelligence requirements for the mission in the force tailoring considerations, either by providing early arriving intelligence units, ensuring connectivity with national assets, or both.

CONNECTIVITY

Effective communications and computer systems that ensure connectivity throughout the ASCC's battle space are vital to planning, mounting, and sustaining a successful major operation. Operations, CSS, and intelligence all depend on responsive systems that tie together the various aspects of joint and multinational operations. The ASCC must maintain an unbroken chain of rapid, reliable, and secure communications with his subordinate commanders and the combatant CINC during all phases of a campaign. To perform his battle command responsibilities, the ASCC needs home-station, en-route, and in-theater communications means that are secure, reliable, and timely. These means must also be compatible with the mix of supporting forces and services within the region, including civilian agencies of the United States government.

LOGISTICS PREPARATION OF THE THEATER

Logistics preparation of the theater base and the COMMZ is a key tool available to the ASCC and his planners in building a flexible theater strategic operational support plan. It consists of the actions taken by logisticians at all echelons to optimize means—force structure, resources, and strategic lift—of logistically supporting the ASCC's plan. These actions include identifying and preparing forward operating bases; selecting and improving LOC; projecting and preparing forward logistics bases; and forecasting and building operational stock assets forward and afloat. They focus on identifying the resources currently available in the theater for use by friendly forces and ensuring access to them. A detailed logistics estimate of requirements, tempered with logistics preparation of the theater, allows the command logistician to advise the ASCC and the CINC of the most effective method of providing support that will

not overwhelm the force or fail to provide adequate, timely support.

More often than not, the identification and preparation of an initial lodgment or support base will have a major influence on the course of the campaign. Lodgments should be expandable to allow easy access to strategic sealift and airlift, offer adequate space for storage, facilitate transshipment of supplies, and be accessible to multiple LOC. Thus, lodgments are often established near key seaports and airports in the theater. Logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations may augment undeveloped or damaged facilities or provide ports where none exist. Conducting LOTS operations from anchorages becomes more important if the enemy has the capability to deliver long-range, highly destructive fires. Split-based operations are often a requirement during the establishment of an initial lodgment. Enhanced communications permit the accomplishment of certain logistics management functions from CONUS or from a forward presence location, requiring the deployment of only those capabilities that are absolutely necessary. This concept of split-based operations was used quite successfully in 1993 by the JTF SUPCOM during the initial stages of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Then, the JTF SUPCOM commander was certain that priority electronic transmissions could be sent back and forth between a forward material management center (MMC) cell in Somalia and the CONUS (home station) MMC supporting the operation from Fort Hood. By relying on split-based operations, the JTF SUPCOM commander reduced the quantity of support resources that had to be stockpiled forward.

Seldom will an initial lodgment or support base contain the ideal mix of desired characteristics. The ASCC must make difficult choices when organizing support for the theater of operations. One of the most difficult is whether to stockpile supplies forward in the theater or rely on “just-in-time” throughput from CONUS or an intermediate staging base. For example, stockpiling places supplies in relatively close proximity to units in the combat zone (CZ), but may place a burden on the theater support structure in terms of having to move, protect, and handle large quantities of support resources on a repetitive basis. On the other hand, while just-in-time throughput reduces this burden significantly, it is highly dependent on the availability and responsiveness of limited airlift assets to deliver critical supplies in a timely manner to ensure that fighting forces are able to sustain the desired operational tempo. The ASCC must weigh the risks and benefits of both of these options and then decide which can best fulfill the support requirements of his operations plan. Depending on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) factors, the ASCC may transition from one option to the other or adopt a combination of both.

The selection and improvement of LOC are essential aspects of maintaining uninterrupted logistics support throughout all phases of an operation or campaign. The operational commander must understand the relationship between stockpiles, time, LOC, and forward combat power. Time spent in deliberate preparation—projecting and preparing forward logistics bases and stockpiling resources in them—can result in shorter LOC

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

General MacArthur's decision to continue with the X Corps' Wonsan landing despite ROK I Corps' capture of the port on 10 October was to have logistics repercussions Eighth Army. For the first half of October, nearly all the Inchon port facilities were busy loading

out the 1st Marine Division and unable to off-load ships for Eighth Army. Therefore, supplies had to continue to come all the way from Pusan. Levels of stocks were at times reduced to one day's supply. This situation continued until after mid-November. Eighth Army needed 4,000 tons of

supplies a day for offensive operations, and this level of supply was not achieved until 20 November. Lieutenant General Walker was forced to advance into North Korea with only I Corps, leaving IX Corps behind until the logistical situation improved.

and greater operational capability in the future. This was the case in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm where bases were positioned forward as part of the CINCs strategic concentration to support future operations. On the other hand, the age-old problem of overextended LOC and supply shortages can have a detrimental impact on a large force trying to conduct offensive operations. Eighth Army operations in Korea during the fall of 1950 are an example of what can happen when this problem occurs.

The ASCC has certain support responsibilities that derive from his position in the chain of command. In one case, the CINC directs how the ASCC will furnish logistics support for the benefit of the joint force. For example, he may task the ASCC to furnish the military police (MP), medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), medical, communications, intelligence, civil affairs (CA), or psychological operations (PSYOP) support for the joint force. The ASCC is also the sole provider of the theater logistics command and control (C²) and infrastructure. In another case, regardless of the command arrangements within the theater, the ASCC retains responsibility for certain service-type functions such as furnishing logistical support and supply Classes I, HI, V, and VIII for all forces in the theater, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance.

FORCE PROTECTION

One of the ASCC's most important responsibilities is to conserve the fighting potential of his force so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place. Operational

protection includes protecting the force from enemy air, ground, and sea attack. In safeguarding operational forces, the ASCC constructs significant fortifications, conducts electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), integrates air defense coverage, implements NBC defensive measures, and conducts rear operations. Since operational maneuver and the exploitation of tactical success often depend on the adequacy of a force's sustainment capability, the ASCC must mass, economize, and secure rear forces with much the same thought process that goes into the maneuver of combat units. The CINC may designate the ASCC as the joint rear area coordinator (JRAC), thereby giving him responsibility for coordinating and maintaining the overall security of the joint rear area (JRA) as directed. The JRAC is a critical link in coordinating security, establishing intelligence and counterintelligence support, and establishing communications with all forces in the JRA. The JRAC creates a secure environment in the JRA to facilitate sustainment, host nation support (HNS), infrastructure development, and joint force movements. He is also responsible for providing intelligence support for the JRA and establishing sufficient communications to accomplish his tasks, planning for the reality that the JRA will not be contiguous with the CZ. One task that the JRAC must not overlook is his requirement to coordinate closely with the area air defense commander (AADC) who has operational control of the theater army air defense assets. This coordination is essential because air defense at the operational level is concerned primarily with protecting the theater base with its critical points and facilities—ports, key bridges, operational C² facilities—in the COMMZ and forces moving through the COMMZ.